



Daily Report

East Asia

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Japan

Foreign Ministry Suspends Grant Aid to Burma

OW1301074289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0626 GMT
13 Jan 89

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 13 KYODO—Japan is suspending a 927 million yen aid grant to Burma because it is regarded as being under military rule, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

The government approved the assistance to Burma last July but it has not yet been provided because of subsequent unrest there.

Japan has not recognized the Government of Prime Minister Saw Maung, an army general who took office after a coup last September.

The assistance had been intended to help Burma purchase medical equipment and telephone switchboards, ministry officials said.

WPK Delegation To Visit in January

Reaction to DPRK Statement

OW1201113189 Tokyo KYODO in English 1105 GMT
12 Jan 88

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—North Korea will send a (North) Korea Workers' Party delegation to Japan as early as January 21 as guests of the Japan Socialist Party, political sources said Thursday.

The sources said the members and itinerary of the delegation are not known. The mission will attend the largest opposition party's convention scheduled for January 23-25.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Keizo Obuchi told an evening news conference the same day that the Japanese Government is ready to hold talks with the delegation on issues pending between Japan and North Korea.

Japan hopes to win an early release of two Japanese seamen detained in North Korea on espionage charges since November 1983, government sources said.

North Korea's ruling party promised a JSP delegation last September to send a mission to Japan by October, but no such mission has been sent to date.

Meanwhile, North Korea's official KOREAN NEWS CENTRAL AGENCY (KCNA), in a report monitored here Thursday, rejected Japan's overtures for upgraded contacts, saying that the current "abnormal situation" precluded government-level talks.

A top-level Japanese Foreign Ministry official expressed regret over the KCNA report that rejected government-level meetings between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

The official, however, speaking on condition of anonymity, added that he took note of the fact that the North Korean Government expressed its hope for developing bilateral relations.

The official reiterated Japan's readiness to hold direct talks with North Korea to improve bilateral relations. The two countries have no diplomatic links.

Group To Arrive 21 January

OW1301075789 Tokyo KYODO in English 0657 GMT
13 Jan 89

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 13 KYODO—A (North) Korea Workers' (communist) Party mission will arrive in Tokyo on January 21 for a week-long visit to Japan at the invitation of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), JSP Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi said Friday.

It will be the first visit to Japan ever by a delegation from the North Korean ruling party.

Yamaguchi told a press conference that the largest Japanese opposition party received a message from North Korea Friday morning stating that it will send a delegation to Japan from January 21 as it had promised.

Yamaguchi said the mission will comprise four or five members but that their names are not yet known.

The Japanese Socialists and the North Koreans will discuss frankly how to promote bilateral relations between Japan and North Korea, he said.

Among the topics expected to be covered are Japan's request for North Korea to release two Japanese seamen detained on espionage charges in North Korea since November 1983.

Yamaguchi said he will urge the government to issue visas for the delegation without setting any conditions.

The delegation may attend the JSP convention scheduled for January 23-25 in Tokyo if they want to do so, he said.

Ho Tam, a former foreign minister and currently secretary of the North Korean party, promised Yamaguchi in Pyongyang last September that the party will send a working-level mission to Japan by October last year and a high-level delegation in 1989.

But the North Korean party did not send such a mission last year.

The JSP is the only Japanese political party maintaining friendly ties with North Korea, with which the government has no diplomatic ties.

On Thursday, Chief Cabinet Secretary Keizo Obuchi told a press conference that the government is ready to hold talks with the North Korean mission to settle pending bilateral problems.

Takeshita Says PRC Ties To Remain in Heisei Era
OW1201182589 Tokyo NHK Television in Japanese 0300 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Prime Minister Takeshita had a talk this morning with China-Japan Friendship Association President Sun Pinghua who is currently visiting Japan. Both agreed to continuously work to make further progress in Chinese-Japanese friendship.

At the talk, President Sun Pinghua first expressed his regret over the death of the former emperor. In reply, Prime Minister Takeshita expressed his appreciation for courteous telegrams of condolence sent by President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng. President Sun Pinghua also said that Japanese-Chinese relations entered a new stage after Prime Minister Takeshita's visit to China last year and that we hope for the continuation of Chinese-Japanese friendship during the new era of Heisei. Prime Minister Takeshita replied that the amicable relations between Japan and China will not change at all in the Heisei era either, and we hope to extend friendship between the two countries into Asia and the world. Thus, he shared the opinion with President Sun Pinghua that the promotion of Japanese-Chinese friendship shall continue in the Heisei era.

Emperor Wanted Long U.S. Occupation of Okinawa
OW1201184589 Tokyo KYODO in English 1206 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Naha, Jan. 12 KYODO—People of Okinawa Thursday expressed great shock at a report that the late Grand Chamberlain Sukemasa Irie's diaries confirmed the deceased Emperor Hirohito's wish for a prolonged U.S. occupation of Okinawa which was Japan's only battleground in the Pacific war.

Choho Zukeran, chairman of the Okinawa Shakai-Taishu Party, said only Okinawa went under long occupation by the U.S. forces because the late emperor "sold the island" and he bore "great responsibility" for that.

RYUKYU SHIMPO, a local daily, said Thursday Okinawa may have been "abandoned" in order to save the rest of Japan, while a local progressive party said that the late emperor should be held responsible for Okinawa's long U.S. occupation lasting from 1945 to 1972.

The morning edition of the ASAHI SHIMBUN on Wednesday reported that in his diaries, Irie wrote that the emperor admitted he had asked the U.S. forces to continue their occupation in 1947.

RYUKYU SHIMPO said that it was heartrending for the people of Okinawa to learn that the emperor, according to Irie's diaries, said Japan escaped the fate of becoming a divided nation, when Okinawa was separated from mainland Japan. The paper wondered how the emperor felt about Okinawa.

OKINAWA TIMES said the view that "for the security of Japan, Okinawa can be sacrificed" has existed throughout the years, from the time Okinawa was a battleground to this day.

Gisho Funakoshi, a 63-year-old writer who said he mourned the emperor's death as a citizen, was saddened that the will of Okinawa has always been ignored. He said the emperor system involves serious problems that must be addressed.

A Japanese academic wrote in 1979 that such a message by the emperor existed, but it was disputed whether it reflected the will of the emperor himself or that of his aides.

More Countries To Send Envoys to Hirohito Funeral
OW1201155089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0943 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—Australia, Bhutan, Norway, the Philippines, Tonga and West Germany will send head of state-level mourners to the February 24 state funeral for Emperor Hirohito, who died last Saturday, Foreign Ministry officials said Thursday.

The representatives are Governor General-Designate Bill Hayden of Australia, King Wangchuck of Bhutan, Crown Prince Harald of Norway, President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, King Tupou IV of Tonga and President Richard von Weizsaecker of West Germany.

Japan received the formal notifications from the six countries on Thursday, the officials said.

This brought the number of countries sending representatives to Japan to 10, in addition to one international organizations, ministry officials said.

Hayden, who will assume the post of governor general on February 15, will be accompanied by his wife Dallas. Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus will accompany President Aquino.

Other mourners to come to Japan are U.S. President-elect George Bush, Britain's Prince Philip and Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, Belgian King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola, Finland's President Mauno Koivisto, Honduras' President Jose Azcona Hoyo and Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Conterras, Indonesian President Suharto, and Swedish King Carl XVI Gustaf and Queen Silvia.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), will send Jean-Claude Paye, its secretary general.

30,000 People To Be Granted Government Amnesty
*OW1201193789 Tokyo KYODO in English 1342 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—The government is preparing to grant amnesties to about 30,000 people in connection with the state funeral of Emperor Hirohito, to be held on February 24, government officials said Thursday.

Among those likely to be granted amnesties, which will be applied to a total of 17 different criminal offenses, are about 3,500 violators of the Alien Registration Law.

The government said that of the total figure about 10,000 are people who have been charged over the last five years with violations of various gambling laws.

In addition to the amnesties, about 11 million other petty criminals will either be released, have their sentences reduced, be freed from parole or have their civil rights restored.

The government said, however, that violators of the Election Control Laws would not be eligible for amnesties, a decision largely influenced by the need to divert public criticism away from politicians and government officials, many of whom have been implicated in the Recruit stock scandal currently rocking the Japanese political world.

Takeshita To Respect Spirit of Defense Budget
*OW1201135589 Tokyo KYODO in English 1028 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 12 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita told labor leaders Thursday that his cabinet will respect the spirit of the 1976 cabinet decision to hold down Japan's defense budget below 1 percent of its gross national product (GNP).

Takeshita made the remark in separate meetings with leaders of Japan's two largest labor organizations, Rengo and Sohyo.

Japan's defense budget exceeded the 1-percent-of-GNP ceiling for two consecutive Fiscal Years 1987 and 1988, after the government of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone scrapped the 1976 policy.

The prime minister told the labor leaders he understands Chinese and Southeast Asian apprehensions about the boost in Japan's defense budget but that Japan's self-defense forces are firmly under civilian control.

The government allocated 3,700.3 billion yen in defense outlays for fiscal 1988 ending March 31 this year, amounting to 1.013 percent of Japan's projected GNP.

Takeshita promised efforts to curb soaring land prices and housing costs in Tokyo and its environs and other big cities, both Rengo and Sohyo officials said.

Twelve union leaders from Japan's largest trade union Rengo and 10 leaders from Japan's second largest union Sohyo attended the separate meetings with Takeshita at the prime minister's official residence.

Among the union leaders attending were Toshifumi Tateyama, chairman of the Japanese Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (Rengo), Seigo Yamada, secretary general of Rengo; Takeshi Kurokawa, chairman of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) and Eikichi Magara, secretary general of Sohyo.

LDP Political Reform Panel Established

*OW1301075589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0655 GMT
13 Jan 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan. 13 KYODO—The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita on Friday established a 41-member panel on political reform, LDP officials said.

Masaharu Gotoda, the former chief cabinet secretary, who chairs the panel, said his group will, among other things, discuss redistribution of constituency seats in the House of Representatives and a tightening of controls on fund-raising parties.

The LDP panel will also study restrictions on transactions of unlisted shares by politicians, he said.

Takeshita, who concurrently serves as LDP president, has repeatedly said that political reform will be one of two major tasks he will tackle after winning Diet approval in December of six tax bills which included one to impose a 3 percent consumption tax. The other is the "furusato" (hometown) national development plan.

Takeshita says he is considering a revision in the election system, establishment of higher political ethics, and tighter controls on political funds as political reform targets.

North Korea

Chon Kum-chol on 'Team Spirit', Detente
*SK1301050689 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0435 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[“ ‘Team spirit’ Joint Military Maneuvers Going Against Dialogue Must Be Given up Unconditionally”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—If the United States and the South Korean authorities are truly interested in detente and dialogue, they must unconditionally

give up the "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers which conflict detente and run against dialogue, declared Chon Kum-chol, head of the North side delegation to the Panmunjom meeting of North-South parliamentarians for the preparations of a North-South joint parliamentary conference, in his press statement dated January 12.

Chon Kum-chol said that the South side, far from taking effective measures for detente and dialogue, announced in the beginning of the year that it would stage "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers with the United States as scheduled, aggravating the situation of the county and beclouding the atmosphere of dialogue.

Considering the reckless and adventurous military maneuvers of the United States and the South Korean authorities to be an open challenge to the sincere efforts of the North for detente and dialogue and to the desires of the Korean people and the world peaceloving people for peace and peaceful reunification of Korea, he bitterly condemned them.

He continued:

The United States and the South Korean rulers openly declared that they would hold bellicose "Team Spirit" military exercises, throwing a wet blanket over the future of the maturing dialogue. This shows that they pay lip service to detente and dialogue outwardly, but seek, in actuality, to lay artificial hurdles in the way of North-South dialogue by aggravating the situation.

Although the United States and the South Korean authorities describe the "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers as something for "defense," there is no doubt that they are an attack rehearsal and "preliminary nuclear war" for a preemptive strike on the North, the other party of dialogue, in view of the armed forces and military equipment involved, content and nature of the maneuvers.

Whether the United States and the South Korean authorities stage the "Team Spirit" joint military maneuvers or not will be a touch-stone distinguishing whether they seek confrontation and war or want dialogue and peace on the Korean peninsula.

Denounces 'Team Spirit' Exercise

*SK1301063189 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2200 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Statement by Chon Kum-chol, head of the North side's delegation to the Panmunjom meetings between parliamentarians from the North and South for the preparation of a North-South joint parliamentary meeting—read by announcer]

[Text] I cannot tolerate [muginhada] the announcement by the United States and the persons in authority in South Korea about the plan to conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise this year, too, as in the previous year.

As stated even in the statement released by the spokesman for our Ministry of People's Armed Forces, many rounds of the Panmunjom meeting between the parliamentarians of the North and South to prepare for North-South joint parliamentary talks were held during the last year and, as a result, a prospect for convening a full-dress meeting was opened. Also, various channels of talks such as high-level North-South political-military talks, student talks, and sports talks have been placed on the calendar and, as a result, the situation as a whole began to flow in a propitious direction toward detente and dialogue.

Seeing the South side agree to our proposal for holding North-South joint parliamentary talks to discuss the issue of announcing a joint declaration of nonaggression and hearing it talk about the relaxation of detente and peace at every opportunity, we came to believe that the South side would now refrain from undertaking acts of aggravating the confrontation and tension.

Motivated by a desire as such, our delegation proposed to the South side at the seventh meeting the discussion of the issue of halting the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise as the priority agenda item at the meeting of the North-South parliamentary delegates to make a success of the North-South joint parliamentary meeting at an early date and to lead other forms of talks to success.

The South side, however, is now rendering the situation in the country tense and diluting the atmosphere of dialogue by announcing, from the start of the new year, together with the United States that they would conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise as planned, instead of taking effective measures for detente and dialogue.

We have stated on many occasions that the large-scale war exercise designed to strike at the opposing party is incompatible with dialogue and that they do not sit well with each other. This is also a fact well demonstrated by past lessons.

This notwithstanding, the United States and the South Korean ruling clique, while pouring cold water on the future of the dialogue which was moving to a good maturity, announced at the outset of the new year that they would conduct an openly belligerent "Team Spirit" war exercise. This shows that they are, in fact, about to lay artificial obstacles to North-South dialogue by way of rendering the situation tense while superficially babbling about detente and dialogue.

I resolutely denounce the scheme of the United States and the persons in authority in South Korea to conduct this reckless and adventurous war exercise as an open challenge to our sincere efforts for detente and dialogue and the desire of our fellow countrymen and the peace-loving people of the world hoping for peace in Korea and its peaceful reunification.

Although the United States and the persons in authority in South Korea make an excuse that the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise is for defensive purposes, there is no question that it is an offensive exercise as well as a preliminary nuclear war to mount a preemptive strike at us, the opposing party in the dialogue, in view of the size of the troop contingent and the military equipment to be put into the exercise and its substance and contents.

At a time when we not only have taken the measure of unilaterally reducing troops to remove the tension between the North and South and have recently put forward an all-inclusive peace proposal and proposals for multifaceted negotiations and have been making every sincere effort possible to realize them, the U.S. and the South Korean authorities are about to conduct landing operations, river-crossing operations, and (surprise operations) after massing a vast number of troops and military equipment of offensive purposes in South Korea from the continental United States, Guam, Okinawa, and the Philippines. The goal behind this is not to deter somebody else's strike, but, on the contrary, to strike at us.

If the adventurous "Team Spirit" joint military exercise that threatens and provokes the opposing side in the dialogue is carried out, the various channels of North-South talks ripening after turns and twists will once again be endangered and the U.S. and the South Korean authorities will have no alternative but to take full responsibility for it.

If the United States and the South Korean authorities are really interested in detente and dialogue, I strongly call on them to unconditionally halt the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise that runs counter to detente and dialogue.

Whether they conduct the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise or not will serve as a touchstone determining whether the U.S. and the South Korean authorities pursue confrontation and war on the Korean peninsula or hope for dialogue and peace there.

[Dated] 12 January 1989, Pyongyang

Paper Urges U.S. To Accept Talks Proposal
SK1301103589 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1021 GMT 13 Jan 89

[("The United States Must Alter Anachronistic Policy Towards Korea"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—If the United States is truly interested in peace in Korea and its peaceful reunification, it must not pursue its "two Koreas" policy and stage provocative war manoeuvres, but look squarely at the actual reality on the Korean peninsula in which the tendency towards national reunification has become an irresistible trend, alter its Korea

policy in keeping with the trend, stresses NODCNG SINMUN today in an article titled "United States Must Alter Anachronistic Policy Towards Korea."

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught:

"The U.S. must not pursue its "two Koreas" policy as ever but look squarely at the actual situation on the Korean peninsula in which the tendency towards national reunification has become the irresistible trend, alter its Korea policy in conformity to the trend and, as a manifestation of its readiness to do so, accept, above all else and as soon as possible, the proposal of the tripartite talks we have made."

The author of the article says:

The U.S. imperialists set it as the bedrock of their Korean policy to freeze and perpetuate the division of Korea and keep the military occupation of South Korea by creating "two Koreas".

Letting loose a string of absurd and shameless sophistry that the U.S. forces are present in South Korea for the "security" there as a "deterrent" to "threat from the North," they are steadily reinforcing armed forces in and around South Korea, expanding their nuclear base there and escalating provocative military exercises against the DPRK.

The U.S. imperialists pursue such splitist policy as "cross contact" and "cross recognition" and intensify political and diplomatic offensive in order to create "two Koreas".

They are now leaving no stone unturned to make a breakthrough for "cross contact" and "cross recognition", while zealously pushing ahead with the puppets' "northern policy" behind the scene and cooperating with them in an all-round way.

The U.S. imperialists' policy towards Korea to perpetuate its division and keep hold on South Korea as a colony and military base for an indefinite period by creating "two Koreas" is an anachronistic policy which is entirely contradictory to the national desires and demands of the Korean people and going against the trend of the situation.

The wrong policy of the U.S. ruling quarters in occupying South Korea and obstructing the reunification of the Korean nation brings a big disgrace to the U.S. people.

The international situation as a whole, too, is now gradually heading for a relaxation thanks to the persistent struggle and positive efforts of the world's peace-loving forces and a new phase is opening where regional disputes are settled in a peaceful way.

The Korean question should be naturally resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation in keeping with the trend of relaxation.

In order to correctly solve the Korean problem, the four principles for the guarantee of peace on the Korean peninsula and a package of peace proposals put forward by the DPRK should be realized. To this end, tripartite talks involving the DPRK, the United States and South Korea, parties concerned, should be held as soon as possible.

There is no excuse for the United States, a direct party concerned which is responsible for the solution of the Korean question, to evade it.

It must not ignore but respond without delay to tripartite talks repeatedly proposed by the DPRK.

With nothing can the U.S. imperialists justify their anachronistic policy towards Korea and there is no excuse or ground whatsoever for them to keep their aggression forces in South Korea.

U.S. Commander Allegedly Suppresses Workers
SK1301043289 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0421 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The commander of the U.S. Seventh Air Force in South Korea reportedly ordered the "labor superintendent" of the Air Force unit to submit a "blacklist" to suppress the South Korean workers involved in a strike demanding a stop to violations of human rights.

Last year about 3,300 workers of South Korea employed at U.S. Air Force bases staged protests with an 8-point demand including a stop to human rights violations by the U.S. force's side, and went on a strike when the U.S. force's side refused to accept this demand.

Their struggle is a resolute and inevitable protest to defend the personality of workers and the dignity of the nation and can never be an object of suppression.

But, the U.S. imperialist aggressor's scheme to suppress the south Korean workers under the pretext of "disciplinary punishment," lording it over in South Korea.

No Issues 'Suppressive' Order to Home Minister
SK1301043689 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0424 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u on January 10 ordered the puppet home minister to "strongly counter" the anti-U.S., anti-fascist struggle of students and workers for independence, democracy and vital rights, branding it as an "illegal violent act," according to a report.

This suppressive order coincides with the reinforcement of police force, intensification of campus surveillance and frequent terrorist acts against workers in different parts of South Korea.

This shows that the fascist clique, upset by the growing struggle of the people for independence, democracy and reunification, is more viciously resorting to bayonet-brandishing to block it from the beginning of the year.

Dailies Comment on Order

SK1301103889 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1032 GMT 13 Jan 89

[“Horrible Bayonet Policy”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u, while receiving a report on "business plans" for this year recently from all departments of the puppet administration, blared that "utmost efforts should be made", "legal order be established" and the "leftist violent forces be punished" "for the defense of the liberal democratic system."

A commentary of NODONG SINMUN today says this is a suppressive order on directing the spearhead of the "state policy" of the puppet administration for this year to the suppression of the people's struggle for independence, democracy and reunification.

The news analyst notes:

The traitor's blaring suggests what bloody developments will take place this year in South Korea.

Surprise raid on the campus and brutal terrorism against workers are openly committed from the outset of the year. This clearly shows the criminal nature of the suppressive moves of the traitor No Tae-u.

Though he tries to cover the wholesale suppressive offensive under the mask of "democracy", it only further reveals his color as a crafty and vicious military dictator.

If the No Tae-u group does not want to meet such an end as that of its preceding dictators forsaken by the times and the people while brandishing bayonets in suppression, it had better deport itself with discretion.

The author of a MINJU CHOSON commentary says that the traitor No Tae-u clamoured about intensifying the suppression by the fascist laws this time, fully revealing his nature as a dictator challenging democratisation.

Paper on Improving Japan Relations
SK1301052889 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0456 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—If Japan truly wants improvement of relations with us, it should apologize to the Korean people for the crimes it has committed in the past, abrogate the "treaty" it signed with South Korea recognizing the latter as the "only legitimate government" on the Korean peninsula, immediately renounce its policy hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its anti-DPRK campaign, and desist from joining the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets in their moves toward division and war.

MINJU CHOSON today says this in a signed commentary on the Japanese authorities' recent talk about "improvement of relations" with the DPRK.

As for the "improvement of relations" between the DPRK and Japan, it is just what we have called for all along, the commentary says, and stresses:

However, the DPRK-Japan relations have failed to be improved to date entirely because of the Japanese government's policy hostile to the DPRK.

The commentary fully digs open the seamy side of the Japanese Government's policy hostile to the DPRK.

The Japanese Government has pursued its one-sided policy, from the very beginning, adopting unfriendly attitude toward the DPRK.

In 1950 when the U.S. imperialists unleashed a war of aggression against our Republic, the then Yoshita government took a direct part in the Korean war. In the 1960s and 1970s the Japanese reactionaries had been dead set against our Republic and worked round the clock with the anti-DPRK campaign by availing themselves of the Nixon's doctrine that "Asians should be made to fight among themselves." Their malicious moves have become more undisguised in recent years. At the time of the "KAL incident" they groundlessly took issue with our Republic and carried on a campaign against the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon) while trying hard to isolate our Republic in the international arena.

Clamouring about "cross recognition" and "simultaneous U.N. membership," they are trying overtly and covertly to drive a wedge among socialist countries, realize the "two Koreas" plot and perpetuate the division of Korea.

They are also strengthening the tripartite military alliance with the United States and the South Korean puppets. These days they are extolling the "northern policy" of the South Korean authorities and assisting them to push it into effect and craftily scheming to dampen North-South dialogue.

The commentary emphasizes:

How can the Japanese authorities have the face to talk about improvement of relations with us, while bringing the DPRK-Japan relations to such a high pitch of aggravation and carrying on the anti-DPRK campaign openly?

People view such shameful behavior of the Japanese authorities as an insidious one to conceal their anti-DPRK manoeuvres and pursue their one-sided policy on all accounts while pretending to go in step with the trend of the times toward dialogue and detente.

May the "gentlemen" of the Japanese authorities ask the question; how can this be interpreted otherwise than an overbearing act?

We have a lot to settle accounts with Japan, but, proceeding from the desire of the Korean and Japanese peoples and the need of our foreign policy in principle to have good neighbourly relations with all friendly countries, the neighbours in particular, we have made and are making all sincere efforts to develop relations with Japan.

Yet, the Japanese authorities who always advertise "prescience" with a voluble talk about "advanced nation" and "intellectual" are trying to flout the world's public opinion under the barbed signboard of "improvement of relations," in spite of themselves. Do they mean they had no idea of this stand of the DPRK?

If their talk about "improvement of relations" is not a superficial one for insidious purposes, it means that they want to develop relations with our Republic while its sovereignty and dignity are encroached upon. This is unthinkable.

Our people regard chajusong as what keeps them alive and never tolerate such acts as infringing on their sovereignty or interfering in their home affairs.

There has been and will be no change in this stand of the DPRK, a dignified state independent and sovereign.

CPRF Declares No North-South Trade
SK1301045289 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0430 GMT 13 Jan 89

[*"There Is No Economic Exchange Between North and South, Declares CPRF"—KCNA headline*]

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in its Information No. 523 dated January 12 denounced the South Korean authorities for conducting these days a false propaganda as if there were unofficial economic exchange between the North and the South.

The information says:

Some time ago, the puppets announced that they imported anthracite and aquatic products from the North through a third country. Entering the new year, they are making much ado, claiming that they would import gold bars, magnesite, talcum, myongtae, liquor and ginseng (Insam) from the North and that they are making "brisk contacts" to export electronic products and chemical goods of south korea to the North.

This is a sheer lie and a false propaganda for a sinister political purpose.

In fact, there have never been any economic exchange between the North and the South and not a ton of coal or aquatic products of the North has been sold to the South.

The South Korean puppets' blatant propaganda about fictitious "trade" with the north is aimed at creating a favorable condition for having "two Koreas" legitimised.

With a view to justifying the "northern policy" which is shunned everywhere and putting it into effect at any cost, the puppets are resorting to a despicable trick, spreading false reports about "trade dealings" between the North and the South.

Their acts show what an empty one the "northern policy" is and how miserable they look in their attempts to carry it into practice.

If the South Korean rulers are truly interested in improvement of relations and exchanges between the North and the South, they must rather pay attention to the solution of the basic problems in creating conditions for economic cooperation and exchange between the North and the South than talk about fictitious "trade dealings."

Activities of Pak Song-Chol in Cuba

Attends Havana Rally

SK1301105189 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
2200 GMT 9 Jan 89

[Excerpt] A central rally was held in Havana, the capital of Cuba, on 4 January in celebration of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution.

Comrade Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, and president of the Council of Ministers; and other leaders and cadres of the party and state; older revolutionaries, and model workers were present at the central rally.

The party and government delegation of our country led by Comrade Pak Song-chol, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice president of the state, and other foreign delegations and representatives were invited to the central rally. Comrade Fidel Castro spoke at the central meeting. [passage omitted]

Meets With Fidel Castro

SK1301105389 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
1300 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Text] According to a report from Havana, Comrade Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, and president of the Council of Ministers, met Comrade Pak Song-chol, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice president of the state, who was, at the head of the party and government delegation of our country, on a visit to Cuba to attend the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution.

On the occasion, the head of the delegation conveyed the warm congratulatory greetings which the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il sent to the respected Comrade Fidel Castro.

Comrade Fidel Castro expressed deep gratitude and asked the head of the delegation to convey to the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and dear Comrade Kim Chong-il his warm greetings, wishing their good health and long life.

On the occasion, conversations were held in a friendly atmosphere.

Comrade Jorge Risquet, member of the Politburo, and secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, was on hand.

Meets Raul Castro

SK1301110189 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
1300 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Text] The party and government delegation of our country led by Comrade Pak Song-chol, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice president of the state, which was on a visit to Cuba to attend the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution, sojourned in the country from 30 December to 8 January.

On 8 January, the head of the delegation met and conversed with Comrade Raul Castro, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, first vice president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, first vice president of the Council of Ministers, and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Earlier, on 5 January, the delegation visited the museum on the Isl. of Youth, where the history of Comrade Fidel Castro's struggle is shown.

On 6 January, the delegation visited Holguin city.

Pak, Delegation End Visit
SK1301110589 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
1300 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Text] The party and government delegation of our country led by Comrade Pak Song-chol, member of the Political Bureau of WPK Central Committee and vice president of the state, which had attended the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution, left Havana on 8 January.

The delegation was seen off at the airport by Comrade Raul Castro, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, first vice president of the Council of State of the Republic of Cuba, first vice president of the Council of Ministers, and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Comrade Jorge Risquet, member of the Politburo, and secretary of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; and other functionaries concerned.

The delegation was seen off also by Pak Chung-kuk, ambassador of our country to Cuba, staffers of the embassy, and functionaries of the SKNDP mission in Cuba.

Pak Returns to Pyongyang
SK1301104589 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1036 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The party and government delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Pak Song-chul, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and vice-president, returned home today by air after participating in the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution.

It was met by Yi Chong-ok, member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and vice-president, and other officials concerned.

It was also met by the Cuban ambassador to Korea and charges d'affaires ad interim of the GDR and Soviet Embassies here.

Auditing Committee Member Yi Chong-sik Dies
SK1301121789 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0109 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] [Summary of Comrade Yi Chong-sik]

[Text] Regrettably Comrade Yi Chong-sik, member of the WPK Central Auditing Committee, died of illness at 0930 on 12 January 1989 at the age of 63.

While working in agricultural field for a long time, the Comrade dedicated all of his wisdom and energy to implementing the party's agricultural policy.

The comrade, firmly arming himself with the party's monolithic ideology, remained endlessly loyal to the party and the leader until his last moments.

Although Comrade Yi Chong-sik passed away, his merits dedicated to our party and the revolutionary cause will be immortal.

[Dated] 12 January 1989

[Signed] the WPK Central Committee

Minister Holds Concert for Foreign Envoys
SK1301044289 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0426 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The Ministry of Culture and Art arranged a concert at the Mansudae Art Theatre on January 12 for foreign diplomatic envoys in Pyongyang on the new year 1989.

Present at the performance with the guests were Minister of Culture and Art Chang Chol, Minister of External Economic Affairs Chong Song-nam, Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries Yi Mong-ho, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-chu, other officials concerned and working people in the city.

At the concert, instrumental music, songs and other pieces were performed by artistes of the Mansudae Art Troupe.

The performance was warmly acclaimed by the audience for its high ideological and artistic value.

A floral basket in the name of the diplomatic corps was presented to the artistes for their successful performance.

Foreign Ministry Gives Party for Ambassadors
SK1301044689 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0428 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Pyongyang January 13 (KCNA)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a party for foreign diplomatic envoys in Pyongyang last evening on the occasion of the new year 1989.

Present there were First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-chu and others.

Speeches were made at the party.

SKNDF Sends New Year Message to People
SK1301062489 (Clandestine) *Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0300 GMT*
1 Jan 89

[SKNDF Central Committee new year message to the people—read by announcer]

[Text] Dear fellow countrymen:

Another year has gone and the dawn of the new year has broken on the road of the arduous anti-U.S. antifascist nation-saving struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification. The SKNDF sends militant new year greetings to the youths and students, who have defended the forefront of the anti-U.S. antifascist nation-saving struggle along our patriotic vanguard, and to the workers, peasants, intellectuals, religious figures, and all other people of all circles and classes who have gallantly struggled in the plaza of the people struggle.

In retrospect, 1988 was a year of arduous struggle during which confrontation and clashes grew and expanded between the fascist colonial force and the patriotic democratic force over the issues of power transfer and unilateral hosting of the Olympics.

Last year, our people's antifascist struggle for democracy was further deepened into the struggle to end the military rule and establish a new democratic civil government. Early in the year, our masses' antifascist struggle for democracy, which had been rekindled from the struggle opposing the deceptive transfer of power, was deepened into the struggle against the general elections. Then, it was expanded into the struggle against the Olympics of dictatorship and division and developed into the struggle to liquidate the irregularities of the Fifth Republic, thus driving its clone, the No Tae-u military government, to take a defensive position and into a corner.

In particular, riding the tide of the growing fever of democracy, the labor movement was further galvanized and the workers' political movement was newly highlighted, thus making the colonial military rule face an even more serious crisis.

Last year, our masses' reunification movement achieved a new development. Our masses' fever of reunification, which began to grow with the occasion of a wall poster acting as a fuse, was finally spread to the nation-saving reunification plaza through the self-immolation struggle, was linked with the struggle for the cohosting of the Olympics, and was developed into the struggle to hold the North-South students talks on 10 June and 15 August.

The whole country seethed under the slogans of reunification "Let us go To the North!" and "Come to the South!" and amid the inaugural rallies for the North-South student talks and the cross-country march. Under these circumstances, the spirit of collaboration-with-communism reunification began to grow on the soil, which was frozen by the anticommunist policy for 40-odd years; government-controlled debate of reunification, which was confined in the compound of Chongwadae, was spread to the masses; and the reunification movement, which was rising in the hearts of the people, was highlighted as a practical task of the nation-saving struggle.

Last year, our masses' anti-U.S. struggle for independence was expanded to an even more popular struggle. Anti-U.S. consciousness grew and the anti-U.S. movement surfaced among all circles and classes. As a result, the anti-U.S. struggle was further intensified, the nation-saving struggle was closely linked with the anti-U.S. struggle, and finally the anti-U.S. slogans calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops among other things were put forth as social issues.

Amid the blood-stained struggle of our masses, the chuche idea, the publicly acknowledged trend of the era, spread among all circles and classes with irresistible attraction and became the concept of guidance for the reform movement. Along this course, more of the cores of the new generation have emerged, the reformist force has made its new debut, and the main force of the nation-saving movement has become formidable. As a result, in the nation-saving movement of our masses, a strong foundation has been established for the development of the struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification.

This is a success worthy of close attention, which was won in the nation-saving struggle of our masses. At the same time, this is a precious gain.

However, in the anti-U.S. antifascist nation-saving struggle of our masses, there were still weak points to be overcome for a new leap and there were due lessons to be drawn.

The popularization of the nation-saving movement is a key to all victories. Nonetheless, despite the people's urgent wish and aspiration for reunification, scientific strategies and tactics were not worked out and diverse struggle methods were not developed to turn the reunification movement into a popular struggle. As a result, the struggle remained declaratory and failed to win a final success.

Carrying out the struggle to the end is an essential requirement to seize the initiative in confronting the enemies and to expand the nation-saving struggle in realizing the final objectives. Nonetheless, last year, the antifascist struggle was not persistently expanded into a struggle without letup by foreseeing the maneuvers of the

enemies and by raising the consciousness of the masses, not into the struggle to arrest traitor Chon Tu-hwan, the ringleader of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic, and to overthrow the No Tae-u military government through endless offensive. As a result, the enemies were allowed to recover their breath, and the fighting spirit of the masses was damped.

Our fellow countrymen, this year is the last year of the eighties. The U.S. domination, the fascist rule, and the division of the nation, which began in the 1940s, cannot be allowed to extend into the nineties. On the soil of our country, our people should live not as slaves of foreigners but as masters of their destiny, not as prisoners of dictatorship but as the sovereign of a democratic government, and not as sufferers of a divided nation but as consanguineous people of a reunified nation. This is the mission of the history of the nation and the order of the era.

This year, our nation is facing an important historic task to open a new phase in the nation-saving struggle for independence, democracy, and reunification. The anti-fascist struggle of democratization to overthrow the No Tae-u military government and the struggle to smash the two-Koreas maneuvers must be stepped up, and this must be developed into the anti-U.S. struggle to drive out the U.S. troops. This is the basic direction of our nation-saving struggle for this year.

Currently, with the deceptive statement of apology by Chon Tu-hwan, with the special statement by No Tae-u, and with the superficial party-government shake-up and amnesty, Chongwadae is scheming to bridge over the crisis by covering up the misdeeds of the Fifth Republic and to establish the foundation of security of the military government through a government-manipulated vote of confidence.

Therefore, the issue of the misdeeds of the Fifth Republic and the issue of the vote of confidence are issues of acute confrontation and clash between the fascists and democrats, where a choice between sham democracy and true democracy can be made.

Our masses must not miss this opportunity but continue to expand the struggle to eradicate the remaining forces of the Fifth Republic. By so doing, we must arrest and punish Chon Tu-hwan and we must bring his clone, the No Tae-u ring, to the trial of the people and overthrow the Sixth Republic to establish a democratic civil government.

Our major goal of this year's nation-saving struggle is to smash the two-Koreas scheme of Chongwadae.

Currently, at home, with the so-called theory of national community, the No Tae-u ring is scheming to make relations between the North and South a community between states like the European Community. At the same time, in the international community, with the

northward policy, it is scheming to freeze the state of national division through relations with socialist countries, and to legalize two Koreas through diachronic cross-recognition and diachronic UN entry.

Therefore, completely exposing the No Tae-u clique's deceptive theory of national community and the essence of its treacherous northern policy and smashing its two Koreas plot is a life-and-death task that should not be delayed even for a moment to prevent the crisis created in the wake of the current trend of East-West detente and to open the road of national reunification. All compatriots who love the country and the nation should gallantly join in the struggle to smash the No Tae-u clique's policy of creating two Koreas and to pioneer the road of achieving reunification through collaboration with communism, while correctly knowing the North.

The anti-U.S. struggle is the general goal of the national salvation movement. The U.S. colonial rule is the source of all evils on this land. The anti-U.S. struggle for independence precisely constitutes a short way to overthrow the military dictatorship, to realize genuine democratic politics, to prevent the crisis of permanent division, and, thus, to provide a new turning point for national reunification. This is why all of our national salvation struggle is conducted on the track of, combined with, and directed toward the anti-U.S. struggle for independence.

All patriotic forces should vigorously join in the anti-U.S. struggle to expel the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from this land, to oppose the U.S. pressure on South Korea to open its markets, to liquidate the U.S. colonial domination over South Korea, and to judge and punish the ringleaders of the Kwangju massacre.

The heavy task assigned to the movement of our masses this year shows that it is ever more urgent to strengthen the main struggle forces and to effect a new innovation in the struggle method. All national salvation movement organizations and their core elements should ideologically indoctrinate the masses through the consciousness-raising activity, should provide the ideological foundation for the national salvation movement with the chuche idea, should rally the masses through organizational work, and should develop the mass movement into a political party movement by founding a progressive political party. The unity of all patriotic democratic forces and the popularization and vitality of the struggle of these forces are directly related to the success of the national salvation movement of this year. If and when the patriotic democratic forces become divided before the enemies, this means a road of self-ruination.

Our patriotic democratic forces should not be divided simply because of differences in their ideologies, views, and struggle methods, but should firmly unite under the banner of the anti-U.S. and antifascist struggle for national salvation and should form one united front for their joint struggle.

To minimize the national salvation struggle is to embark on the road of defeat. We will renounce a (?vanguard-type), adventurous, and radical struggle in which individuals venture themselves and will wage a positive mass struggle which fights hand in hand with and together with the masses. Giving up halfway in the struggle means defeat. Once a struggle has started, we should not give up halfway but should struggle to the end until we achieve our goal.

The road of struggle is arduous. However, victory stands at the side of our masses struggling for independence, democracy, and reunification. Let us all hold aloft the banner of the just anti-U.S. and antifascist struggle and greet the new dawn of independence, democracy, and reunification through a nationwide national salvation struggle.

[Signed] The Propaganda Bureau of the SKNDP Central Committee

[Dated] 1 January 1989, Seoul

South Korea

Weekly on North's Chemical Warfare Capability
SK1301020289 Seoul *THE KOREA HERALD* in English
13 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] London (YONHAP)—North Korea maintains the third largest chemical warfare capability in the world, Jane's Defense Weekly reported Wednesday.

The weekly, quoting an American military specialist, said North Korea has produced chemical weapons, utilizing agro-chemical products imported from Japan since 1964.

According to the British weekly, North Korea organized its first biological and chemical troops in 1954, when the nation was provided with basic technologies, instruments and products needed for biological and chemical warfare by the Soviet Union and China.

The north expanded its production of chemical weapons in the 1970s, aided by the Soviet Union.

In the early 80s, North Korea began deploying the chemical weapons, including poison gas, and 9,900 soldiers, 1.1 percent of the North Korean armed forces, are now assigned to the chemical warfare units.

The weekly added there are factories to manufacture chemical weapons in eight places in North Korea, including Pyongyang, Chongjin and Hungnam.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for Japanese agro-chemical business circles denied the report his country has exported chemical products to North Korea which can be used for manufacturing chemical weapons.

Educational Directives on Portrayal of North
SK1001041389 Seoul *YONHAP* in English
0302 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 10 (YONHAP)—Amid mounting calls for more dialogue instead of rivalry between South and North Korea, South Korea's educational authorities have decided to adopt new educational directives aimed at projecting North Korea not as a rival but as an "undeniable brother."

The Education Ministry has decided to direct teachers in primary and secondary educational institutions to shift the main emphasis of their lessons on North Korean affairs to a new direction that may help younger students obtain a better understanding of the homogeneity of the Korean people in both Koreas.

Pupils have so far been taught to associate North Korea with an image of a hostile rival of South Korea since the peninsula was divided for ideological reasons four decades ago.

Ministry officials explained the new directives are aimed at preventing the younger generation from being confused with the contradictory values of traditional anti-communist education versus the incumbent government's initiatives seeking reconciliation with the Pyongyang regime and other socialist-bloc countries.

Official sources said Tuesday that the ministry will begin an earnest evaluation of a relevant draft policy guideline worked out by the Korea Educational Development Institute (KEDI) to finalize detailed directives concerning education on North Korean affairs.

The KEDI draft, meanwhile, emphasizes that the Korean war of 1950-53 should be projected not as a pretext for stimulating enmity against North Korean communists but as a past fact that can be useful for enhancing the younger generation's determination to deter any war.

Midterm Evaluation of No's Performance

Opposition Drafts Statement
SK1301071889 Seoul *YONHAP* in English
0659 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 13 (YONHAP)—Korea's opposition leaders are likely to issue a joint statement containing their positions on interim evaluation of President No Tae-u's performance and other major political issues at the conference slated for Jan. 24.

Opposition sources said Friday drafting of the joint statement had already begun and chief policymakers of the three opposition parties will finalize it when they meet on Jan. 20 to prepare for the conference of opposition leaders.

The timing and details of the proposed interim appraisal of No's presidency as well as the introduction of a special prosecutor system to probe the wrongdoing perpetrated during former President Chon Tu-hwan's rule will be contained in the document, according to the sources.

The opposition parties—the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP)—are engaged in a tug of war with the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) on those issues. Though they are regarded to agree in principle on those issues, approaches to solving them vary among the opposition parties.

The opposition leaders to show up at the "three Kims' meeting" are PPD President Kim Tae-chung, RDP President Kim Yong-sam and NDRP President Kim Chong-pil.

'Orthodox' Method Urged

SK1301021289 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
13 Jan 89 p 3

[By staff reporter Sim Yong-su: "DJP Set To Meet Mid-Term Challenge"]

[Text] A high ruling party lawmaker yesterday said President No Tae-u will keep his promise to undergo a midterm evaluation.

"I strongly believe No should choose an 'orthodox' method for his interim appraisal. I have no doubt he will overwhelmingly win in view of his solid popularity," Yi Tae-sop told THE KOREA HERALD in an exclusive interview.

Head of the Democratic Justice Party's think-tank, the Research Institute on State Policies (RISP), Yi said his belief is shared by many other DJP lawmakers as well as a majority of his constituents.

The interim evaluation, which No promised to call at a campaign rally in Seoul Dec. 12, 1987, is expected to become the biggest political issue this year.

No said he would step down if he lost the midterm evaluation, though he and his party have since neither confirmed nor denied the statement.

Yi, however, said the DJP has yet to decide on how and when No's interim appraisal should be conducted.

He said the RISP and other DJP organizations are studying the matter, and a final party decision is expected by March at the latest.

"The difficulty lies in the fact that there was no precedent of a midterm evaluation in the Republic's history, and no clause of the Constitution stipulates it," Yi said.

Science and technology minister under disgraced ex-President Chon Tu-hwan, Yi said he was not in a position to say that the interim appraisal should become a vote of confidence, as the opposition once demanded.

"If No happens to lose, though it is unthinkable at the present stage, he will certainly get irresistible pressure to quit from both inside and outside the party," Yi said.

If he wins by an overwhelming margin, he said, it will put an end once and for all to the opposition's questioning of the legitimacy of his government and solidify his powerbase.

The opposition, particularly radical college students and dissidents, have refused to recognize the government's legitimacy because No won just 37 percent of the vote in the presidential election.

The opposition once demanded that No's interim evaluation be a vote of confidence, but recently withdrew the demand without explanation.

Analyzing the opposition's sudden change of stance, some DJP lawmakers said it was prompted by the growing likelihood that No would overwhelmingly win a national referendum.

Opposition leaders Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam led a campaign to make No's interim evaluation a vote of confidence till last December.

As to recent reports that the DJP is trailing the three opposition parties in popularity, Yi replied, "It is partly true."

"It is true that our party lost popularity in recent months. But we are not behind all three opposition parties. To my knowledge, at least one party is behind us," Yi said.

The recent parliamentary hearings on the Chon administration dealt a big blow to the ruling party, Yi said.

The ruling party stood to gain nothing from the nationally televised hearings, in which opposition lawmakers asked questions aimed not to elicit answers but to discredit the DJP, he charged.

The DJP will regain its popularity gradually as the unprecedented fever over the hearings subsides, Yi said.

Korea's "northern policy," Yi said, will make steady progress as long as socialist nations continue their open-door policy.

Between Beijing and Moscow, Beijing is likely to be the first to open formal diplomatic ties with Seoul in view of the geographical proximity and historical relations between Korea and China, Yi said.

Yi showed keen interest in Korean participation in development projects in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.

"Japanese and Americans are reportedly hesitant to join the Siberian projects. But if Koreans decide to, they will do the work successfully, in view of their experience in the Middle East," said the head of the ruling party's key decision-making organization.

Chong Chu-yong, founder and honorary chairman of the Hyundai business group, is in Moscow to discuss Siberian development projects with Soviet officials.

Moscow on several occasions, through official and unofficial channels, has invited Seoul to join the Siberian projects.

Turning to the inauguration of President George Bush in the United States, Yi said the traditional friendly relations between Seoul and Washington will remain firm under the new administration.

"Both President Ronald Reagan and Bush are Republicans. I don't expect any major change in Washington's Korean policy after Bush takes office.

Yi leaves for Washington Jan. 17 with four other DJP lawmakers, including Secretary-General Yi Chong-chan, to attend Bush's inauguration.

Trade friction will remain a key issue between Seoul and Washington but it is not expected to aggravate, Yi said.

"We did our best to reduce friction. As evidence, we boosted the import liberalization rate to 95 percent over the last few years," Yi said.

On the inter-Korea talks, Yi warned against excessive optimism and pessimism.

Noting that Pyongyang cited the Team Spirit exercise as a key obstacle to parliamentary talks, he said, "They are not yet ready to sincerely discuss with us a breakthrough."

Prosecution To Conduct Probe of Chon Aides

SK1101104689 Seoul YONHAP in English
1034 GMT 11 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 11 (YONHAP)—The prosecution has reportedly decided to wage a thorough investigation into the past actions of former President Chon Tu-hwan's key aides as part of its efforts to liquidate "irregularities" involving Chon's administration, prosecution sources said Wednesday.

Prosecutors Wednesday summoned Rep. Yi Hak-pong of the Ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), former senior presidential secretary for civil affairs, for questioning on whether he exercised his influence in the scandalous takeover of an insolvent steel mill by another.

Public suspicion has it that the former key aide to Chon became involved in Dongkuk Steel's takeover of the property rights of the Yonhap Steel and Iron Company in March 1985.

Yonhap's former owner has reportedly claimed during recent prosecution questioning that Yi used his influence in pressing him to concede his ownership of the mill to Dongkuk. Yi is also accused of having threatened a businessman to turn over his ownership of a truck terminal firm to another businessman for money.

The prosecution said that it would arrest Yi on charges of blackmailing should he be found to have abused his power.

The prosecution plans to summon several other close aides to Chon to wrap up its probe of irregularities committed during Chon's administration, prosecutors said. Chon stepped down from the presidency last February.

Those to be summoned by the prosecution reportedly include Chang Se-tong, former director of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), Korea's top intelligence organization, Ho Mun-to, former senior presidential secretary for political affairs, Yi Won-cho, ex-president of Korea Petroleum Development Corp., and Yi Sang-chae, former vice secretary-general of the ruling DJP.

The prosecution has been tracing real estate holdings and bank accounts of Chon's close associates, prosecutors said.

Meanwhile, justice minister Ho Kyong-ku said Tuesday that the prosecution were detaining a group of 43 persons, including nine former cabinet members, in connection with its ongoing crackdown on the alleged wrongdoing involving leading figures of the past government. Some of them have already been prosecuted, he added.

The prosecution plans to finalize, by the end of this month, its probes of irregularities and wrongdoing allegedly involving Chon's government, prosecutors said.

Meanwhile, opposition parties have accused the prosecution of having been only beating about the bush by refraining from tackling Chon's own misdeeds.

Chon Urged To Testify

SK1301085289 Seoul YONHAP in English
0846 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 13 (YONHAP)—Opposition leader Kim Yong-sam reiterated Friday that former President Chon Tu-hwan should appear at parliamentary hearings to testify on alleged misdeeds during Chon's seven-year presidency.

"Mr. Chon's candid testimony at the National Assembly would only be a key to an early liquidation of Fifth Republic irregularities," Kim said during a press luncheon.

Kim, who heads the opposition Reunification Democratic Party, said testimony by former Presidents Chon and Choe Kyu-ha, the introduction of a special prosecutor system and punishment of core figures of the past Chon government are prerequisites for eradication of the negative legacies of the Chon era.

Kim's remarks seem to contrast with an earlier hint by the RDP that it would not insist on the two former presidents testifying at the assembly hearings if the ruling party accepts the opposition's call for introduction of special prosecutors.

The largest opposition Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) has also called for the special prosecutor system but the ruling Democratic Justice Party opposes it.

Regarding the controversial interim appraisal of President No Tae-u, Kim insisted that No be subject to the evaluation "for the sake of the No government's morality and legitimacy."

He also said the interim appraisal should be conducted in the form of a national referendum, which he said would enable the people to directly evaluate No's achievements in liquidating negative vestiges of the past government and in pushing for democratic reforms.

The interim assessment, a pledge by No during his 1987 presidential campaign, has emerged as a major political issue, the outcome of which could have a substantial impact on the domestic political scene this year as well as the future of No's presidency. No promised that he would step down if he failed to win public support for his presidency through the appraisal.

DJP Member Arrested

SK1301013089 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
13 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] Yi Hak-pong, 51, a lawmaker of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, was formally arrested yesterday for abusing power in the course of transferring ownership of Union Steel Mfg. to the Tonguk Steel Mill in 1985.

Yi, former senior secretary to former president Chon Tu-hwan in civil affairs, was charged with malfeasance.

According to the special prosecution task force probing irregularities of Chon's regime, Yi stubbornly denied the power abuse charges in the ownership transfer all through the interrogation.

But the prosecutors could seek Yi's arrest warrant based on ample evidence, including testimonies from Kwon Chol-hyon, former owner of Union Steel.

The prosecutors also found that Yi had received a large sum of money for political funds from Chang Sang-tae, Tonguk Steel chairman, just before the general elections in April last year.

Yi was elected a lawmaker on the DJP ticket from the electoral district of Kimhae, Kyongsangnam-to, in the polls.

The prosecutors suspected that the money was a kind of "reward" for Yi's "cooperation" in the ownership transfer.

Yi's act of receiving money does not constitute the crime of accepting bribery because Yi was no longer a government official at the time of the donation. But, he can be punished on charges of violating a law governing political fund donation, the prosecutors said.

The prosecutors said that they confirmed the fact of Yi's influence-peddling at the time of the ownership change, from Yim Chang-yol, former high-ranking official of the Finance Ministry, and Yi Sok-chu, former president of the Korea First Bank.

The ex-presidential secretary pressured them to have the former owner of Union Steel sell his share of stocks worth 1.6 billion won to Tonguk Steel, they were quoted as saying.

Meanwhile, another prosecution team yesterday summoned Kim Chu-ho, former director of the Office of Supply, to question him on the U.S. rice purchase scandal of 1981.

The interrogation focused on why he changed abruptly the U.S. rice suppliers and purchased rice at higher than the international standard price.

The prosecutors also plan to call in Yi Won-cho, former president of the Petroleum Development Corp., shortly for questioning to determine whether he misused the corporation fund, while serving as head of the corporation from 1980 to 1986.

Yi, former chief financial advisor to Chon and now a DJP lawmaker, has been suspected of having misappropriated a considerable portion of the fund consisting of revenues from imported oil.

For the investigation, prosecutors yesterday summoned two officials of the corporation for interrogation.

Hyundai Chairman Returns From USSR

SK1301105989 Seoul *YONHAP* in English
1026 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 13 (YONHAP)—South Korean businesses, including Hyundai Construction Co., are expected to actively participate in the Soviet Union's Siberian development projects, Chong Chu-yung, honorary chairman of the Hyundai business group, said upon his return from the Soviet Union Friday.

The leading industrialist in Korea said in a press conference shortly after his arrival at the Kimpo Airport that he and Soviet officials had agreed to promote South Korean enterprises' participation in the construction of thermoelectric and hydroelectric power plants in Siberia.

He said that he had met with senior Soviet officials in Moscow and Leningrad to discuss Korea's participation in Siberian development projects, comprising exploitation of energy resources and forests.

Chong said that he and V.L. Malkevich, chairman of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, exchanged written agreements to establish a private-level economic cooperation committee between the two nations by the end of February to promote economic cooperation including Korea's participation in Siberian development projects.

Chong also said that a group of South Korean business leaders will visit the Soviet Union in March at an official invitation of the socialist country.

Chong left here on Jan. 6 for Moscow at the invitation of Malkevich, who visited Seoul in mid-December.

Chong is scheduled to visit Pyongyang late this month, which will mark the first time for a South Korean businessman to openly visit the North since the Korean war ended in 1953.

Embassy-Level Ties To Begin With Hungary
SK1301023089 Seoul YONHAP in English
0209 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Seoul, Jan. 13 (YONHAP)—Hungary and South Korea will issue a joint communique on Feb. 1 to declare the establishment of diplomatic relations at embassy level, a senior official at the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

With the communique which will be issued simultaneously in Seoul and Budapest, Hungary will be the first communist nation to have ambassador-level diplomatic ties with South Korea, the official said. The two nations exchanged permanent missions last October and December, respectively.

Horn Gyula, Hungarian vice foreign minister, is expected to visit Seoul in late January to sign the joint communique and an agreement on the opening of embassies in Seoul and Budapest, said the official, who declined to be identified.

As a preparatory step for the ambassador-level relations, Sin Tong-won, South Korean vice foreign minister, made an official visit to Budapest last month and reached an agreement to conclude the matter at the earliest possible date.

Meanwhile, South Korea and Hungary, which have already signed an investment protection pact, reportedly will conclude agreements as early as possible on double taxation avoidance, culture and education, and science and technology.

Education, Economic Ministers Brief No
SK1301014489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
13 Jan 89 p 2

[Text] President No Tae-u directed yesterday a stern step should be taken against universities which do not exert their utmost efforts to earnestly protect educational functions from campus unrest.

Voicing his worries about the tendency of campus disturbances to end up in radical violence, No said firmly, "The government should no longer let them go unchecked."

The Chief Executive handed down the instruction in a New Year business briefing by Education Minister Chong Won-sik at Chongwadae. Later in the day, he received a briefing on the plans of the Economic Planning Board by Deputy Premier-Economic Planning Minister Cho Sun at the presidential mansion.

He also directed stern government action against "unlawful and violent" labor disputes. But he said, basically, the solution to labor-management problems has to be left in the hands of both sides.

No made the order in a briefing on New Year plans of the Economic Planning Board at Chongwadae, foreseeing that labor unrest will erupt during the upcoming spring season when negotiations on wages between workers and employers will take place.

Saying that it is actually difficult for the government to intervene in all labor disputes, No said that labor unrest at state-run agencies and defense industries should be dealt with first.

No stressed that entrepreneurs have to be encouraged to share a greater part of the pie with workers, improve welfare for employees and make voluntary contributions to help under-privileged people.

The Chief Executive also instructed that the first priority should be given to stabilizing prices and curbing real estate speculation.

He said that the government should strive to keep of [as published] consumers' price hikes under 5 percent and wholesale hikes under 3 percent this year.

Four Independent Lawmakers Join DJP

*SK1301014689 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
13 Jan 89 p 3*

[Text] Four independent lawmakers have joined the ruling Democratic Justice Party, pushing the number of its parliamentary seats to 129, but still 21 shy of a majority.

The four were Yi Hae-ku, Hong Hui-pyo, Ko Se-chin and Yi Ki-pin.

In a joint statement, they said they were convinced that President No Tae-u's policy seeking reform amid stability is the most desirable political line.

At present, Kim Tae-chung's Party for Peace and Democracy has 71 seats, Kim Yong-sam's Reunification Democratic Party has 60 seats and Kim Chong-pil's New Democratic Republican Party has 35 seats. There are four remaining independents in the 299-member parliament.

Changes in Dissident Community Structure Viewed

*SK1301100089 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
8 Jan 89 p 3*

[Article by Pu Chi-yong: "Dissident Community To Unify; the Chonminyon Is the Eye of the Hurricane"]

[Text]

Limits of Mintongnyon [United Mass Movement for Democracy and Reunification] Ability Revealed

As 1989 gets under way, the political climate increasingly favors a reorganization of the dissident community. The eye of the hurricane in this regard is the Chonminyon [National People's Democratic Movement League—Chonkuk Minchok Minchu Untong Yonhap], a mass umbrella organization of dissident groups to be organized officially on 21 January 1989. In the wake of the presidential election at the end of 1987 and the National Assembly elections of April 1988, the dissident community was riven by competing perceptions of the prevailing situation and by intense disagreements over tactics, but as 1988 progressed, a chorus of voices rose in the dissident community demanding "organization of our capabilities."

In response to such demands, attempts were made to create combined, permanent struggle organizations formed from smaller dissident groups in a move to concentrate active "struggle capabilities" within regions, disciplines, and social classes. The trend was to foster a growing sense of unity: In June 1988 dissidents formed the "Fatherland Peaceful Unification Movement Council" [Chokuk Pyonghwa Tongil Untong Hyopuihoe]; in August they put together the "Pan-National Conference Promotion Council" [Pom Minchok Taehoe Chuchin Ponpu], which in October was subsumed by the new "Struggle Headquarters for the Kwangju Massacre and for the Arrest and Punishment of the Masterminds of

Fifth Republic Scandals Chon Tu-hwan and Yi Sun-cha" [Kwangju Haksal-okong Piri Chupom Chun Tu-hwan Yi Sun-cha Pupu Kusok Chopolul Uihan Tuchaeng Ponpu].

As the process of unification unfolded, limits on the executive ability of the Mintongnyon, whose activities were centered largely in provincial areas, began to emerge. Leaders of regional dissident organizations began to join with activist organizations in the same region to form organizations whose names began with the name of the locality followed by "Regional People's Democratic Movement League." Sometimes the "council" was used in place of the "league." On 22 December 1988 a meeting of the Promotion Council established a "National People's Democratic Movement League Preparatory Committee" which in turn decided to hold a conference on 21 January 1989 to officially establish the Chonminyon. The preparatory committee also appointed a temporary executive group on 22 December. The executive is headed by a secretary general, former chairman of the Seoul Democratic Struggle League Yi Pu-yong. Former Minchongnyon [Democratic Youth Association] Chairman Kim Kun-tae was appointed temporary director of the Office of Policy, and chairman of the Seoul Masses League Yi Chae-o was appointed to head the Conference Administrative Subcommittee and concurrently serve as official spokesman.

Meanwhile, the 15th session of the preparatory committee's representatives met on 4 January 1989 and agreed that the name of the new dissident combined organization would be "National People's Democratic Movement League," Chonminyon. A source with ties to the Promotion Committee said 15 umbrella organizations are promoting the Chonminyon and that the committee estimates that the number of individual organizations involved reaches 150. The committee is "hopeful" that the number of major representative groups will reach 20 and the number of individual constituent groups, 200.

Sources involved in promoting the Chonminyon say that the new organization will include regional organizations such as Seoul's Minhyop [Mass Democratic Movement], and that the Chonminyon will boast an impressive "ability to mobilize the masses" because it will number many student organizations in its fold. Sources claim that the Seoul Area General League of Student Councils and the Pusan Area General League of Student Councils have already joined.

Whether or not the Chonminyon attracts large numbers of student organizations, in fact it already includes a large number of key, broadly based dissident organizations, such as the Mintongnyon, which have participated in Korea's recent "mass movements." Rather than the usual narrow foundation linked to the name value of a few famous dissidents, the Chonminyon, in fact, is based on laborers and farmers, the "bottom floor power of the masses." The people attracted to the Chonminyon criticize existing opposition political parties, branding them

with epithets like, "They're only establishment parties." The prospect is that the Chonminyon will inaugurate an era of independent, reformist politics.

Although the Chonminyon claims it will represent all regional dissident organizations, such weighty organizations as the Democratic Labor Union Council and the National Teachers' Council point to the Chonminyon's "politicized nature" as justification for not joining. Observers believe the political nature of the Chonminyon saddles it with a built-in "restraint."

National Assembly Deputies With Dissident Backgrounds Deny Rumors

The dissident movement, however, has been building up a head of steam over the last 6 months, demanding unification of the dissident community. Created on 21 January 1989, the Chonminyon will answer the dissidents' need for unity and will serve as a global center for the progressive political community as well. The Chonminyon, therefore, will produce a strong "gale" of pan-activism directed against establishment politics.

As the dissident community rushes toward unification, a tug of war has developed between Chonminyon figures on the one hand and "older former dissident figures" on the other. Chonminyon people approach the "former dissident figures" who won PPD or RDP seats in the April 1988 National Assembly elections and say, "You can come back now." Meanwhile dissidents who have been part of the "establishment" for a longer period counter with, "Hey, its better over here than we thought. Come and work with us."

The "progressive political coalition" views the Chonminyon as the womb from which a legal progressive party will issue, so even as these organizations work to establish themselves as "subordinate elements" of Chonminyon, they have been pushing hard to rally or persuade "old comrades" to join them, and this has become common knowledge among the established opposition parties. Thus optimistic "rumors" have circulated recently at the periphery of the Chonminyon to the effect that, "Large numbers of PPD and RDP deputies with dissident backgrounds plan to participate in the founding of a progressive political party." This presumption of a "reorganization of the opposition camp" is denied by assembly deputies with dissident backgrounds, the very men about whom the rumors speculate, who respond with comments like, "Exaggerations. Distortions. Nothing more than overblown rumors."

Assemblyman Mun Tong-hwan, executive director of the Peace Research Center, an independent organization composed of 11 PPD deputies with dissident backgrounds, said on 7 January 1989 that, "The proverb says smoke does not stream from a chimney when no fire burns below. But these rumors have grown to the point where we've got to change the proverb to, 'Smoke can

stream from a chimney even when no fire burns below.'" Mun flatly denied the rumors: "This kind of talk has absolutely no basis in fact."

Pointedly, one PPD source said, "Wouldn't it be more desirable for the dissident community to join us rather than the other way around?" He noted that, "Actually, one deputy who received an invitation to join the progressive liberal camp responded with, 'We welcome anyone from progressive politics who wants to join the PPD.'"

Moreover, according to a different source, PPD assembly deputies with dissident backgrounds looked down the road at political changes in the offing and, in the 2 months prior to last December's release of political prisoners, undertook to approach, directly and indirectly, those prisoners regarded as likely candidates for release, meeting with them in prison, taking them food, and trying to build good will in an attempt to convince them to join the PPD.

Some Say "It's Too Early"

In this ongoing tug-of-war, both sides are saying, "Join our side." Those being wooed—assembly deputies with dissident backgrounds and released political prisoners—respond with, "It's too early." Since they don't express their intentions beyond that, rumors and speculation abound.

It is noteworthy that one former dissident who is now a PPD assembly deputy addressed the tug of war issue by stressing that the political reality is that the PPD is "based firmly on dissidents."

This assemblyman emphasized that, "United under a goal to improve the quality of the PPD, the cooperative structure of former dissidents within the PPD is firmer now than ever before."

In direct contrast, the logic of the dissident side's insistence on PPD limitations is based on criticism of the "scheme to remodel the PPD."

Observers agree that during the 1987 presidential election, forces in the dissident community who sympathized with President Kim Tae-chung's relatively liberal views adopted a "position of disapproving support" of the PPD. These people believed they could join the PPD and later mold it into a progressive party. Now, however, dissident figures "outside the establishment" have given up not only on the "scheme to remodel the PPD" but on support for the PPD in any form because after the elections the PPD switched priorities, laying primary emphasis on getting Kim Tae-chung elected president, switching too much emphasis to the middle class in a bid to expand its voter base. Thus, after the National Assembly elections, those elements within the dissident camp who advocated that the activist voice must be raised independently carried the day.

Interest in the PPD's Approach to the Socialist International

Seen from this viewpoint, intense interest is focused on the PPD now because of perceptions that the PPD's recent push to join the Socialist International as an observer was somehow related to changes in the political situation outside the PPD itself. Actually, on 7 January President Kim Tae-chung said of the Socialist International issue that, "The PPD has never discussed this on the official level." But Kim then added, "However, it is a fact that PPD executives have discussed it on the individual level." Even without President Kim's statement, the 1 January 1989 edition of the PPD party newspaper and a report of the proceedings of the PPD's International Committee issued at the end of 1988 both clearly raised the Socialist International issue, triggering instant negative reaction from elements promoting a progressive political party.

A leader of progressive politics who is promoting the formation of the Chonminyon revealed his "displeasure," saying, "If the PPD goes so far as to take away the Socialist International, what does that leave for us?"

When the Socialist International issue became public, however, Kim Tae-chung backed off, even though review of the question of joining as an observer had reached the point where it was mentioned in an official PPD report. Kim said, "Its under review at the working level." This is noteworthy because of the view in some quarters that lately President Kim displays a readiness to draw a line between the PPD and the dissident camp side.

Possibility of a "Reform Era"

Once the Chonminyon is formally organized, the Korean political scene will change. The establishment will be composed of four conservative political parties and the antiestablishment figures will have carved out a niche as a progressive political force. The Korean people will then face the prospect of being urged to make a choice between conservative politics or progressive politics. Observers believe that before the year is out the desire of the activists to formally inaugurate a progressive political party will have come to fruition, propelled by the concerted action of the "three forces" and the need to get the progressive party underway before local autonomy is implemented. The "three forces" include 1) the influence of existing progressive political groups, 2) those figures inside the newly-created Chonminyon who plan to make it a political power, and 3) opposition party members who sympathize with the activists' line: National Assembly deputies, opposition party executives, and opposition party local committee chairmen who are not assembly deputies.

Thus, if these dissident efforts come to fruition, then the possibility exists that a link will be forged between dissidents and National Assembly political parties, or at least that there will be room for "cooperation" between

Chonminyon and liberal figures active in the conservative political parties in the National Assembly. I would say, then, that a clear possibility exists that the Korean people will witness the rising of the curtain on a new "conservative reformist political era."

Monthly Reviews Opposition Strategies SK1001075889 Seoul SINTONG-A in Korean 1 Jan 89 pp 236-245

[Article by Han Tong-yun: "The Opposition Parties' 1989 Strategies for Winning Chongwadae"]

[Text] Many anticipate that 1989, the second year of the Sixth Republic, will be a period of profound importance in Korean politics. Each political party, whether opposition or government, has differing views on the interim evaluation, but observers expect President No Tae-u to conduct the interim evaluation as he promised the public, although the form the evaluation will take is not yet certain. Meanwhile, efforts to reveal the truth about Fifth Republic scandals and the Kwangju Democratization Movement eventually will end as well, and after a 27-year hiatus local self-government will be implemented once more. Any one of these issues, and others, present daunting challenges to those who would solve them satisfactorily, but together they form a veritable mountain of thorny tasks.

In the case of the interim evaluation, the government and DJP keep their counsel regarding details on how it will be conducted and how it will be constituted. On 10 December 1988, meanwhile, PPD President Kim Tae-chung hinted that the interim evaluation could take the form of a vote of confidence in the regime. Among the issues pending in 1989, the evaluation bids fair to be the most potentially disruptive because of the attitude adopted by both the DJP and the government toward the methodology of the evaluation and because of resulting reactions from the opposition parties.

The interests of the three opposition parties conflict and their proposals and policies clash not so much on the interim evaluation as on the issue of local autonomy. Some predict the possibility that the structure that emerged after the 26 April 1988 election will encounter grave trials in the new year. In this system, the ruling party holds a minority of Assembly seats and the three major opposition parties forged a system of informal cooperation to exploit their majority in the legislature.

Thus, the three Kims—Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-pil—each perceive 1989 to be a year of crisis and challenge to his own political future, and each is already working mightily to preserve the gains won to date and to exploit the challenges of 1989.

During 1988 the three Kims managed to preserve a cooperative structure among themselves, at least outwardly, but inwardly they scrambled sanguinarily up the slopes leading to the presidency. It is obvious, then, that in 1989 each

politician will struggle to improve his position and to establish domination of the political situation, turning up the heat another notch in the process.

Kim Tae-chung Shows He Can Dominate Korean Politics

As we enter the new year, the position adopted by PPD President Kim Tae-chung is more complex and labyrinthine than the positions of the other two Kims, but it is also more sophisticated. Kim Tae-chung appears to possess the necessary confidence to make maximum practical use of the PPD's position as the first opposition party, a prize won by the PPD in last April's elections, and Kim's efforts to dominate the direction of the Korean political situation seems certain to pull the 13th National Assembly along at something very like the PPD's own pace.

Kim Tae-chung endured the shame of a third-place finish in the presidential election, but he can take most of the credit for pushing through a system for direct election of the president. Embroiled in difficulties in the wake his third place showing in the presidential race and surrounded by enemies on every hand, Kim Tae-chung nevertheless managed almost single-handedly to push through a system of electing only a single deputy from each National Assembly electoral district. This paid off handsomely for Kim as the PPD emerged from the election as the first opposition party and as Kim reveled in his achievement. Kim nourished a cooperative system with the RDP's Kim Yong-sam and the NDRP's Kim Chong-pil, both of whom enjoy strong representation and leadership in the National Assembly. Kim Tae-chung appears to believe that his own political skills and ability at statecraft, as exhibited in his control of the main opposition party, contributed decisively to 1988's opposition success in the Assembly.

In 1988, cooperation among the three opposition parties suffered from a few shaky areas, to be sure. But Kim Tae-chung believes that his was the major role in Assembly initiatives to reject President No's Supreme Court Chief Justice nominee Chong Ki-sung, to establish the five National Assembly select committees to conduct hearings—Kim is particularly pleased with his leadership in establishing the Fifth Republic Scandal Select Committee and the Kwangju Select Committee—and to play the leading role in the process of deciding the Republic of Korea's position on the form and procedures for South-North legislative talks. And indeed, even by objective measures Kim did take the lead on these issues, at least to some extent.

PPD officials gleefully point to these accomplishments and declare that, "We don't know whether Mr No Tae-u is president or whether Mr Kim Tae-chung is president." This common joke, of course, is meant only to suggest that Kim Tae-chung is the *de facto* prime mover on the Korean political scene. Amid these current successes, Kim Tae-chung takes time to consider his goals and

those of the PPD five years hence and works extremely hard to build bridges to the "three veto groups" which regard Kim with antagonism, the middle class, the military, and non-Chollalites. Kim's purpose is to adopt conventional, moderate gestures to alter the image he has among these groups as one who seeks radical change. Kim Tae-chung has also worked hard to goad President No Tae-u no more than absolutely necessary.

Even when it comes to President No's interim evaluation, Kim Tae-chung has promised that, "If the DJP and the government work sincerely at democratization and at cleaning up the Fifth Republic mess, I'll work to ensure that this will not be a problem, work to solve it satisfactorily." This statement and other statements and actions by Kim illustrate that he has resolutely pursued a line designed to build a new, conventional image. The new image, of course, is directly linked to his own long-range plan to win the presidency.

The PPD Mounts Strong Counterattacks Amid Feelings That It Is "Surrounded"

As the National Assembly select committee hearings reached full stride, the DJP attitude in the select committees and DJP internal realignments undertaken by President No in advance of his interim evaluation caused President Kim Tae-chung to wonder whether the ruling party was not creating an environment damaging to his position. Kim reacted with a certain nervousness and sense of crisis. In the Kwangju Select Committee hearings, for example, DJP deputies emphasized Kim Tae-chung's record in his twenties, the Kwangju rebellion plot case, and the Hanmintong case in Japan, damaging Kim's prestige. Moreover, Kim Tae-chung let it be known that he was enraged over the selection of figures for the new cabinet and DJP executive positions who brought with them reputations for toughness and who were unalterably opposed to Kim Tae-chung. Sources close to Kim explain that this kind of challenge was mounted because of the results of an assessment of Kim's influence and political strength conducted by the DJP and the government. Some sources profess concern that the government and DJP have decided to alienate the PPD, joining the NDRP and RDP in what amounts to an operation to surround and isolate the PPD.

In speeches made by National Assembly representatives last October, the RDP and NDRP each presented unilateral views on the local autonomy issue. Very recently Mr Kim Yong-sam emphasized the need to revise the system for electing national assembly deputies, a system Kim Tae-chung believes that he himself created at the cost of no small expenditure of effort. Mr Kim Chong-pil insists, meanwhile, that a cabinet-centered executive system is necessary when the time is right. And DJP Chairman Pak Chun-kyu was no sooner appointed than he resurrected the ideas of a cabinet executive and

coalition government. Observers from the Kim Tae-chung camp believe that Kim is vitally concerned, seeing in these pronouncements the creation of a political environment damaging to his cause.

Kim Tae-chung's concern in this regard no doubt triggered his recent statement that he was considering adopting a strongly negative position vis a vis President No's interim evaluation. Some observers believe that at least part of Kim's intent is to maintain and even tighten his dominance over the direction of Korean politics by holding hostage the interim evaluation, the Sixth Republic's Achilles heel, thus driving a wedge between the potential and villainous union between the DJP and government on the one side and the RDP and NDRP on the other. Other observers are convinced that victory or defeat for Kim in his long-term run for the presidency hangs on whether or not it is possible for him to continue to dominate the direction of Korean politics.

This is not to say with certainty, however, that the PPD and Kim Tae-chung will push to make No's interim evaluation a vote of non-confidence in the No government. Kim himself is well aware that up until now he and the PPD have been unable to accumulate the power necessary to bring down the No government. And Kim Tae-chung seems to have decided that irrespective of the reasons for it, the fact is that the Korean people chose President No's Sixth Republic in a direct election, and that the Korean people do not seem to be searching for a replacement.

Efforts To Render the No Government and Kim Yong-sam Impotent

Moreover, even if the No government were to fall, there is no guarantee that Kim Tae-chung would become president in his stead. And it can be said that Kim Tae-chung is influenced by the fact that were the No regime to fall there would be no assurances that the nation would not witness a repeat performance of 1980's circumstances. Thus, observers suggest that Kim Tae-chung's long-range strategy in suggesting the possibility that he would push the interim evaluation into a vote of confidence on the No government was to threaten the ruling camp. Under this threat, then, the political situation devolves into a relatively orderly political play conducted between the DJP and the PPD, weakening the position Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil while expanding Kim Tae-chung's own base of support.

This strategy provides a natural answer to the question of why Kim Tae-chung locks onto RDP President Kim Yong-sam as his principal rival, taking aim at Kim Yong-sam time after time. Kim Tae-chung assumes that in the next presidential campaign there will once again be four major candidates, and he considers that among the candidates Kim Yong-sam will be his most bothersome obstacle. Kim Yong-sam placed second in the previous presidential election, carrying Pusan and South

Kyongsang Province, his firm regional base. Kim Tae-chung apparently feels that it will be difficult for him to win the presidency so long as Kim Yong-sam continues to enjoy that firm regional support.

During budget deliberations in the last plenary session of the National Assembly, the PPD adamantly proposed that the government should simply forgive farm debt, while the RDP clung to the view that the government should go no further than adopt measures to alleviate debt burden on farmers. The PPD mounted a concentrated campaign of criticism against the RDP, saying, "Legitimate opposition parties consistently defend the position that the government should forgive farm debt," purposely pushing the issue until it developed into a full-fledged confrontation between the two parties. However, when the nomination of acting Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun reached the floor of the Assembly, the PPD once more geared up for a challenge, but this time adopted a strategy of keeping the RDP and Kim Yong-sam out of the line of fire. It is obvious that although the PPD will not be able to force Kim Yong-sam out of the competition in the early going, the PPD feels strongly that it must neutralize him to the extent that he will not be a significant element in deciding who wins and who loses the race for the Presidency. It seems equally obvious that it was in this connection that during the presidential campaign Kim Tae-chung frequently stressed the need to introduce a system involving a "runoff election" into presidential politics.

Although the PPD and Kim Tae-chung have their long-range sights set on the presidential campaign, as the recent National Assembly hearings revealed, they convey the impression that they are pursuing a second strategy, one designed to cause the No administration to "wither to death" over time. Even if prevailing circumstances prevent the PPD and Kim Tae-chung from exploiting the interim evaluation to that extent, the PPD's plan for blocking the DJP's return to power is simplicity itself. The PPD and Kim Tae-chung have only to continue to exploit the fatal problems of the No government to limit its popularity to the range of a "37 percent president and a 37 percent regime," as Kim Tae-chung relishes in repeating, to ensure that when President No's five-year term expires and he leaves office that he will not be replaced by the DJP candidate.

The political world interprets the attempts by PPD National Assembly deputies in hearings before the Kwangju Select Committee and the Press Subcommittee of the Culture and Information Committee to damage President No's image by emphasizing No's role in 1979 and 1980 when he commanded the 9th Division and the Defense Security Command as a scheme designed to keep the No Government paralyzed, afraid to use its overwhelming strength. It is accepted that this is also the reason that the PPD alone takes every opportunity to wrangle with the so-called TK [Taegu-North Kyongsang Province—FBIS] Division, in the persons of Deputies Chong Ho-yong and Pak Chol-on. When viewed from

this perspective, Kim Tae-chung furnishes a number of interesting hints with his question, "Will they be able to operate at all next time under the DJP signboard?"

Interest in Local Autonomy and the Interim Evaluation

While Kim Tae-chung will continue to work to block the DJP's chances for taking power again, it is the local autonomy system which has repeatedly been assumed to be his short cut to power. Once local autonomy is implemented, Kim Tae-chung's first goal is to seize Seoul. Indeed, so strongly has he signalled his intent in this matter, that recently a rumor made the rounds that Kim Tae-chung himself would run for Seoul mayor.

The rumor is in error, of course, but elements within the PPD speculate that Reverend Mun Ik-hwan or Yi Ton-myong may run for the job. The extent of such speculation, however, suggests that the PPD and Kim Tae-chung have been both more diligent and more hungry in preparing for the implementation of local autonomy than have the other parties. Kim Tae-chung established the "Peace College" at the Party's Namhan River Consolidated Training Center and since last summer has spared no expense to hold weekly training sessions for party members at the facility. The PPD does not deny that the purpose of the training is to prepare the Party for local assembly elections.

Neither Kim Yong-sam nor Kim Chong-pil enjoys the kind of solid regional support that Kim Tae-chung commands in the Cholla Provinces, but at the same time Kim Tae-chung is thoroughly excluded from regions other than Cholla. Thus, the only means open to the PPD to expand the limit of about 20 percent of the presidential and Assembly votes imposed by the Cholla connection is to successfully run PPD candidates for local assemblies in and out of Cholla. This path is perceived as not only the sole method for achieving victory in future elections, but the most stable one as well.

Kim Tae-chung knows better than anyone else, however, that he faces many barriers to accomplishing this plan for winning Chongwadae. First, he must exercise leadership over Korean politics today, and to do that he must overcome the barrier posed by two wily professional politicians, Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil. Then he must soften his hard-line, radical image. Then he must tear down the wall of regional animosity many people believe that he himself built in the first place. Then he must bring democracy and organization to the PPD, which to a very large extent is modeled solely on his own personality. It goes without saying that Kim Tae-chung must heed those who point out that he must break out from behind his own fence.

In a move designed to do just that, after last year's general election, Kim Tae-chung toured impoverished neighborhoods, and while shaking hands with the alienated undertook a smile campaign directed at the middle

class. As time allowed, Kim visited military units, constantly making moderate gestures toward the military, a group with veto power over him. Despite the pointed scrutiny of the dissident community, Kim maintained some distance between himself and the dissidents, working hard to soften their demands. Observers viewed his expression of opposition to the arrest of Chon Tu-hwan and Yi Sun-ja as an effort to distance himself from his image as a reflexive negativist, opposing everything.

In spite of efforts in this direction, however, if Kim Tae-chung is to maintain his dominance of Korean politics, then unavoidably he must wield political strength, and the more power he applies, the more he must unavoidably adopt hard-line measures. If Kim successfully maintains political dominance, then, he may fall into the trap of espousing two contradictory principles, fostering a pliant image on one hand but adopting effective, hard-line measures on the other. The result may be the destruction of the moderate image he has worked so assiduously and so long to build. One recent example is instructive in this regard. Recently the DJP ran into difficulty as it encountered the PPD's extra Assembly strategy centered on the interim evaluation issue. In the process, however, the PPD conveyed the impression that the party foresees a struggle leading to the overthrow of the regime, or as Kim Tae-chung himself expresses it, the party is misperceived as a bunch of politicians "digging a tunnel" to undermine the government.

Some sources claim that Kim Tae-chung is seriously considering whether or not at some point to take the pressure off President No on the interim evaluation issue, but others say that Kim has put the idea in cold storage, having estimated that the interim evaluation is simply "too good to pass up." There is no guarantee, however, that the same interim evaluation judged to be "too good to pass up" will not boomerang on Kim Tae-chung. If the No Government conducts an interim evaluation as an interim evaluation but manages to emerge from it relatively intact, then the PPD and Kim Tae-chung will be thrown into a very difficult position. On the other hand, if the interim evaluation ultimately proves not to be a contentious issue, but the DJP and the government choose the expedient of conducting it in the form of a vote of confidence, then what attitude should the PPD adopt? These two potential outcomes present real problems for the PPD.

The crucial question is whether President Kim Tae-chung and the PPD will be content to remain in the position of first opposition party in 1989, or if they choose not to do so, then whether they are able to establish themselves as a force capable of replacing the regime.

Mr Kim Yong-sam Eyes Control of Korean Politics

If PPD President Kim Tae-chung's hasty maneuvers suggest that his political fate hangs in the balance in 1989, RDP President Kim Yong-sam conveys the impression that he is preparing for a long war, placing

emphasis on bolstering the power of the local RDP electoral districts. Kim Yong-sam lost badly in the 26 April 1988 National Assembly elections, his RDP emerging as only the second opposition party. Kim was unable to throw off the shock from the loss until the advent of hearings held by National Assembly select committees late in the year, when Kim slowly regained his stride. If Kim Yong-sam sometimes attracts attention by attacking the ruling camp an octave higher than anyone else, other times he steals a march on the PPD and NDRP by adopting an approach to an issue which is much more conciliatory than that of any other opposition party. It appears, then, that Kim's is a dual strategy of both honey and vinegar.

In the period after the 13th National Assembly first convened, Kim Yong-sam had no choice but assist the nimble-footed Kim Tae-chung and his first opposition PPD from the sidelines. But in the special hearings the RDP outperformed the PPD. The superior performance of the RDP deputies acted as a tonic to heal the malaise that had gripped the RDP over its inferior number of seats in the legislature, and enabled Kim Yong-sam to undertake systematic preparations for the presidential campaign, which now is only four years away. Swept into office by forceful gusts of yellow wind, newly elected PPD National Assembly deputies often were short on government experience. Very few had served previously as Assembly deputies, so the hearings inevitably revealed PPD weakness in legislative and executive abilities. RDP candidates, on the other hand, came from a relatively select pool of experienced men and women. As they undertook their activities in the Assembly, observers came to believe that their professionalism revealed that if they pushed it they represented a force that had a chance to win the presidency.

In their preparations for 1989, the positions and agenda of the PPD and RDP reveal a number of hints that the two parties will clash on many points. As a matter of fact, there have already been numerous instances in which the RDP and Kim Yong-sam's strategy have clashed with the political operations of the PPD and Kim Tae-chung.

Just as the PPD and Kim Tae-chung seek to remove the RDP from the center of political power, so it is also a fact that Kim Yong-sam deliberately attempts to restrain Kim Tae-chung. If the PPD and Kim Tae-chung swiftly attack an issue, then Kim Yong-sam undertakes a glacial offensive. His contrarian approach serves to disrupt Kim Tae-chung's political pace. When the nomination of Kang Yong-hun as prime minister was before the National Assembly, for example, Kim Yong-sam's RDP did not oppose the nomination as did the PPD, even though the RDP stance could not have changed the outcome. In the process of deliberating the 1989 governmental budget, the RDP actively opposed the PPD's position that the government forgive farm debt. Such instances stem from the RDP's strategy of refusing to surrender political leadership to the PPD, and also

reveal that the RDP is not content to remain a dependent actor in the struggle to dominate Korean politics, but will instead work to strengthen its position as an independent actor.

Strategies Related to the Interim Evaluation

Kim Yong-sam's views on the interim evaluation are interesting. When Kim Tae-chung dropped hints that he intended to use the interim evaluation to cripple the Sixth Republic, Kim Yong-sam observed, "Since the interim evaluation is a promise made to the people, it must be accomplished, and its form must be that of a referendum. However, I will not use the vote of confidence as an opportunity to seize power." Kim's statement was an attempt to portray political maturity, however, rather than an expression of a genuine desire for Sixth Republic stability, and must be interpreted as Kim Yong-sam's determination not to provide an opportunity to Kim Tae-chung.

Under the prevailing four-party system and most especially in the situation where the PPD as the leading opposition party dreams of winning the presidency, the RDP and Kim Yong-sam recognize that the stability of the Sixth Republic is in their own best interests. In fact, although it has been carefully concealed, the RDP has wanted stability for the No government since its inception, as evidenced by the fact that virtually nobody in the RDP will deny it. When President Kim Tae-chung let it be known before the Olympics that he wanted Assembly select-committee politics to continue for a long time, well into 1989, President Kim Yong-sam proposed an end to committee activities within 1988. Evidence that the RDP moved to speed up the hearings comes in the fact that in spite of PPD opposition the Fifth Republic Scandals committee began its operations even before the National Assembly finished the executive branch audit.

In regard to the interim evaluation, when Kim Yong-sam said, "However, I will not use the vote of confidence as an opportunity to seize power," he meant that the evaluation must not lead to the downfall of the Sixth Republic. His, "its form must be that of a referendum," however, means at bottom that Kim Yong-sam wants President No to earn a 51 percent approval rating, if possible, wants him to win a popular vote of confidence. In other words, Kim does not want the No regime to fall, but he and the RDP want it to survive by the narrowest possible margin, so as to improve Kim's own presidential prospects in the next campaign for Chongwadae.

There are a number of reasons why Kim Yong-sam operates with many fewer fetters than does Kim Tae-chung, but among them are the facts of the healthy percentage of votes won by Kim Yong-sam in both the presidential and National Assembly elections and also that the RDP vote was centered in the middle class. Kim Yong-sam believes that the presidential election represented Kim Tae-chung's peak draw, and that Kim's

support base will dwindle as the weeks pass. In particular, Kim Yong-sam believes that Kim Tae-chung's overdone support in the Cholla Provinces has stimulated antagonism among people living in other regions and that Kim Tae-chung has already reached the end of his ability to win votes.

At 62, moreover, Kim Yong-sam is younger than Kim Tae-chung at 64, and Kim Yong-sam feels certain that four years from now this age difference will be decisively advantageous to him in the presidential race.

Based on this appreciation of reality and on these competitive factors, the RDP and President Kim Yong-sam have hammered out long-term plans to guide the political situation in 1989 in directions advantageous to the RDP, as a means to seize the high ground in their ultimate challenge for the presidency.

Are No Tae-u and Kim Yong-sam Adopting a Hard-line?

Sources say that Kim Yong-sam is expending prodigious energy to overcome the objective judgment that he is inferior to PPD President Kim Tae-chung, that he has neither the brain for organization, nor mental abilities as broad, and that he falls behind Kim Tae-chung in down and dirty political plotting as well. Kim Yong-sam invites figures versed in politics, sociology, economics and culture and the arts to his Sangdo-dong home where he receives "personal training." One such figure is Seoul National University's Han Won-sang. Sources say that Kim's unremitting efforts have paid off by creating a new man, one capable of memorizing numbers and statistics in a way that could not have been imagined previously.

President Kim Yong-sam's primary concern is the possibility that the RPD may be forced to stand helplessly by as the political situation develops in such a way that a bicameral legislature is established, with control of one chamber by the DJP and the other by the PPD. Kim's strategy is to focus the full strength of his party to prevent this from happening. At one point after the 13th National Assembly was seated, President No and his close advisors advised the DJP to treat Kim Tae-chung with respect and good will. The DJP obliged, triggering speculation among politicians that the possibility existed that the DJP and PPD would strike some sort of policy alliance. But Kim Yong-sam strongly applied the brakes, motivated by the view that no significant player can be excluded from the huge cart of national politics.

Lately, sources claim that through the efforts of ranking officials of the ruling camp that both President No and the DJP itself have adopted a new, hard-line approach. Rumors persist that they have exchanged views not only about the problem of domination of the political situation but even about the very nature of Korea's future political structure. Some observers believe that Kim Yong-sam has lately begun to pay attention to those who

urge him to link the single-deputy constituency system to regional antipathies and push for revision of the system. These observers presume that a possibility exists for Kim to cut a deal with the DJP.

In planning for the next presidential campaign, Kim Yong-sam pins his highest hopes on the judgment that antipathy from other regions directed toward Taegu and North Kyongsang Province will make it impossible for the DJP to field another candidate hailing from that area. Thus, Kim Yong-sam anticipates that he will be the sole presidential candidate with roots in one of the Kyongsang Provinces and that as a consequence he will sweep the region's votes. In this scenario, Kim Tae-chung and Kim Chong-pil will both choose to run again, but the DJP will nominate a candidate who hails from the central area of the country, from a non-Kyongsang region. As a matter of fact, this scenario is also one of Kim Tae-chung's greatest nightmares. Kim Yong-sam believes that if the Sixth Republic continues as it is and if the presidential selection process remains based on a direct, popular election that he has the inside track for Chongwadae.

Other observers claim, however, that the RDP and Kim Yong-sam may be overlooking key factors, indeed that the factors Kim regards as potentially favorable to his candidacy may in fact prove to be obstacles and traps. These observers suggest that the RDP not only shares part of its regional base with the DJP but also shares middle-class support with the government party. Moreover, the RDP cannot be assured of virtually automatic support from the progressive strata of society—students, laborers, and the needy—as does the PPD. And the RDP cannot promote the local autonomy system with the same enthusiasm as the PPD for two reasons. The RDP, of course, lacks the virtually total regional affinity enjoyed by the PPD but also suffers serious organizational deficiencies when contrasted with the DJP. Thus the RDP recognizes that it is burdened with the absolute need to develop a similar regional allegiance and mount a spirited contest if it is to win.

So far as one can safely assume that the RPD and President Kim Yong-sam are pressing to improve their long-term political position, then it is reasonable to anticipate that the RDP will choose to walk its own path more often in 1989 than it did last year, carving out positions that differ from those adopted by the PPD on individual political issues and on strategy within the National Assembly. During the last Assembly session, Kim Yong-sam led the RDP down a divergent path from the PPD on the issue of forgiving farm debt. Kim said, "Competition within opposition ranks must now be altered from a competition of rhetoric to a competition of responsibility." There is no harm in seeing in Kim's statement a prefiguration of the level of cooperation among the three opposition parties in 1989, as well as the main thrust of RDP strategy for the new year.

Kim Chong-pil and the NDRP Expect Victory

The strategy of the NDRP and President Kim Chong-pil are to diligently and gradually build NDRP influence and expand their base of support under the slogan, "four years to be the number one opposition party; five years to win the presidency." Their self-confidence rests on the possibility that Kim can win Chongwadae, and in turn this possibility rests on the party's performance in the presidential election, when Kim Chong-pil won 10 percent of the vote, and on the fact that unique among the four parties the NDRP's slice of the vote actually increased in the subsequent Assembly election. Kim Chong-pil and his party are infected with hope that if this trend continues no law prevents them from winning Chongwadae. However, the NDRP and President Kim seem to feel compelled to diligently ply the party's influence from its intermediate position to prevent exterior elements from rupturing the delicate political equilibrium. The party's concern is founded on a quarter century of political experience by the NDRP and Kim Chong-pil, founded on a sense of urgency stemming from not knowing when the current opposition legislative majority may founder. In regard to the interim evaluation, Kim Chong-pil observed that, "To harbor the intent to use extraordinary methods or physical power to alter the prevailing situation is completely unacceptable, whether that intent lurks in the government camp or among the opposition. Since the people have provided for a five-year term of office for the president, and so long as some extraordinary event does not occur, it is desirable that the incumbent serve the full five years of his term." This statement can be read as a warning to Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam and as advice to President No. The statement neatly capsulizes Kim Chong-pil's view of the present political situation as well as his endorsement of the direction in which the political situation should unfold.

Although President Kim claims that the NDRP's popularity is growing, the general perception is that it will be difficult for the NDRP to come to power in the near future. Thus, Kim Chong-pil appears to think that if only the NDRP can prevent one side or the other from exploiting the interim evaluation to upset the status quo, the NDRP can quietly await an opportunity to come to power amid a climate of continued stability. It can be said that this strategy derives from Kim Chong-pil's belief that the NDRP is more likely to retain its position under the No government than it would if either Kim Tae-chung or Kim Yong-sam were to come to power.

Although certainly Kim Chong-pil's regional base is noticeably weaker than that of either Kim Tae-chung or Kim Yong-sam, Kim Chong-pil has considerable governmental experience and enjoys another significant advantage. Kim Yong-sam is excluded almost totally from Kim Tae-chung's base of support, and conversely Kim Tae-chung is all but totally excluded from Kim Yong-sam's

base of support. Kim Chong-pil, on the other hand, does not suffer from a strong sense of rejection anywhere. Analysts anticipate that in 1989 Kim Chong-pil will continue to follow his previous strategy of avoiding as much as possible support for any one side in Korea's political wars.

They Pin Their Expectations on a Constitutional Revision To Establish a Cabinet-Centered Executive

It appears, however, that even Kim Chong-pil is uncertain whether the NDRP can win power as a result of its own efforts alone. This uncertainty allows us to understand why the NDRP will propose a cabinet-centered executive system if the opportunity presents itself. Although Kim Chong-pil stresses his ability to govern, as the fourth party the only way in which the NDRP can expect to win power is via a cabinet system. Observers sense, therefore, that even if the NDRP is not successful in building party strength that if the cabinet system is adopted the NDRP will be positioned to play the decisive card as the partner in a coalition government.

In this regard, some analysts believe that the NDRP has in mind a secret plan for Kim Chong-pil to propose a cabinet system of government in the 14th National Assembly, and that once his proposal is on the table the aimlessly drifting DJP will encounter one crisis too many and turn to the NDRP, which was a main pillar of support for the Pak Chong-hui government, to rally pan-governmental forces. In this way the NDRP could inherit a share of power.

However, should the NDRP propose a cabinet-centered executive system at a time when Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-chung both remain active on the political scene, it is difficult to expect that either one would risk his political life to reverse direction, and thus there is a high probability that the initiative would end up as a non-starter. The NDRP would be up against the wall in this case, unable to achieve a constitutional revision in concert with the same DJP which until just before the adoption of the current direct-election system vociferously advocated a cabinet system.

Finally, the NDRP and President Kim Chong-pil reject as impossible under a presidential-centered form of government the coalition government issue being raised by the DJP, so the likelihood is great that the coalition government idea will end up as just another sterile scenario. The possibility cannot be completely ruled out, however, that the NDRP and Kim Chong-pil may fall into an unexpected chance to rise to power, if they adhere to the NDRP policy of impartiality, if they continue to criticize the "no counterproposals" politics of Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam, and if they strongly embrace the NDRP stance described by President Kim Chong-pil when he said, "If it is right, we will cooperate without regard to whether it originates from the government side or the opposition side."

Burma

PRC Envoy Meets With Elections Chairman

BK1301075589 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Mr Cheng Ruisheng, PRC ambassador to Burma, at 1400 on 12 January called on U Ba Htay, chairman of the Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections, at No 94, Natmauk Road, Bahan Township, Rangoon.

Present at the meeting were commission members U Saw Kyar Doe, U San Maung, Saya Chai, and U Kyaw Nyunt, and commission secretary U Aye Maung.

The chairman and the members of the commission answered questions related to holding multiparty general elections in a frank and friendly atmosphere.

Coordination Meeting on Elections Bill Held

BK1201145689 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Members of the State Law and Order Restoration Council led by General Saw Maung, chairman of the council and Defense Forces chief of staff, met with members of the Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections led by commission chairman U Ba Htay at 1000 today at Dagon House of the Ministry of Defense to discuss the People's Assembly Elections Bill.

Present at the meeting with Gen Saw Maung, council chairman and Defense Forces chief of staff, were council members Lieutenant General Than Shwe, Rear Admiral Maung Maung Khin, Major General Tin Tun, Brigadier General Aung Ye Kyaw, Maj Gen Phone Myint, Major General Sein Aung and Brig Gen Khin Nyunt, secretary-1 and Colonel Tin U, secretary-2.

Present at the meeting with U Ba Htay were commission members U Saw Kyar Doe, U San Maung, Saya Chai, and U Kyaw Nyunt and U Aye Maung, secretary of the commission.

The coordination meeting on the People's Assembly Elections Bill ended at 1300.

More Political Parties Announce Programs

Southern Chin Democracy Party

BK1301075989 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] 1. The following are the extracts of the objectives and future programs of the Southern Chin Democracy Party, which has registered with this Commission for

[Text] 1. The following are the extracts of the objectives and future programs of the Southern Chin Democracy Party, which has registered with this Commission for

Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections in accordance with the Political Parties Registration Law, and which has its headquarters at No 58, Lanthit Road, Nant-thagon Ward, Insein Township, Rangoon Division.

2. Aims

- A. To make the utmost efforts for all national people to enjoy independence, democracy, human rights, justice, and peace.
- B. To enjoy democratic rights like other national groups.
- C. To work for internal peace and national solidarity and unity through peaceful means.
- D. To apply modern methods in developing natural resources in working for development of the Burmese economy.
- E. To work for political, economic, and social development of the national people scientifically.

3. Programs

- A. To safeguard and preserve friendship and unity of the national people.
- B. To make the utmost efforts for development of the entire Chin people.
- C. To uphold active and independent foreign policy.
- D. To develop national economy by applying modern methods in developing economic resources.
- E. To ensure that those wishing to pursue education have access to higher education.

New Strength Democratic Allied Party

BK1301103589 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] 1. The following are extracts of the objectives and future programs of the New Strength Democratic Allied Party, which has registered with this Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections in accordance with the Political Parties Registration Law, and which has its headquarters at No 67, Kyaikwaing Paya Road, 4th Ward, Mayangon Township, Rangoon Division.

2. Aims

- A. To work for peace, progress, and development by mobilizing patriotic and nation-loving people to achieve the unity of the national people, perpetuation of independence, and preservation of the Union.
- B. To work for the full attainment of human rights for peace and prosperity and elimination of all kinds of armed conflicts, both above and underground, except legitimate defense of the country by the Defense Forces.
- C. To work for the emergence of a developed country of world standard in which all national people residing in the country are equal.

3. Programs:

- A. To cooperate and work with all countries of the world in accordance with the UN Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.
- B. To practice nonalignment in friendly relations with other countries of the world.
- C. To join at an opportune moment with other organizations which have similar aims to struggle for the attainment of democracy.
- D. To work for the establishment of a bank which can be fully trusted and which will be managed by real experts for internal and external trade, and both internal and external trade will be carried out by private enterprises with the help of the government.
- E. To strive for an industrialized country of world standard with the help of technological experts. Special efforts will be made for the emergence of these experts.
- F. To work for modernized agriculture by means of modern and developed technologies, since the agricultural sector is the most important sector of Burma.
- G. To work for the higher standard of living of peasants, workers, and people, and strive for the full attainment of human rights.
- H. To allow private businessmen and entrepreneurs to freely operate the economic systems of the country.
- I. To provide free primary education for the elimination of illiteracy, and to work for middle school, high school, and higher education of world standard; and to systematically rebuild a university students union to enable students to study subjects of their choice.

Two Students Killed in Karen Rebel Clash

*BK1201051089 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
12 Jan 89 p 3*

[Text] Tak—Two Burmese students and four government troops were killed in a clash on Monday about 16 kilometres west of the Karen rebel-held Klerdy Camp opposite Tha Song Yang District here.

A total of 218 students and 74 Karen rebels exchanged fire with Burmese troops who killed Aung Linn, 21, and Maung Maung Lat, 23, said Tan Win, secretary-general of the All Burma Students Democratic Front yesterday.

The Burmese soldiers dragged the bodies of the two students and their four troops.

Troops of the 44th Division attacked Klerdy Camp, which houses about 400 Burmese students, with heavy weapons before the clash while 1,500 children, women and elders were evacuated from the camp.

A source said a 22-year-old student, Tan Lwin, was killed by a Burmese force after he returned home in Moulmein from Klerdy Camp early this month.

The students and other dissidents in the camp would certainly not return home but continue to fight along with the National Democratic Front [NDF] and the Democratic Alliance of Burma, according to NDF secretary Tu Ja.

Fifth Group of Students Return From Thailand
*BK1301073589 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese
1330 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Excerpts] A group of 76 Burmese students, including 3 girls, returned to Rangoon from Tak Province reception camp in Thailand this afternoon in 2 special planes dispatched from Burma under a joint Thai-Burmese Red Cross cooperation program stemming from an agreement reached between the Thai and Burmese Governments. The students constitute the fifth batch to have arrived from Thailand.

The students were welcomed at No 502 Air Base by Brigadier General Myo Nyunt, members of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC], and commander of the Rangoon Military Command; U Ohn Kyaw, director general of the Political Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr Tin U, deputy chairman of the Burma Red Cross and director general of the Health Department; Colonel Myo Thant, director of signals of the Ministry of Defense; Col Aung Thein, director of People's Militia and People's Relations; Col Kyaw Win, director of medical services; Col Maung Maung, commander of the No 502 Air Base; Lieutenant Colonel Than Tun, deputy director of the Defense Services Intelligence; local and foreign journalists led by U Soe Nyunt, managing general of the News and Periodicals Corporation; and 300 Red Cross Brigade members.

The students disembarked from the plane carrying the flag of the Union of Burma. They were taken in cars to the reception camp at the combined mess of the Rangoon Military Command. [passage omitted]

At the camp's reception hall the students and their parents and guardians met with local and foreign journalists and members of the SLORC information committee. [passage omitted]

Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore

Malaysia

U.S.-Libya Incident Said 'Extremely Serious'
*BK1301052589 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0346 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Jan 13 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia Thursday appealed to the United States to consider larger interests in its actions so that it would not jeopardize the process of bringing about diffusion of tensions and resolution of conflicts.

Malaysian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Razali Ismail said Malaysia took a very serious view of the escalation in the U.S. action against Libya especially in the light of recent unproven allegations by the United States of the Libyan attempt to produce chemical weapons.

"We regard the incident as extremely serious, fraught with possible complications," he said in his address before the UN Security Council.

His text of speech was released here.

Razali said the record of antipathy between the United States and Libya went back several years ago and the Security Council had been given the recourse for Libya's grievances since 1981.

Razali said Malaysia was alarmed that the United States should appear set on the adversarial course with Libya and found this in disconcerting contrast to the constructive efforts of the U.S. particularly in the last years which added critical element in advancing serious prospects of peace in many parts of the world.

The present actions had not only affected Libya but could cut deeply into the hopes and achievements accrued in those fruitful years, he added.

Razali who is currently the president of the council, said in the pursuit of conflict resolutions in various parts of the world through collective action through United Nations, many countries including the United States, had played constructive and critical roles.

"We are possibly on the threshold of an international era where mutually reinforcing actions of state can bring about diffusion of tensions and resolution of conflict," he said.

"The Security Council will not be living up to its responsibilities if it does not assert strongly that actions of states conform with international obligations in compliance to norms regulating relations, particularly the respect of sovereignty and inviolability and refraining from threat of use of force against any state," he said.

U.S. 'Threats' to Palm Oil Market Viewed
*BK1301105189 Kuala Lumpur International Service
in English 0800 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Malaysian Government and the palm oil industry are determined to respond vigorously to the new challenge posed by threats to the marketing of the commodity in the United States. For some months now, the industry has been putting the true facts and figures to the American consumers and the business community.

This challenge to the Malaysian product began when the American Soybean Association started to spread vicious propaganda about tropical oil.

The Malaysian palm oil industry sent several delegations of scientists and nutritionists to the United States and other countries in a bid to expose the propaganda. It was obvious to all right thinking people that the campaign of falsehood was intended to capture, if possible, the entire market for palm oil in the United States.

The Malaysian community is unable to understand how is it possible in a country that is proud of its liberal tradition, for a business association to get away with such lies about a rival product.

Malaysian business people have never feared fair competition. They are all sophisticated businessmen, they regard fair competition as healthy and even beneficial to the consumer. But to base one's advertising on a series of lies is of course, another matter. What has been exploited is a very basic concern or even fear that people have about health and its link to the food that they consume. To say that palm oil can directly bring about heart disease or some other ailments is simply not true. They are available for any who care to know the truth. Research finding facts embody a totally different picture about palm oil. It is important that those who are taken in by the sensational allegations put out by the other party should also be willing to hear what the Malaysian palm oil people have to say. Intellectual honesty thus demands that kind of approach.

It is not as though Malaysian palm oil is a new product. It has been marketed for many years. What is more, this same palm oil is broadly consumed in large quantities by several other countries. It is not as if palm oil is a poisonous commodity. All through the ages it has been used as a component in the preparations of some items that are consumed by human beings. It is easy to spread panic but rather more difficult to induce people to see good reason and logic.

Nothing can be more irresponsible than to start off a trail of falsehood and lies. Apart from causing needless anxiety to thousands of ordinary citizens, the livelihood of many thousands employed in the palm oil industry will be affected.

Malaysia is among several developing countries that are committed to economic growth. Trade rather than aid is what Malaysian leaders have always advocated. Malaysia is the world's leading producer and exporter of palm oil. It cannot afford to allow threats from any quarter to undermine the stability of this premier industry, nor to disrupt the livelihood of so many thousands.

Ultimately of course, there has to be freedom to purchase or not to purchase, but that decision should be based on sound reasoning and not on emotional and political factors.

Singapore

Foreign Ministry Issues Policy Statement *BK1201134389 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 12 Jan 89 p 1*

[Excerpts] Singapore will continue to give high priority to relations with its ASEAN neighbours and will maintain efforts to strengthen institutional and personal links with them, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia.

In its addendum to the President's Address to Parliament on Monday [9 January], the Foreign Ministry noted that major political and economic changes are taking place on the international scene.

Communist countries, in particular, are "going through a period of self-examination" and East-West relations have "never been more relaxed".

Setting the tone and direction of Singapore's foreign policy for the next five years, the document signed by Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng declared:

"There will be continuity in our foreign policy while we adjust to these changes."

Underlining continuity, it reiterated the importance Singapore places on ties with ASEAN partners and reaffirmed that it would continue strengthening the institutional and personal ties that have been developed over the years, especially with Malaysia and Indonesia. [passage omitted]

The Republic promises to work with other ASEAN countries to implement the Programme of Action adopted at the Manila Summit of ASEAN heads of government in 1987.

The programme, which sets the pace of future links in ASEAN, sketches in detail various political, economic and socio-cultural areas of enhanced co-operation, and charts the relationship with dialogue partners and other countries.

Looking beyond, the addendum said the thaw in East-West relations had improved prospects for settling regional problems and conflicts.

It added, saying that Singapore will continue its efforts to resolve the Cambodian problem: "A just solution will lead to better political and economic relations between Singapore and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia", echoing past remarks by Mr Wong.

The addendum also repeated his suggestion late last year that there are prospects for better ties with the Soviet Union.

Noting that big countries such as the Soviet Union, China and India are becoming more important in Southeast Asia, it said Singapore will build on its existing ties with these countries.

It noted further that economic ties with China and India are already expanding and added:

"If conditions in the Asia-Pacific region are sound and stable, more areas of common interest with the Soviet Union can develop."

On the Asia-Pacific region, the addendum said Singapore will find common interests with Japan and the newly-industrialising economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Singapore is also ready to take part in a dialogue between the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the NIEs. The addendum also said Singapore will maintain close ties with the Western powers, adding that this should be so with "any country which respects our independence and sovereignty, and our right to live and prosper in peace".

It concluded by saying Singapore will also build its ties with countries in South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and the South Pacific.

Cambodia

Hun Sen Apologizes for Past Mistakes *BK1301014989 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 13 Jan 89 p 6*

[By Jacques Bekaert]

[Text] Kampot, Kampuchea—The People's Republic of Kampuchea has committed serious mistakes regarding religion and the economy, Phnom Penh premier Hun Sen admitted a few days ago in this province.

It was the first time that the Hanoi-installed government had openly apologised for past behaviour.

Hun Sen was speaking to monks and a gathering of old people at the Chum Kriel Pagoda, in a suburb of Kampot City.

The prime minister was visiting the province on the 10th anniversary of the new regime. He made the improvised speech on January 10.

Hun Sen, who is also a member of the Politburo of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, admitted that serious errors had been made about religious matters since 1979.

Such mistakes, he said, had led people to believe that the authorities were against religion. "It was also exploited by our enemies" he claimed.

"The enemy tries hard to convince the population that the People's Republic of Kampuchea is opposed to religious practices," said Mr Hun Sen.

"But I can assure you that the government and the party respect Buddhism." Many leaders of the government and the Communist Party are true believers, added Hun Sen.

Both Heng Samrin and Chea Sim have been monks, he insisted. "You don't have to worry. Do what you want, the authorities are not going to interfere anymore with religious practices," said Hun Sen.

Pointing to the secretary general of the party's provincial committee, Hun Sen said that local authorities will now guarantee freedom of religion.

"Religion will last as long as the people believe in it. Do not trust those who tell you that religion will be eliminated by the government" said Mr Hun Sen, adding that in fact the regime wants to develop religion and shall build new pagodas.

"Only if the people stop believing will religion disappear. If I can read and write it is because I learned it from the monks." he said.

When he arrived at Chum Kriel Pagoda where people had been waiting for a couple of hours, Hun Sen bowed to the ground in front of the head monk and was greeted rather warmly by about two hundred people, mostly older men and women.

The prime minister's visit to this small pagoda, located in a province where security remains a serious problem, was part of an ongoing effort made by the regime to win the hearts and minds of the Khmer people.

After the intervention of the Vietnamese army and the fall of Democratic Kampuchea in early 1979, the new regime took a harsh line towards religion.

Most temples, which had been turned into warehouses or pig farms under the Pol Pot regime, remained closed and only men over the age of 55 were allowed to become monks.

But during his visit to Kampot, Hun Sen promised that past mistakes, like abusive taxation of temples, will not be repeated.

"In the name of the government which made those mistakes, I apologise to you," he said.

Polish Party Delegation Leaves Phnom Penh

*BK1301052789 Phnom Penh SPK in French
0422 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Text] Phnom Penh, 13 Jan (SPK)—The delegation from the Polish party led by Zbigniew Michalek, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, left Phnom Penh yesterday afternoon.

During its stay, it was received by Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the Council of State. It also visited an exhibition on the all-round achievements in Cambodia, economic and cultural establishments in Phnom Penh, and the Angkor Wat temple in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey.

Numerous Thai Border Violations Claimed

*BK1301054389 Phnom Penh SPK in French
0425 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Text] Phnom Penh, 13 Jan (SPK)—During the week ending 7 January, Thai L-19's, F-5's, and A-37's made six reconnaissance flights over O Bok, O Smach, and Trapeang Tau (Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province), between 3 and 4 km inside Cambodian territory.

On land, Thai artillery poured between 900 and 1,200 shells into sectors adjoining the Cambodian-Thai border in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Provinces.

At sea, the Thai Navy made eight entries into the area off Kaoh Tang and Poulo Wai Islands.

Sihanouk Softens Stand on Settlement Plan

*AU1201141789 Paris AFP in English 1326 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Paris, Jan 12 (AFP)—Cambodian resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk substantially softened his stand on at least two points of his five-point project for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict at a meeting here with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, sources close to the ex-monarch said Thursday.

The plan includes a timetable for a Vietnamese troop pullout from Cambodia and the breakup of the two existing Cambodian governments—the Hanoi-backed cabinet in Phnom Penh, and the government-in-exile recognized by the United Nations.

The prince told Mr. Alatas on Tuesday [10 January] he no longer insisted on the term government "breakup" to settle the Cambodian issue but he insisted that his country must be independent.

He added that his five-point plan was a "working paper" and not a pre-condition for the second informal Cambodia talks to open in Jakarta next month, sources said.

Prince Sihanouk plans to be in Jakarta on the sidelines of the conference.

Sources added that Mr. Alatas suggested that an international watchdog panel endowed with broad military powers supervise the Vietnamese withdrawal.

Cambodian resistance groups demand that the pullout be observed by an international peace-keeping force, but Hanoi and Phnom Penh have rejected the idea.

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said Chinese and French positions on the Cambodia problem were "identical or close", after a meeting Thursday with French President Francois Mitterrand.

"We all want a just and reasonable solution to the problem," he said, adding that China and France "can play an important role" to achieve this.

(The statement came after diplomatic sources in Beijing announced that Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co will visit China in the next few weeks to discuss the Cambodia settlement.)

(The visit would be the first direct meeting between the two countries at the vice-ministerial level in more than 10 years.)

Mr. Qian started a two-day official visit here Thursday after attending the U.N. chemical weapons session.

Prince Ranariddh on Solving Cambodian Problem
*BK1101112989 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 11 Jan 89*

[Station correspondent's interview with His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Ranariddh, personal representative of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia and Asia and commander in chief of the Sihanoukist National Army—recorded; date not given]

[Summary] [Unidentified correspondent] The Hun Sen-Heng Samrin clique has asserted that Samdech Sihanouk's five-point proposal is unreasonable and cannot be accepted and that it would enable the Khmer Rouge to return to power and massacre the Cambodian people again. Would you please comment?

[Ranariddh] Before answering your question, let me extend 1989 new year greetings and best wishes to all listeners of the Voice of the Khmer. May the sacred wish of all Cambodian patriots be fulfilled! May their hopes for the restoration of freedom, independence, sovereignty, progress, unity, and family reunion in Cambodia come true!

In the first point of his proposal, Samdech Sihanouk demands that Vietnam give us a calendar and a specific program for its troop withdrawal. If Vietnam is sincere in completely pulling out of Cambodia, it should give the

international community a specific program of its troop withdrawal which should proceed under the correct supervision of the United Nations.

The second point is that the elections should be held within the framework of a new Cambodia to allow all of the Cambodian people to vote freely. The elections should not be held within the framework of the PRK regime, which is a communist regime created by Vietnam. The people have no freedom of expression under a communist regime, be it in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or any other communist state. The Vietnamese satellite Hun Sen regime certainly cannot give a greater degree of freedom than its master.

For this reason, samdech evu demands that elections be held within a new framework, a Cambodian framework, under neither DK nor the PRK.

Another of the samdech's proposals is that a coalition government of national reconciliation, representing Cambodians of all tendencies, should be formed. The reason behind this is that neither the Khmer Rouge regime nor the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin regime truly represents Cambodia despite their claims to the contrary. However, China supports the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam and the Soviet Union support the Phnom Penh regime. We cannot solve anything without the consent of China or the Soviet Union. The samdech thus says we must create a regime called a Cambodian regime made up of Cambodians from the four factions. Is this proposal unreasonable?

The samdech also proposes that since we have a quadripartite government, we must have a quadripartite army. Hun Sen charged that the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in this army would enable the Khmer Rouge to return and massacre the Cambodians again. In this connection, Samdech Sihanouk clearly sees who is capable of doing away with the Khmer Rouge. For the past 10 years, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese troops have tried and failed to crush the Khmer Rouge. For this reason, if we want to stop the Khmer Rouge we must not push them into the jungle, into becoming extremely influential bandits. We must put them within a framework that the three other factions can control. Is this an unreasonable proposal that would bring back the Khmer Rouge massacres?

The last point in the proposal calls for sending an international peacekeeping force within the UN framework to Cambodia not only to control the Vietnamese troop withdrawal and ensure security in Cambodia, but also to prevent and prohibit the Khmer Rouge from abusing their power, killing the people, or threatening the security of the Cambodian people.

The aim of the samdech's proposal is to bring an end to the bloodshed among Cambodians and to find a formula to keep the Khmer Rouge from returning to massacre the Cambodian people again. His proposal is diametrically opposed to what Hun Sen has charged.

"Besides, I, Norodom Ranariddh, as a national liberation fighter, personally do not want to talk back to him. As a resistance fighter fighting to liberate our beloved motherland from the communist Vietnamese aggressors I should not lower myself to the same level as a traitor, a foreign lackey. But I have to answer when, in his recent interview, Hun Sen charged that the samdech had toughened his position, especially during the talks between the samdech and Hun Sen at Fere-en-Tardenois, France, in November 1988.

"Allow me to make the following remarks:

"Samdech Norodom Sihanouk loves the Cambodian nation and people; if he did not, the Cambodian people as a whole would not call him Samdech Euv. He has always made every effort to end as soon as possible the sufferings, misery, and ignominy of the Cambodian people and nation. For this reason, he never hesitated to brave strong and unjust criticism and condemnation as well as abuse launched against him by the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian factions in order to hold three rounds of political talks with Hun Sen in France. If the last three rounds of talks between the samdech and Hun Sen failed to successfully produce a reasonable solution to the Cambodian problem, the fault is not with the samdech."

It is because, first, Hun Sen went to France not for the purpose of finding a solution but to gain publicity for his government, his illegal regime. On the other hand, our samdech euv, true to his word, has continued to insist on the withdrawal of the aggressor Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in accordance with a specific and unconditional program.

Second, as in his five-point proposal, the samdech demanded the dissolution not only of the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin regime, but also of the Khmer Rouge regime before the elections. "Samdech Norodom Sihanouk continued to demand in earnest the formation of an interim coalition Cambodian government whose duty is to organize free elections in Cambodia under the control of the International Control Commission. He also earnestly called for the creation of a quadripartite Cambodian national army with a joint General Staff. Finally, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk requested that an international force of the United Nations be sent to Cambodia to ensure security in Cambodia. The sending of this force must be in accordance with the resolution of an international conference on Cambodia." The proposal of the samdech, unlike the charge by Hun Sen and a small section of international observers, was in no way a toughening of position. It has been heard and known by all for years. It is not a new proposal, nor is it a toughening of the samdech's position.

Hun Sen talked about free elections and the Cambodians' right to self-determination. If he really respected this right as claimed, why did he accuse the samdech of

changing his position and attitude when the samdech called for free elections within a framework other than the illegal framework of the PRK and the illegal framework of the DK?

"Hun Sen talked about crushing the Pol Potists before Vietnam withdraws troops from Cambodia. But let us ask him: Is there any foreign power which will volunteer to send troops to Cambodia to crush the Pol Pot clique when Vietnam itself has failed to crush it over the past 10 years? Communist Vietnam and its satellite Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh have rejected the samdech's proposal to send to Cambodia an international peace-keeping force. Once again, Vietnam and Hun Sen rejected this proposal of the samdech. Under this condition, can we accuse the samdech of trying to open the door for the Khmer Rouge to return and massacre the Cambodian people?"

Allow me to tell the listeners that the United Nations has set \$600 million aside to finance the sending of a 7,000-strong international peacekeeping force to Cambodia when Vietnam completely withdraws its troops. China also supports this idea, and so do 122 UN member countries. Only Hun Sen, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union have rejected this idea.

"The truth is that Vietnam and Hun Sen do not want this international force to keep control and ensure security in Cambodia because they expect that when Vietnam withdraws all its troops the Khmer Rouge will surely return and massacre the Cambodian people again, and this recurrence of massacres will give a pretext for the second time for Vietnam to 'save' Cambodia, that is, to take Cambodia and turn it into a Vietnamese colony or province forever. This is the profound and ugliest aspiration of Vietnam-Hun Sen."

If the samdech did as Vietnam and Hun Sen wanted him to do, Cambodia would certainly become another Kampuchea Kraom, which was lost to Vietnam in the 19th Century. It has already become part of Vietnam and its inhabitants have already become Vietnamese. Cambodia, too, would then become a Vietnamese colony, something that a patriot such as Samdech Sihanouk could never accept.

"Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has repeatedly stressed, through me as his spokesman, that he will never surrender, that he will never retreat if somebody wants to force him to give up the national liberation struggle, if somebody wants to force him to abandon Cambodia's total independence, if somebody wants to force him to renounce the right of the Cambodian people to decide their future. Therefore, can anyone accuse the samdech, through his five-point proposal, of making it possible for the Khmer Rouge to massacre the Cambodian people? Can anyone blame the samdech for the failure of the third round of talks with Hun Sen?

"Venerable monks, esteemed listeners, the truth is that Hun Sen himself is solely responsible for the failure of the third round of talks, for he showed us that his desire was not to solve the Cambodian problem and defend the rights of the 7 million Cambodians. In fact, his desire is to preserve his seat, to maintain his power. And to keep his seat, he has to serve the interests of Vietnam."

[Correspondent] The three Cambodian resistance factions have proposed the postponement of the Jakarta informal meeting [JIM]. What is the cause? The Hun Sen-Heng Samrin regime said it would attend JIM 2 with the ASEAN countries even without the participation of the three factions at JIM 2. What is your opinion?

[Ranadriddh] The fact is that Samdech Sihanouk has not rejected Indonesia's proposal for the so-called JIM 2. He is always grateful to great Indonesia for the assistance and support accorded by Indonesia and President Suharto to the Cambodian people's struggle. JIM was possible thanks to the generosity of Indonesia, which has always expressed its sympathy for the Cambodian people. "Unfortunately, the SRV and the so-called PRK have made use of JIM and turned it into a forum for their own publicity without giving JIM 1 the opportunities to find a most reasonable means to solve the tragic problem of Cambodia.

"Concerning JIM 2, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is in no position to oppose the convening of JIM 2 in February or at any future date. This is the truth. If JIM 2 is held, the samdech's party, FUNCINPEC [Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia], and the Sihanoukist National Army, ANS, will surely send an official delegation to the meeting. However, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has only asked to exercise his right to express his concerns that Vietnam and its lackeys might use the JIM forum again to conduct a misleading propaganda campaign and take advantage of the meeting to show that they represent Cambodia, that theirs is the legal regime.

"As you all know, the PRK is an absolutely unacceptable creation of the SRV. The samdech is worried that JIM 2 might not be a success; that is, it might fail to create a condition to provide Cambodia with complete independence, to give the Cambodian people the right to self-determination. The samdech is worried that JIM 2 might become a roadblock to the search for a reasonable solution to the Cambodian problem. For all these reasons, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has asked permission to express his views and has proposed that JIM be held when it is evident that Vietnam and the Phnom Penh regime have the resolute sincerity to solve the Cambodian problem and will not try to use JIM as a platform for their own publicity."

This is my answer to your question. I would like to repeat that FUNCINPEC representatives will take part in JIM 2. The tripartite Cambodian resistance has merely made

the suggestion on how to utilize JIM as a concrete means to solve the Cambodian problem and not to allow Vietnam and the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin to use it for their own publicity.

[Correspondent] Hun Sen said that all Vietnamese troops will withdraw from Cambodia in September if there is a political solution. Please comment.

[Ranariddh] Foreign observers, such as Western journalists, wrote that Vietnam has withdrawn about 50,000 troops from Cambodia, particularly at the end of December. My opinion is that we must not believe Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime's claim that Vietnamese troops have been pulled out. "Because, though it is undeniable that Vietnam is experiencing difficulties in the economic, social, and other fields at home, and Vietnam is experiencing utter isolation in the international arena, Vietnam has not stopped trying to colonize Cambodia and Laos. It is true that in many regions such as western Cambodia, Vietnam has been seen actually withdrawing troops. However, according to our own observation, Vietnam has withdrawn troops from easily observed regions and hid them in other regions such as in the jungle, unseen by observers. On the other hand, Vietnam has withdrawn weary, exhausted forces from Cambodia and replaced them with fresh troops. Moreover, Vietnam has staged a farce by inviting foreign observers and journalists to Phnom Penh to witness the withdrawal. But Vietnam seems to forget to invite the same observers to visit when it sends fresh troops back to Cambodia.

"My estimate is that there are at least 100,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. If Vietnam withdraws its troops to below this figure, my opinion is that the Heng Samrin regime would not be as insolent and boastful as it is now. As all of you know, when Vietnam pulls out all of its troops, the Heng Samrin regime will just collapse.

"You ask me to comment on Hun Sen's statement that Vietnam will withdraw all its troops in September. If my memory is good, when Hun Sen met the samdech at Fere-en-Tardenois, France, he said Vietnam would withdraw within 12 months after an agreement among the Cambodian factions is reached. Therefore, either—as always—Hun Sen has lied or he has merely repeated like a parrot what his master said.

"According to Hun Sen's statement at Fere-en-Tardenois in November 1988, he said 12 months following the agreement between the Cambodian factions. We are now in January, and there is still no agreement. Therefore, Vietnam will not withdraw before the end of 1989. Thus, Hun Sen has again showed us that either he has deceived us again or he has just repeated what his master told him to say. In Paris he said 12 months, now he says September 1989, if there is an agreement. In reality, I just do not know how to comment for you, for he keeps changing so much.

"Let me tell you this. When he met Samdech Norodom Sihanouk at Fere-en-Tardenois he said there are three conditions: first, the dissolution of the Khmer Rouge forces; second, the cessation of military aid to the Cambodian resistance movement—not to the Khmer Rouge alone, mind you, but to all Cambodian resistance movements, including the Khmer Rouge, the ANS, and the forces of Son Sann. In this connection, allow me to stress the following:

"Hun Sen said we must stop the aid to the Khmer Rouge, for they have massacred the Cambodian people and are forces that might threaten the security of the Cambodian people before Vietnam withdraws all its troops. I did not disagree with that despite the fact that there are also many patriots fighting in the ranks of the Khmer Rouge and they have made many sacrifices in the same war to liberate the motherland from the Vietnamese aggressors. I did not disagree with Hun Sen on that point. But I would like to ask Hun Sen that should he be a patriot as he has claimed, why then did he want people to also end aid to the patriotic forces such as the ANS, an army which has never once threatened the safety or the life of any Cambodians, an army formed for the defense of the Cambodian people's interests, a non-communist army enjoying the support of the Cambodian people, for ANS is an army of samdech euv, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk? If he were a patriot, why did Hun Sen want to deprive the patriotic ANS of the possibilities to liberate the motherland from the claws and colonialism of Vietnam? If Hun Sen continues to insist on making such a proposal, we can clearly see that he is not a patriot, that on the contrary he is a lackey serving Vietnam's interests, for he does not want the patriotic ANS to be capable of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia, of dissolving his regime—the satellite Phnom Penh regime—and, in the future, of opposing the Khmer Rouge.

"If we look closely, we see that Hun Sen is not a patriot. Contrary to what he claimed, he wants the Khmer Rouge to return!"

"My opinion, in conclusion, regarding Vietnam and Hun Sen's announcement that Vietnamese troops will be withdrawn by September 1989 is as follows:

"First, we cannot believe Hun Sen, for he said one thing in Paris last November and has just said another thing now. In fact, Hun Sen has no autonomy in the Cambodian question. He merely repeats what Vietnam orders him to say.

"Secondly, Vietnam, too, has no complete autonomy as far as its troop withdrawal question is concerned, for Vietnam has always [words indistinct] the development of the search for a solution to the Cambodian problem on the international stage. For example, the PRC and the Soviet Union have met twice to discuss ways to solve the Cambodian problem. In particular, during the second discussion, the Soviet Union and the PRC agreed with each other that Vietnam should withdraw all its troops

from Cambodia no later than in the 2d half of 1989. This consensus is of extreme importance. This consensus showed us that Vietnam, which needs military and especially economic aid from the Soviet Union in order to rebuild its own extremely deteriorated economy, just has no other choice but to go along with the Soviet decision. Moreover, as you all know, the Soviet Union is going to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan no later than 15 February. Will the Soviet Union, which has to pull out its troops from Afghanistan in February, allow Vietnam to use Soviet arms and spend Soviet money in order to perpetuate its occupation of Cambodia?

"Moreover, the Soviet Union is implementing its open-door policy and conducting plans to improve relations with the United States, and especially with the PRC. Does the Soviet Union, which is decreasing the number of its troops and scrapping its nuclear weapons, have the possibilities or the policy to continue aid to Vietnam to enable the latter to occupy Cambodia? The answer is absolutely not.

"Moreover, I have learned that the Soviet Union has asked China to agree to negotiate with Vietnam. If the PRC accepts this Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union will directly call on Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. And I have just learned that the PRC has agreed to receive Vietnam's minister or deputy minister of foreign affairs early next February. Based on all these points, it is not possible for Vietnam to maintain the presence of its troops in Cambodia. Vietnam had said that it would withdraw troops at the end of 1990, then that it would do so in the first quarter of 1990 with conditions, and lately that it would completely withdraw in September 1989, also with conditions. However, dear listeners, do you see anyone accept the conditions of Vietnam-Hun Sen? As far as the resistance is concerned, we have not accepted." This shows Vietnam is not able to prolong its occupation of Cambodia.

"Besides, I have just received the news that on Monday, 9 January, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk would meet with the foreign ministers of Japan, Indonesia, and the PRC. This once again demonstrates that major countries continue to regard Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as the main key in solving the Cambodian problem. Based on all of these facts, it is my opinion that we must not be too much concerned with what Hun Sen said, for we have clearly seen that he is merely a Vietnamese puppet, that he is not a key to the solution of the so-called Cambodian problem."

Son Sann Interviewed on Settlement Prospects
PM1101092889 Milan *L'UNITA* in Italian
6 Jan 89 p 5

[Interview with KPNLF leader Son Sann by Gabriel Bertinetto in Bangkok; date not given]

[Excerpt] Bangkok—[Passage omitted] [Bertinetto] How do you assess the present situation in Cambodia? Everything suggests that things are moving toward a political solution of the conflict.

[Son Sann] I believe that thanks to international pressure from the United Nations, the United States, and the European and ASEAN countries and thanks particularly to the Chinese-Soviet talks, Hanoi will be forced to negotiate. We are urging them to set a precise timetable for their withdrawal and to accept international supervision and the presence of a military peace force during the transition phase (through a general election held jointly with the government based in Phnom Penh and the three resistance groups.) However, there is a very delicate point. The Vietnamese will withdraw, but they are certainly already planning a possible future return. We (the resistance) must be very careful not to grant them any excuses for reentering Cambodia.

[Bertinetto] What kind of excuses?

[Son Sann] For the Vietnamese the genocide perpetrated by the previous regime was an excuse for invading and occupying our territory. If the Khmer Rouge tried to seize power again the Vietnamese would have a good excuse for returning. However, I hope the Khmer Rouge will understand what its duties are.

[Bertinetto] But do you believe the Khmer Rouge is really willing to accept a compromise political solution?

[Son Sann] Yes, I believe it is in its interests. If Phnom Penh agrees to dismantle its state apparatus, then the Khmer Rouge too will accept the DK government's dissolution.

[Bertinetto] Who really leads the Khmer Rouge: moderates such as Khieu Samphan or hard-liners such as Pol Pot?

[Son Sann] Khieu Samphan is the one who represents them within the coalition.

[Bertinetto] Is that enough to make him the real leader?

[Son Sann] That question should be put to them.

[Bertinetto] Mr Son Sann, your group seems to be weakened by internal splits.

[Son Sann] Back in 1985 I delegated military powers to others, but I retain the front's political leadership and take care of the civilian population in the refugee camps. We must organize and educate our people and prepare cadres for the future Cambodian state. I enjoy the confidence of everyone in our group with regard to the handling of such matters. It is true, however, that there is a lack of discipline in the camps. I am trying to restore order to our ranks because time is pressing and we must prepare for the country's liberation.

[Bertinetto] Do you have faith in Hun Sen? Do you believe he really wants to negotiate or that he is only trying to retain power?

[Son Sann] I believe that if they are strong enough we will negotiate. However, last November in Paris they just said "no" to our proposal. This means that they are not strong. Real strength lies in seeking compromises. We are not asking them to accept a Khmer Rouge regime and Hun Sen cannot ask us to accept his.

[Bertinetto] Let us try to be pessimistic for a moment: Suppose the Khmer Rouge returns to power and Vietnam invades Cambodia again. Which side will you be on?

[Son Sann] It depends on the situation at the time, but the Khmer Rouge has promised that they will do nothing like that and also China could not accept the assumption of a dominant role by a single component of the future four-way coalition.

[Bertinetto] The front that you head enjoys some popularity among the refugees, but what about in Cambodia?

[Son Sann] The refugees are a reflection of the Khmer people. When I visit the camps the request that the refugees put to me is to return to Cambodia with them.

SRV Statement Termed 'Deceiving, Tricky Lie'

BK08010.12289 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 7 Jan 89

[Station commentary: "To Quickly and Genuinely Resolve the Cambodian Problem, Vietnam Must Accept Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's Five-point Peace Plan and Withdraw All Its Aggressor Forces from Cambodia Under an Effective International Control and Supervision"]

[Text] A few days ago, Nguyen Co Thach said that the Cambodian problem could be solved through a political solution in 1989. The statement is nothing but a deceiving and tricky lie to world opinion. In fact, so far the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors are still insincere in producing a genuine political solution to the Cambodian problem.

1. They diametrically reject Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point peace plan for an equitable and fair solution to the Cambodian problem.
2. They are conducting deceitful maneuvers in connection with their troop withdrawals.
 - a) They unilaterally declared their withdrawals which had been conducted in the absence of international control and supervision.
 - b) They withdrew only disabled, worn-out soldiers, and those sick with malaria.
 - c) They have sent and are sending many more fresh troops to Cambodia. From early June to 31 December 1988 alone, Vietnam dispatched over 40,000 men to Cambodia.

d) They have organized and are organizing their new and old aggressor troops in Cambodia as the puppet forces and have ordered them to attend Cambodian language classes. Moreover, they have moved their troops to hidden positions in jungles away from main routes and townships.

3. Almost every day they send hundreds or thousands of Vietnamese families to settle in Cambodia. The Vietnamese settlers now number nearly a million and are successively naturalized.

4. They squarely reject the dissolution of the puppet regime which has been propped up by their bayonets since early 1979.

5. They oppose the presence of an international commission to monitor their troop withdrawals and organize elections in Cambodia.

The Hanoi authorities' stubborn attitude and malicious tactics both on Cambodia's battlefields and in the international arena have unambiguously proven that their repeated promises are nothing more than treacherous exercises to cover up the strategy of annexing Cambodia as a part of their stinking Indochinese federation.

The only way to speedily resolve the Cambodian problem and to safeguard durable peace and stability in Cambodia and Vietnam as well as in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is for Vietnam to accept Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point peace plan and quickly and completely withdraw its aggressor forces from Cambodia within a specific time frame and under effective international control and supervision.

Sihanoukist Army's 1988 Battle Successes Cited
BK1001075589 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer in Cambodian 0430 GMT 10 Jan 89

[Text] In 1988, National Sihanoukist Army [ANS] forces conducted 703 attacks, ambushes, and raids on Vietnamese troop positions in Cambodia, killing 1,383 enemy forces and wounding 1,858 others. ANS also seized 239 assorted firearms, including 3 mortars, 183 AK's, 56 rocket launchers, 12 light machineguns, and 5 12.7-mm machineguns.

On the Tonle Sap battlefield, ANS forces destroyed 5 Vietnamese boats, 19 ammunition and rice depots, 108 barracks, and 7 vehicles.

Moreover, ANS forces have expanded their positions and bases in central, eastern, and western Cambodia with a total of 21,000 troops.

Indonesia

U.S. Downing of Libyan Planes Said Regrettable
BK1301071189 Jakarta BERITA BUANA in Indonesian 9 Jan 89 pp 1, 9

[Excerpt] Jakarta—The Indonesian Government views the downing by U.S. fighters of two Libyan planes on Wednesday (4 January) as a regrettable development.

The action "tends to again cloud the international political situation which had been showing bright prospects recently, particularly with regard to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict," a statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs said in Jakarta on Saturday [7 January].

The Indonesian Government is following with deep concern the latest development of the rising tension in U.S.-Libyan relations.

In accordance with the basic principles of its foreign policy, "Indonesia believes that every dispute or conflict between nations should be duly settled through diplomacy and peace talks and not by the use of violence," the Department of Foreign Affairs said. [passage omitted]

Businessmen To Take Part in Soviet Trade Fair
BK1201141089 Jakarta ANTARA in English 1255 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Jakarta, Jan 12 (ANTARA/OANA)—Indonesia will for the first time participate in "Consume Expo," an international trade fair to be held in Moscow, the Soviet Union, from January 19 to 23, with the aim of introducing Indonesian capabilities in producing several goods to potential buyers in the European countries.

Head of the National Agency for Export Development (NAFED) Arifin Lumban Gaol disclosed this to the press here Wednesday [11 January], during which businessmen whose companies were to take part in the trade fair were also present in the meeting.

Some 700 companies from 25 countries will also take part in the trade fair.

Arifin stated the planned participation will be financed by the private sector, the first for its kind, as the previous participation were always under the cost of the government.

According to Arifin, the participation of seven Indonesian companies and representatives of the association of the state-owned trading companies will be emphasized on introducing Indonesian capabilities.

He reminded the businessmen not to conclude any contracts if they were not capable to supply the products requested in the contracts that might be signed.

Meanwhile, Ariono Susanto, who will become a coordinator of the Indonesian participants during the fair, said Indonesia plans to display various products ranging from rubber gloves, spices, yarn, plastic hose to processed foodstuff and garment.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Uganda
*BK1201063889 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian
0600 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] The Governments of Indonesia and Uganda have agreed to issue a joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A press release by the Department of Foreign Affairs today said that the two governments had also agreed to simultaneously make the announcement in the two capitals, Jakarta and Kampala.

Laos

Article Views U.S. Production of Chemical Weapons
*BK1201115989 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 11 Jan 89*

[Unattributed article: "Who Has Carried Out the Chemical Arms Race?"]

[Text] At present, chemical weapons have become one of the most formidably dangerous and deadly weapons in the world because, if used, they are capable of effecting mass killings at one stroke. Due to the grave concern expressed by the world's nations, an international conference has now been convened on this issue in Paris, France, with participation of delegates from 145 countries. This conference is aimed at finding ways to do away with and to ban totally the use of any chemical weapons in the world.

Before and during this international conference, the United States actively carried out activities in connection with chemical weapons. A few weeks before this conference was to begin, the Washington administration launched a large-scale anti-Libya propaganda campaign, accusing Libya of constructing a chemical weapons production plant. It even set in motion a plan to use force to destroy the alleged plant site. It is difficult to understand this U.S. reaction. This is because the United States does not really know what products the plant under construction in Libya is going to turn out. The White House administration has merely been furiously accusing Libya of building a plant to produce chemical weapons.

At the conference, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz offered various views on chemical weapons; for example, saying that the production and use of such weapons must be banned and that their producers be punished. However, if one closely looks at the U.S. reaction, one can see that the United States merely wants to draw the world's attention away from certain dubious acts of its own on this matter so as to cover up its crime against mankind.

Everyone knows full well that the United States has intentionally produced and used chemical weapons to kill people in the Indochinese and other countries on several occasions. At present, the United States is continuing to produce these weapons. On 8 December 1987, U.S. President Reagan signed a treaty with the Soviet leader on the elimination of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington. At that time, it appeared that preparations were already made by the two sides to sign an agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons. A joint statement issued after the summit also touched on this question. Nevertheless, shortly afterward, on 16 December 1987, the United States began to produce a new type of binary chemical weapon, code-named VX-2, at the Pine Bluff factory, which is operated by the Pentagon and located in Arkansas, at the rate of 70,000 units per month. Production of some components of this chemical weapon is reportedly carried out in Shreveport town in Louisiana. In the middle of last year, the Pentagon proceeded to build another similar but bigger factory.

The VX-2 chemical substance is used to equip 155-mm and 203.2-mm artillery shells, the XM-135 rocket, and some air-to-ground missiles. All of these weapons have been in use in all the NATO member countries. The hasty production of these chemical weapons by the Reagan administration is aimed at using them to replace the nuclear weapons which must be dismantled in accordance with the INF treaty the United States earlier signed with the Soviet Union.

All this clearly shows the hypocrisy of the Washington administration. It always tries to take advantage of and to be militarily superior to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. To be more specific, the above-mentioned act by Washington will only serve to further encourage the arms race, thus running counter to the overall trend in the world and the aspirations of all peace- and justice-loving countries.

Nevertheless, one cannot help but be gratified to see that George Bush has pledged that all chemical weapons should be completely destroyed. However, if the Washington administration really wants to show its good intentions, it must do so in a concrete and practical manner to create a model for other countries to follow. People all over the world—the Lao people included—are waiting to see whether the United States will take any action to conform with the world's aspirations to do away with all chemical weapons.

LPA Head, Thai Military Commander Hold Talks
*BK1301025789 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Text] At the invitation of General Sisavat Keobounphan, chief of the LPA General Staff, General Chawalit Yongchayut, Thai Army commander and acting supreme commander, and a delegation of high-level military officers arrived in Vientiane yesterday morning

for consultations on issues relating to the military of the two countries in accordance with the spirit of the Lao-Thai joint communique dated 25 November 1988.

Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut and his delegation were given a warm reception by Gen Sisavat Keobounphan and LPA high-ranking military officers upon their arrival at Wattai Airport.

Later, the high-level military delegations of the two countries cordially held consultative meetings and were unanimous on every issue discussed, such as the effort to quickly bring to normalcy the situation in the formerly disputed border area between Boten District of Sayaboury Province and Chat Trakan District of Phitsanuok Province, and economic cooperation between Lao and Thai armed forces in a brotherly and neighborly spirit and on the principle of equality and mutual interests.

Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut and his delegation returned to Bangkok on the afternoon of the same day.

Thai Commerce Minister, Delegation Begin Visit
BK1301052389 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0000 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Text] Sali Vongkhamso, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of economics, planning, and finance, received a delegation from the Commerce Ministry of the Kingdom of Thailand led by Commerce Minister Dr Subin Pinkhay. The meeting proceeded in a good atmosphere. In the afternoon of the same day, the Thai delegation also called on Sisavat Keobounphan, chairman of the Vientiane Administrative Committee and Phao Bounnaphon, minister of trade and foreign economic relations.

The Thai trade delegation arrived in Vientiane yesterday morning [12 January] for consultations with the Lao side on trade and investment between the governments and private sectors of the two countries, purchase of Lao wood by Thailand, and cooperation in these areas. At the same time, they will also discuss the setting up of the Lao-Thai trade and technical cooperation committee.

Philippines

Reportage on Asia Pacific People's Conference

Secret U.S. Base Alleged in Mindanao
HK1301050389 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 13 Jan 89 pp 1, 8

[By D. Borje]

[Excerpt] A secret base in Mindanao was pinpointed yesterday as America's "scorekeeper" in the event of a thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Meeting on the first day of the 18-country peace conference at the Mirador Hotel, experts monitoring foreign bases in the Asia-Pacific region said the secret base is located inside the Del Monte compound in Bukidnon.

Officials of Del Monte company were not available for comment regarding the charge that the base is located in its premises.

The base, according to experts, is operated by the U.S. Air Force and has actually a signboard on it. It is reportedly located near a Philippine military camp.

Owen Wilkes, a New Zealand expert on U.S. bases overseas, and conference delegate Marie Leadbeater affirmed in a conference paper a conclusion by the provincial government of Misamis Oriental about the presence of the U.S. monitoring base.

"At Bukidnon in Mindanao is a facility that will act as scorekeeper in any nuclear war," said Leadbeater and Wilkes, formerly of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

"Its antennae and other sensors will detect where all the nuclear explosions are happening, and measure their size, so that U.S. commanders know where the Soviets are attacking and where the U.S. missiles are detonating—which ones are on-target, which ones are duds," their paper said.

The two experts who analyzed the importance of American bases in the country have concluded that "of all facilities in the Philippines, Bukidnon is probably the one most intimately involved with nuclear warfighting."

When confronted with the information provided by the two foreign experts, the U.S. embassy in Manila denied that the U.S. Air Force maintains a base in Mindanao.

"The allegation is not true," embassy spokesman Jerry Hutchel said in a telephone interview.

A check with official brochures of the United States Information Service showed that the U.S. has six U.S. bases in the Philippines, but none in Mindanao.

But Leadbeater and Janine Macgruddy of New Zealand's Peace Movement of Auteroa, said that in their recent trip to Cagayan de Oro, they talked with witnesses who testified that there was actually a U.S. Air Force base in Bukidnon.

A check with the records showed that in 1983, then Misamis Oriental Gov. Homobono Adaza received testimonies from workers that there was actually a base in the area.

Affidavits of workers are reportedly still in the possession of the provincial government of Misamis Oriental.

But even during that time, the U.S. embassy had denied the presence of a U.S. military base but admitted that it had an installation monitoring seismic behavior in the Asia-Pacific region.

Prof. Roland Simbulan, author of THE BASES OF OUR INSECURITY and conference discussant, said the Mindanao base was not in the list of bases listed in the 1947 Military Bases Agreement.

The Mindanao base could have been installed in the early '70s, Simbulan said.

Simbulan said he does not doubt the integrity of Wilkes and Leadbeater, whom he described as "serious researchers."

He said that while a fellow in a Stockholm research institute, he exposed the U.S. spy nests all over Sweden. [passage omitted]

Reactions to Allegations

HK1301091189 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0700 GMT 13 Jan 89

[Slantlines indicate passages in English]

[Text] Judith Rueras reports:

[Begin recording] [Rueras] Senate minority floor leader Juan Ponce Enrile denied any knowledge of the reported U.S. military facility in Bukidnon, Mindanao. He said the government should give formal information about the matter. Enrile reacted to the report of the Asia Pacific People's Conference on Peace and Development which is currently being held in Manila. According to reports, this military installation is the most sophisticated among all the U.S. facilities in the Philippines because it can monitor nuclear activity in any part of the world. According to U.S. military facility experts in the Philippines, even if the United States claims this to be only a weather station, this nuclear monitoring system was set up in Camp Philip inside the Del Monte plantation in Bukidnon in 1970 to monitor all nuclear tests and earthquakes in the Pacific.

Enrile said the government should determine whether or not there is an agreement between the Philippines and the United States regarding this matter, and the public should be formally informed. He was the acting defense minister when this facility was established and his department had nothing to do with it. He had passed the responsibility to the Department of Foreign Relations.

[Enrile] /The Department of National Defense, as far as I know, has no participation whatsoever./

[Reporter] /Those installations you mean.../

[Enrile, interrupting] /That is the only one that I know. I do not know what is the purpose of that. But anyway, I think there must have been an agreement between the Philippine Government and the U.S. Government in connection with that facility. And we should find out from the Department of Foreign Affairs what that is. And if there is no agreement, then the Philippine Government should ask the Americans to discontinue it. But if there is an agreement, then we'll find out what are the rights and obligations of the contracting parties with respect to...[changes thought] It is immaterial [word indistinct] it was installed. Let us not blame Marcos again for it. The fact is that it is there, and it is now the duty of this government to make a decision whether they like it or not. If they like it, then they should tell the Filipino people why they like it, and whether it is for the good of the country or not. If they do not like it, then they should have the courage and the will to say so. We have nothing to do with that. That is purely a matter of foreign affairs./

[Rueras] Meanwhile, Senator Aquilino Pimentel assured that the United States had already dismantled this installation in 1985. He said that he was among those who voiced the truth when it was discovered through research the reason behind the existence of this monitoring facility. The U.S. officials had admitted the presence of this installation in 1983.

[Pimentel] /My impression is that it was over, that apparently they had no more need of it./ It was a long time ago, before early 1985.

[Rueras] Senator Joseph Estrada condemned the issue saying that the Americans cannot be trusted.

[Estrada] /So I condemn such action of the U.S. Government for not making it public. At the same time they should abide only by what is agreed upon in the bases agreement. They already have this propaganda which they have started all over the Philippines. In Butuan, I was there last month, and I could see the propaganda materials—expensive magazines. I never knew that Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Platt know how to speak Tagalog. So they are really penetrating the mass base of our people. That is why I am making an antibases movie, showing the ill effects of the U.S. bases here, to counteract that propaganda. And I believe that this movie will be more effective to the masses./

The U.S. military bases should really be removed from our country because as I have always said the bases have been here for 80 years now and nothing has been done to benefit us. In other words, based on my assessment, this is the reason for our poverty. There are many invitations—I have been invited many times—but I did not accept them because I think it's not yet the time to talk to them.

Secretary Shultz and Secretary Manglapus recently signed the Military Bases Agreement and it is obvious that we are again the underdog. Our three small demands, i.e. criminal jurisdiction over the U.S. military personnel, power to protect our workers in the bases, and collective bargaining, were not granted. Our soldiers who fought with the Americans in World War II during the Japanese Occupation have not yet received their veterans' claims, and many of them have already died. How can you say this is for the mutual interest of both countries? They always have the upper hand and our small petitions are not even granted. This is a one-sided contract. [end recording]

Meanwhile, Gabby Salcedo reports from Malacanang:

[Begin recording] [Salcedo] President Corazon Aquino clarified allegations published in today's newspapers that there is a U.S. base on a plantation in Bukidnon. This was alleged by a foreign antinuclear activist attending the Asia Pacific Conference on Peace and Development in Manila. According to New Zealand delegate Marie Leadbeater, the Philippines is being made a storekeeper for the eventuality of a nuclear war. Here is the president's reply on this issue as well as the latest update on Rizal Ali. Press Under Secretary Felix Bautista reads the statement:

[Bautista] /The AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] findings and recommendations on its investigation into the Zamboanga incident will be submitted this weekend, after which I shall take the necessary action.

/From 1963 to 1985 the United States maintained the seismological research station as an aid station at Del Monte, Bukidnon, to monitor compliance with the 1963 limited steps ban treaty. The station was closed on July 22, 1985./ [end recording]

Officials Said To Support U.S. Bases

HK120115789 Hong Kong AFP in English 1104 GMT
12 Jan 89

[Text] Manila, Jan 12 (AFP)—Philippines Senator Wigberto Tanada criticized civilian and military officials for their alleged support of U.S. bases in the country, at a conference of left-leaning groups here Thursday.

He also bemoaned government warnings that delegates of the Asia Pacific People's Conference on Peace and Development might try to contact and provide support to local communist insurgent guerrillas.

Mr. Tanada singled out Philippine Ambassador to the United States Emmanuel Pelaez who said Monday that the Philippine economy would be affected if Manila abruptly removed U.S. military bases from the country.

"In saying that an abrupt withdrawal of the bases here after 1991 could be disruptive and could lead to political upheavals, Ambassador Pelaez ignores the determination of our people to be free from nuclear weapons and to terminate the military bases agreement," Mr. Tanada said.

About 200 activists from Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Pacific island nations are currently attending the January 12-15 conference sponsored by foreign and local left-leaning groups.

Former human rights lawyer Justice Secretary Sedfrey Ordóñez and Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus have warned the delegates on local laws against interfering in Philippine affairs.

A top military official has also said that they would be criminally prosecuted if they attempt to contact members of the banned communist movement or take part in violent anti-government demonstrations.

Mr. Tanada said: "It is therefore ironic that under the new democratic dispensation, a conference ... committed to ending the spectre of nuclear war and the senseless escalation of nuclear weapons ... should now be questioned by the guardians of national security."

At a news conference Wednesday, the delegates called for the immediate dismantling of all foreign military bases in Asia and the Pacific and a halt to nuclear testing in the region.

The Philippines hosts Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, the two largest U.S. military bases overseas located north of Manila. Their leases are due to expire in 1991.

Secretary Luis Santos To Attend Bush Inaugural HK1301020789 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Local Government Secretary Luis Santos is scheduled to leave today for Washington, D.C., to attend the inauguration of U.S. President-elect George Bush on January 10. Santos will be attending the inauguration in response to an official invitation by the U.S. Republican Party. While in the U.S., Santos said he would meet with several high government officials of the Departments of Interior and Agriculture as well as the Director of the United States Agency for International Development [USAID] to follow up on an earlier agreement regarding the USAID's funding for special projects administered by his department. Santos is also scheduled to meet the president of the Bechtel group of companies to discuss the construction of an ultra-modern superhighway starting from Capas, Tarlac, to Taguig, Metro Manila. He said President Aquino has already approved his 1-week official trip to the United States.

State Firm Seeks Trade With Socialist Nations
HK1301052189 Manila BUSINESS STAR in English
13 Jan 89 p 12

[Text] The state-owned Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) is launching an all-out campaign to penetrate the socialist bloc and South American market with non-traditional products, according to Oscar Espejo, general manager of PITC's International Trading Department.

Eastern Europe, according to Espejo, is the object of an all-out market coverage, particularly for coconut oil. He told THE BUSINESS STAR that Eastern Europeans get their supply of coconut products from Rotterdam and that PITC is exploring the possibility of directly supplying coconut products to this region.

Espejo indicated the need for the Philippines to diversify its markets and export products especially in the light of growing protectionist tendencies among its traditional trading partners.

Establishing special trading arrangements with these countries is an initial step to further expanding the coverage of Philippine products in this largely untapped market, he said.

The Philippines must have an industrial economy to be able to export manufactured products, Espejo explained, because the success or failure of an agro-based economy is "dependent on the weather." He added that because of this the Philippines doesn't have enough products for export.

In explaining the need to diversify the market for Philippine goods, he cited the banning of tropical oils in the U.S. because of rumors that these are carcinogenic and the tariff hike for palm oils in the European Community.

He noted that these moves by traditional markets for Philippine goods would be a great loss to the coconut industry which is the country's biggest agro-based export earner.

Since trade with socialist countries is usually conducted through barter, the Philippines can expect industrial raw materials such as steel products, coal, construction materials and pharmaceuticals in exchange for coconut products.

PITC also plans to increase trade with Japan and other neighboring countries to save on transportation costs. Espejo cites the marketing development project in Brunei with a foodstuff market worth \$450 million. Philippine goods can compete with Singaporean products because of the shorter freight distance (THE BUSINESS STAR, Jan 3, 1989).

Espejo also expressed optimism for food exports to the Middle East especially with a ready market of Filipino expatriates in the region.

The problem with the Middle East market for construction materials like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, is the competition with U.S. and Western European products in terms of price and quality, he said.

According to him, it would be difficult for the Philippines to compete with the U.S. and Western Europe with transportation costs to consider, Espejo added.

No Plans To Evacuate Workers From Libya
HK1201112189 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH in Tagalog 0945 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] With regard to the U.S. downing of two Libyan planes, many Filipinos with relatives in Libya are concerned about the situation and fear that the rift between these two countries will worsen. Relatives of overseas workers and Philippine Embassy personnel in Libya are concerned that an evacuation may be necessary.

Rey Arquiza reports that there are no plans to evacuate Filipino contract workers in Libya. This is based on the statement by Libyan Ambassador to the Philippines Salim Mohammed Adim.

[Begin Arquiza recording] Libyan ambassador to the Philippines, Salim Mohammed Adim, said there are no plans to evacuate Filipino contract workers and their dependents. As proof Adim said that within a week, 160,000 [figure as heard] Filipino contract workers will arrive in Tripoli to work for the Sidra Oil Company. He added that during the next 2 months 2,000 Filipino hospital workers will also go to Tripoli. Currently, there are around 40,000 workers in Libya.

Ambassador Adim also held a meeting with POEA [Philippine Overseas Employment Agency] officials and learned that there are no plans to order the return of Filipino workers from Libya. His meeting with the POEA is related to earlier reports saying that the agency would order the workers to come home because of the U.S. threat to bomb a chemical plant suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons located near Tripoli. The Libyan ambassador stressed that the plant does not produce chemical weapons but medicine, and they are prepared to be investigated by foreign diplomats and the media.

Earlier, reports reaching the Department of Foreign Affairs home office said that the Philippine Ambassador to Libya Abdul Madki Alonto has made assurances that Filipino workers there are out of danger even if the United States were to bomb the plant. According to Alonto, there are around 80 Filipino workers, the majority of whom are health workers, who are in Sharqiyah, a

town near the chemical plant found in Al-Rabitah, 58 km from the south of Tripoli. Most of the Filipinos, around 15,000 of them, are in the center of Libya, Alonto added. [end recording]

Aquino Approves Sale of Tokyo Property
*HK1201093789 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0700 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] President Aquino said that she has spoken with Congressman Herminio Aquino but the congressman denied having stated that several officials connected with Malacanang have benefited from Philippine real estate holdings in Japan. We have taken a statement from Malacanang, from the president, saying that a committee has recommended the sale of one of the state properties in Japan and the president has given her approval to the sale. The following are the contents of President Aquino's written statement for the press:

I called up Congressman Herminio Aquino, and he denied having made the statement that certain individuals who claimed to be influential with Malacanang have already made money on Philippine real estate holdings in Japan.

Incidentally, the committee charged with the disposition and utilization of the Philippine properties in Japan has already briefed the Senate and the House of Representatives on the progress of its work. And we will hold a news conference before the members of the Malacanang Press Corps this afternoon at 3:00 [0700 GMT].

The committee has recommended and I have approved the sale of the Roppongi property.

The Philippine Government owns five properties in Japan: three in Tokyo and two in Kobe. No definite decision has been made on the two other properties in Tokyo, one of which is occupied by our chancery and the third by our ambassador's residence.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has decided to transfer our consulate in Kobe to Osaka. The plan is to swap the two Kobe properties for a piece of property in Osaka.

Laurel Opposes Sale
*HK1201083389 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0700 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] Vice President Salvador Laurel is opposing the sale of the Philippines Roppongi property in Japan.

According to Vice President Laurel the value of the property will soar in the coming years. Laurel said that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program will be a failure anyway, so there is no need to sell the Roppongi property and donate the proceeds to the program. Laurel

has noticed that land owners within the Roppongi district are not selling their properties. He claimed that businessmen in the area know that properties there are so valuable because it is a financial district.

Aquino Urges Stricter Observance of Gun Law
*HK1301033189 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
in Tagalog 0300 GMT 13 Jan 89*

[Text] President Corazon Aquino appealed for a stricter observance of the law regarding the possession of firearms. The chief executive made this appeal in the wake of the proliferation of sophisticated firearms into the country. Mrs Aquino emphasized that no one is above the law. She requested legislators to seek gun permits from the constabulary before acquiring high-powered guns. The president said that the legislators, like all Filipinos, should abide by the regulations covering the possession of firearms.

House Terms Israeli Firearms 'Illegal'
*HK1301021589 Manila Far East Broadcasting
Company in English 2300 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] Defense Under Secretary Fortunato Abat said the controversial importation of 150 Israeli-made machine pistols [as heard], Uzis, and Galil assault rifles, allegedly for the use of the security force in the House of Representatives, is illegal. Abat said that the importation was not approved by his office. Customs authorities seized on Wednesday the gun shipment upon arrival at the Aquino International Airport. The shipment was reportedly consigned to Representative Rodrigo Gutang who is also the chairman of the House Committee on Public Safety. The importation has stirred a lot of controversy and created havoc and embarrassment in the House of Representatives, particularly when Speaker Ramon Mitra disclaimed any knowledge of the firearms shipment. The controversy was further aggravated when Minority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano and Assistant Minority Floor Leader Salvador Escudero III called for a thorough investigation of the importation.

The deadly Uzi submachines and the Galil assault rifles are the standard weapons issued to the Israeli army. According to Abat, the Department of National Defense was not informed about the importation of these firearms. He also said that to import a gun, one must first secure a permit from the Constabulary chief who will in turn forward the request to the Firearms/Explosive Unit for processing before it forwards the request back to the PC chief for approval. PC Chief Major General Ramon Montano had asked Customs Commissioner Salvador Mison to seize the 150 Uzis and Galil rifles because of the lack of proper documentation. The high-powered firearms were valued at \$53,925.

Media Bodies Protest Airport Restrictions

HK1201123789 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network in Tagalog 1030 GMT 12 Jan 89

[From "GMA News" program]

[Text] Media personnel have today urged President Aquino to revoke her directive restricting the movements of reporters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.

Three noted media organizations, the National Press Club, People's Movement for Press Freedom, and the Press Photographers of the Philippines, signed the appeal.

According to them the president's directive is a violation of press freedom.

Defense Department Confirms Ali Alive

HK1201133389 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 1300 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] The Department of National Defense has confirmed that Rizal Ali, the renegade patrolman who hosted and killed Regional Command 9 Commander Eduardo Batalla, is alive.

The confirmation is based on the investigation conducted by retired General Felix Brawner who was sent to Zamboanga to conduct the investigation. However, he could not identify the place where Ali is now hiding.

In this connection, the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Senator Ernesto Macea has decided to reopen an investigation. The Macea committee will wait until the Armed Forces have finished their investigation into the case before conducting its own. [Macea recording indistinct]

NPA Said Developing 'Fighting Villages'
HK1301050189 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 13 Jan 89 pp 1, 8

[By staff writer Divina Paredes-Japa]

[Text] The communist rebels are developing "fighting villages" in Negros, and even the elderly and children are trained to battle with the military.

This is part of the two-year strategy of the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]-NPA in Negros, the country's fourth largest island and where the rebels have reportedly succeeded most in organizing both legal and underground support groups.

Other strategies include increasing the number of organizations throughout the island and stockpiling of ammunition and explosives, Brig. Gen. Rene Cardones, brigade commander of the Philippine Army in Negros, said yesterday.

Cardones, in a briefing for Commission on Human Rights [CHR] officials on the insurgency situation in Negros, said that under the concept of "fighting villages," the residents are "committed enough to directly participate in hostilities" against the military.

"More women, children and old people are being indoctrinated to make direct participation in hostilities," Cardones said.

To support his claim, Cardones cited recent raids where children, who are "supposedly civilians" participated by recovering the firearms of "fallen soldiers."

CHR chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista said the use of children "in battle" has been raised before the United Nations. Cardones said this has been done "several times" referring to the situation in Negros.

Cardones maintained that Negros is the "most affected island in the country" as far as insurgency is concerned.

The rebels' strength is not measured alone by the number of armed elements but in the number of organized masses and sectors throughout the island, he explained.

In outlining the "CCP Revolutionary Spectrum" in the island, Cardones said the communist rebels have several "front organizations," he cited the League of Filipino Students, the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG], the National Federation of Labor Unions and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers.

Told that CHR commissioner Abelardo Aportadera was a member of FLAG, Cardones explained that when the military had a dialogue with the leaders of this lawyers' group, the former explained that "you may not be Left (but) we have reason to believe your people in the field may be of that persuasion."

Cardones admitted that their basis for this conclusion is "moral." "We try to be as objective in our analysis...we would rather be overly concerned than be naive," he said in explaining the linking of these cause-oriented groups with the underground movement.

Cardones likewise cited a news report that said 35 priests have "sworn allegiance" to the CPP-NPA in 1987. He said the report "could be the understatement of the year," to stress the supposed influence of the rebels even among members of the Catholic church.

He said the "organized masses" of the CPP-NPA in Negros number 131,412 compared to 79,880 in Samar; 52,000 in Panay; 10,800 in Leyte; 7,973 in Cebu and 6,040 in Bohol.

The NPAs in Samar have an armed strength of 5,985. Of these, 117 belong to "Sparrow Units"; 3,124 are militiamen which Cardones said are the counterparts of the CAFGUs; 2,124 belong to "self defense organizations" and 620 to guerrilla units.

The CPP claims a membership of "only" over 2,390, but has 50,000 "mass activists," and 400,000 "influenced masses," including members of cause-oriented groups, he said.

Cardones said the number of CPP "organized masses" in Negros has actually gone down from 134,513 in 1985 to the present 131,412.

Yet, he said the military is still "not comfortable" with this.

He said the military will launch this month "Oplan Gemini" which aims to reduce insurgency in the next three years, which was also President Aquino's timetable of beating the rebels from both the left and the right.

This plan involves "continuous" offensives against rebels. He said the military will use the "special operation teams" similar to the propaganda organizing units of the NPAs.

He said that military, however, has initiated 387 encounters with the rebels, compared to 59 initiated by the CPP-NPA.

The NPAs, on the other hand, liquidated 159 civilians who refused to join the movement. "They're trying to eliminate obstacles to their mass organizing," said Cardones who placed these cases under the title "enemy atrocities."

Guerrilla Returnees Resettlement Approved
HK1201125189 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network in Tagalog 1030 GMT 12 Jan 89

[From "GMA News" program]

[Text] The National Reconciliation and Rehabilitation Council [NRRC] has today acted on the resettlement of about 10,000 guerrilla returnees.

Local Governments Secretary Luis Santos, acting NRRC chairman, and National Housing Authority General Manager Raymundo Dizon today signed an agreement on the resettlement of the guerrilla returnees.

Secretary Santos also disclosed that P [pesos] 72 million has been allocated for the rebels' livelihood programs. He said that the government is hoping for more rebels to surrender this year.

[Begin Santos recording in English in progress] ...I told you before is one guerrilla ties down a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 10 enlisted men. You can imagine if you

maintain 10 soldiers indefinitely it is cheaper to rehabilitate one rebel from the purely cost benefit ratio; it is the wisest thing to do. [word indistinct] that we want peace and brotherhood in the Philippines, the cost benefit ratio alone is, the result is incalculably good for the entire nation. [end recording]

Thailand

Prime Minister Chatchai 'May Resign' at Age 70
BK1301141889 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
13 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said he is getting old and may resign when he turns 70.

At a New Year party he threw for reporters at his Soi Ratchakhru residence on Wednesday night, the Premier said that the factor that would dictate whether he would survive his four-year term would not be a political one but his own physical fitness.

"I have intended to remain in the term until I am 70. It's so quick. Now I'm 69. One mistake and there may not be enough time left for me to make amends," he said.

Gen Chatchai said, however, that he was still physically fit. "I have tried to eat little but I still put on weight because I can't play golf or tennis anymore. I have to spend my free time going up country to see the people."

He said he had agreed to accept the premiership because of public support and he vowed to do his best.

"Being prime minister, I have to be careful in every issue. I have to study every issue that will go into the Cabinet and my advisers also have to help screen things to prevent problems," he said.

"One must realise that when he becomes old he must know when to stop. It's no use trying to keep on going because he won't make it," Gen Chatchai said.

Sitthi Returns From Visit to SRV

Reports on Talks With Leaders
BK1201144389 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
1300 GMT 12 Jan 89

[Text] Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila has ended an official visit to Vietnam from 9 January and returned to Thailand today at 1600 hrs. He reported to mass media at the Air Force Headquarters Airport at Don Muang that the visit and the meetings with Vietnamese authorities were very successful. Vietnam considers this visit a new chapter in Thai-Vietnamese relations. Both sides agreed to cooperate in efforts to bring peace to the region, to urgently seek a settlement for the Cambodian problem, and explore possibilities to expand mutual cooperation and strengthen friendly relations.

The foreign minister said that, during the visit, he met the Vietnamese prime minister, the general secretary of the CPV, and the Vietnamese deputy prime minister and foreign minister. He said that the Vietnamese prime minister commended Thailand for the big advancement it made and said Vietnam wished to send officials for studies here. He hoped that the forthcoming visit to Vietnam by Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan will further strengthen the relations between the two countries.

On his meeting with the general secretary of the CPV, the foreign minister said Vietnam told Thailand that it would make efforts to end the fighting in Cambodia, in other words, to find a settlement to the Cambodian problem as soon as possible so that Vietnamese troops could be brought back to Vietnam for national development.

On his meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, he said both sides agreed on various points. Both realized the need for and mutual benefits they would gain from expanding cooperation to solve the Cambodian problem, to clear obstacles blocking development of relations between the two countries and of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Both sides agreed that a settlement of the Cambodian problem must be a comprehensive one—involving troop withdrawal, an end to external interference, and national reconciliation among the four Khmer factions. Sitthi said he congratulated Vietnam for its decision on an earlier troop pullout from Cambodia by September this year, and agreed to hold more talks to discuss details on troop withdrawal, an end to external interference, and Cambodian national reconciliation, especially on the meeting of the four Khmer factions which would pave the way for an international conference of concerned parties later on.

On bilateral relations between Thailand and Vietnam, he said Vietnam has shown good will by offering to free 281 Thai fishermen, 10 among that number have already returned to Thailand today. They also discussed technical and business cooperation between Thailand and Vietnam as well as measures to solve the problem of Vietnamese boat people.

More on Talks With Nguyen Co Thach
BK1301013189 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
13 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] Details of a timetable for a Vietnamese withdrawal are likely to be settled at the second Jakarta Informal Meeting next month, a senior Foreign Ministry official said yesterday.

Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, who returned to Bangkok yesterday from his four-day visit to Hanoi, and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach discussed the timetable of the troop withdrawal, but did not go into details.

Mr Thach announced on Wednesday that if a political agreement is reached, a Vietnamese troop withdrawal could take place within the next three months or by September at the latest.

ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi said yesterday at a press conference after arriving home: "Vietnamese leaders said firmly that the complete withdrawal will take place by this September despite any problem."

He quoted Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Linh as saying that sending troops to Kampuchea has caused a great loss to Vietnam and it will speed the peace process to enable those troops to return home and develop the country.

ACM Sitthi said "I also told Mr Thach that he could talk to (Phnom Penh premier) Hun Sen and Heng Samrin to soften their stance towards the resistance forces to facilitate an agreement."

On the problem of boat people and refugees, ACM Sitthi said Vietnam agreed to join in an international conference on refugees called by ASEAN in Geneva for the middle of this year.

The Vietnamese also agreed to increase measures preventing their people from fleeing and to expand the Orderly Departure Programme so that Vietnamese refugees can be settled in third countries without risking the hazardous journey to first asylum countries.

Vietnam also agreed to receive refugees who return voluntarily.

ACM Sitthi added that Vietnam will send a team of officials to Bangkok next month to discuss a voluntary repatriation programme.

A Foreign Ministry source noted that both Thailand and Vietnam have grown "less stubborn" and "more realistic" regarding the Kampuchea problem, and the change of attitude has increased the possibility of a solution.

The source predicted a flurry of diplomatic activity on Kampuchea in the next few months following ACM Sitthi's successful visit to Vietnam.

ACM Sitthi also clarified some points pertaining to the Kampuchean solution that were announced on Wednesday in a joint press statement.

The "international mechanism for control and supervision"—the term Vietnam agreed to instead of an International Control Commission and an International Peace Keeping Force—will control and verify withdrawal, a ceasefire, and oversee the election, ACM Sitthi said.

Vietnam said it would take into consideration the Thai proposal for territorial withdrawal, and promised ACM Sitthi an answer later.

Vietnam also told him that it would like to join the ASEAN alliance, which ACM Sitthi promised to discuss with other member countries.

Meanwhile, members of the Thai private sector who accompanied ACM Sitthi said Vietnam would like to buy 100,000 tons of Thai rice.

Mr Saman Ophatwong, president of the Thai Rice Association, also signed a contract to buy US \$2 million worth of logs.

Mr Suwit Wangli, vice president of the Board of Trade, said Vietnam had offered direct trade for its agricultural products, animal hides, marine products, wood and ores, including jewellery.

In return, Thailand offered to trade rice, cement, light machinery and textiles.

Dr Kramon Thongthammachat, who led a team of eight academics in ACM Sitthi's delegation, said a conference between Thai and Vietnamese scholars will be held within the next few months.

The meeting, which Mr Thach had approved, will contribute to bilateral cooperation, Dr Kramon said.

Sharing the flight home from Ho Chi Minh City with the official delegation were ten Thai fishermen that Vietnam had released without fines as a gesture of goodwill.

ACM Sitthi had negotiated the release of 281 Thai fishermen held in Vietnam, which agreed to halve the fines of the other 271 fishermen.

Cites Possibility of SRV-PRC Dialogue
OW1201150889 Tokyo KYODO in English 1450 GMT
12 Jan 89

[Text] Bangkok, Jan. 12 KYODO—Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said Thursday that China and Vietnam may soon hold direct dialogue on the Kampuchean issue.

Sitthi made the remark in response to a question at a news conference following his return from a four-day visit to Hanoi.

Sitthi and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach held talks in Hanoi and said in their joint statement issued Wednesday that they had agreed to work together "toward achieving peace in Kampuchea."

Sitthi said that while he was in Hanoi, Thach told him that Vietnam and China would have direct talks, but added that Thach did not say on what level such talks would be conducted.

(A report from Hanoi, meanwhile, said a Vietnamese official—possibly a vice foreign minister—may leave for China via Bangkok on Friday).

Sitthi also said an expanded forum of the so-called Jakarta informal meeting with both China and the Soviet Union participating may be held at an appropriate time after the second Jakarta informal meeting.

The second such meeting is scheduled to be held February 20-22 in Indonesia. The first meeting took place at Bogor, Indonesia, in July last year, with representatives of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and three Indochinese nations—Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea—attending.

Sitthi said he has expressed his willingness to visit Beijing from February 9 to 12, but the Chinese side has not given him any response.

Sitthi said moves toward a political settlement to the Kampuchean issue will be accelerated from now on.

'Pleased' With Visit
BK1301011189 Bangkok THE NATION in English
13 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] China's agreement to meet Vietnam next month for their first known high-level talks on Kampuchea will contribute to the attempts to settle the 10-year-old conflict, Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday.

The move is seen as one of the new developments concerning the Kampuchean problem that make Sitthi confident that peace and stability will return to Southeast Asia by September.

The others include Khmer resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk's decision to join the informal Kampuchean talks scheduled for next month in Jakarta and Hanoi's pledge to convince the Phnom Penh regime to show flexibility in the peace talks and to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by September.

But Sitthi declined to further comment on the report that China has agreed to receive Vietnam's minister or deputy minister for foreign affairs for talks on the Khmer conflict early next month.

He said it would be inappropriate for him to comment on matters that are still considered "confidential".

Sitthi said he knows when China and Vietnam will meet to discuss the conflict but could not divulge any details. [passage omitted]

Speaking at a news conference upon his return from Vietnam, Sitthi said Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach informed him of the new developments toward a settlement of Kampuchea during his three-day visit there.

Sitthi said Vietnam has clearly demonstrated intention to solve the Kampuchean conflict with a pledge to withdraw its remaining forces from Kampuchea by September. Hanoi also promised to help facilitate attempts to reach a political solution among the four warring Khmer factions.

Sitthi said Thach told him yesterday morning that Sihanouk, now in Paris, has already dropped his demand to have the Vietnamese-supported government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in Phnom Penh dismantled before he would have any more talks with it.

He said he was also told the prince has stated his intention to attend the second informal meeting on Kampuchea in Jakarta next month.

Sitthi said he was "very pleased" with the success of his trip to Vietnam which would contribute to the peace process in Kampuchea.

Sitthi said both Thailand and Vietnam agreed in the talks in Hanoi that the most desirable solution to the Kampuchean problem would be a comprehensive one involving the total withdrawal of foreign troops, the cessation of external aid and intervention and the realization of national conciliation among the four Kampuchean parties.

Sitthi said the three elements are inseparable.

He said the Jakarta informal talks next month should lead to an "expanded meeting" that would include China, the Soviet Union and other countries concerned.

"An expanded meeting is necessary in laying down a groundwork for international recognition of a Kampuchea settlement," Sitthi told the news conference.

The foreign minister said he also asked Thach to help persuade Phnom Penh leaders to be more flexible in talks with the three other Khmer resistance forces of Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge Khieu Samphan, and Khmer People's National Liberation Front Son Sann.

On refugee problem, Sitthi said Vietnam will send a delegation to Bangkok next month to discuss repatriation of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand who want to return home voluntarily.

It would be the first meeting between the two countries on the question of refugee repatriation. Vietnam has already concluded repatriation agreements with Hong Kong and Malaysia.

He said during the Hanoi talks, Vietnam agreed to attend the international conference on refugees to be held in Geneva in the middle of this year.

He said Vietnam also promised to try to prevent its people from fleeing the country illegally and at the same time to step up the implementation of the orderly departure programme.

Calls Meetings 'Great Success'

*BK1301070189 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
13 Jan 89 p 14*

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Speaking to newsmen at Don Muang Airport upon returning from his visit to the SRV, Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila said he considered his discussions with Vietnamese leaders to be a great success and that Vietnam regarded his visit as beginning a new chapter in Thai-Vietnamese relations.

Thailand and Vietnam agreed on a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem through withdrawal of troops, cessation of external interference, and Cambodian national reconciliation. Sitthi said he briefed Vietnamese leaders on his approval of the Vietnamese intention to withdraw all its troops by this September and suggested that at the same time other political processes should be speeded up.

The foreign minister said of his meeting with CPV Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh, the latter assured that it was his intention to settle the Cambodian problem quickly so that Vietnamese soldiers could return home to help national development. The CPV secretary general admitted that it was a great loss in sending Vietnamese soldiers to Cambodia, including in terms of their death. He also commended Thailand's progress and said Vietnam could learn many things from Thailand.

The foreign minister said he had a long meeting with SRV Premier Do Muoi, who asked him to convey his New Year's greetings to the king and said the Thai prime minister's coming visit to the SRV will greatly promote Thai-Vietnamese relations. Sitthi said: I am very satisfied with the visit to Vietnam. [passage omitted]

Comments on Refugee Talks

*BK1201131389 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
1200 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] The foreign minister and his delegation, including members from the private business sector, had a successful visit to Vietnam thus opening up a new chapter in Thai-Vietnamese relations which will greatly contribute to security in Southeast Asia. The visit is also a golden opportunity to open trade between the two countries. Reporting on the visit, Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila told the mass media after returning from Vietnam and arriving at the Air Force Headquarters Airport this evening:

[Begin Sitthi recording] On the first day of our arrival, delegations assigned to specific areas held separate discussions with their Vietnamese counterparts. We have a problem about the refugees to be solved with Vietnam. I assigned the secretary general of the National Security Council and the director general of the International Organizations Department to head the discussions. Officials of the two countries achieved the following results during the discussion—we received pledges from Vietnam to help solve the problem as follows:

1. To participate in the international conference on refugees in accordance with the appeal from ASEAN, which will be held in Geneva in the middle of this year.
2. To increase measures to stop the outflow of Vietnamese people who are a burden to Vietnam's neighboring countries.
3. To expand the Orderly Departure Program, or ODP, to allow orderly and direct settlement of Vietnamese people in third countries without having to go through first-asylum neighboring countries, including Thailand, before reaching Western countries. The expansion of the ODP program will help reduce the number of Vietnamese refugees illegally entering Thailand.
4. Vietnam is ready to take back Vietnamese refugees if they wish to return to Vietnam. In February, Vietnam will send a delegation to Bangkok for discussions of the details of this matter, especially concerning the repatriation of refugees.

In short, I am very pleased with the outcome of this visit by our delegation. [end recording]

Commentaries, Editorials on Sitthi Visit to SRV

MATICHON Views 'New Attitude'
BK1301104789 Bangkok *MATICHON* in Thai
12 Jan 89 p 9

[Editorial: "New Attitude of Our Foreign Policy"]

[Text] Thai Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila has just completed talks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in Hanoi. According to reports, the talks went smoothly and both sides achieved good mutual understanding. Everything went well not only concerning the Cambodian problem, in which Thailand has urged Vietnam to accelerate its troop withdrawal from Cambodia, but also about trade between the private sectors of Thailand and Vietnam. Everything indicates a possibility for improvement of the relations between the two countries.

Foreign observers describe Sitthi's visit to Vietnam as an end to Thailand's cold attitude toward Vietnam. Looking back in history, since Vietnam sent its military troops to occupy Cambodia on 7 January 1979, Thailand has openly opposed the Vietnamese action on the grounds that Vietnam had violated the UN Charter.

Thailand has joined hands with other ASEAN nations to inspire the world community to put political and economic pressure on Vietnam.

Most countries in the world support ASEAN's stand and oppose the Vietnamese action of encroachment of Cambodia's sovereignty. For this reason, most of the UN member countries do not recognize the Vietnamese-established puppet government in Cambodia. Despite Thailand's opposition to Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam have still maintained diplomatic relations.

However, Thailand's attitude toward Vietnam has been based mainly on the Cambodian problem which Thailand regards as an important issue. Thailand wants Vietnam to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia without any conditions because Thailand does not accept any country's military occupation of another country. Based on this policy, Thailand has for years adopted an attitude of coolness toward Vietnam for its violation of the UN Charter. Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi has declared, time and again, that he would not make a visit to Vietnam as long as the Cambodian problem has not been settled.

Anyway, the question of Cambodia and its impact on relations between Thailand and Vietnam cannot be counted upon by the three concerned countries only. There are other important external factors for it—the roles and changing policies of the superpowers. It can be said that the shift in the Soviet Union's policy under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev has sparked off a positive impact on other countries.

Gorbachev has changed policy toward Afghanistan by withdrawing the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, opening talks with the United States on nuclear disarmament, and introducing economic reforms in the Soviet Union. Another important factor is the fact that the Soviet Union is in the process of normalizing its relations with China. This factor has influenced Vietnam in adjusting its policy toward being more flexible concerning its occupation of Cambodia.

It is not only Vietnam that has to adjust its policy; Thailand will also have to adjust to the changing situation. The saying goes that there are no eternal friends or enemies in international politics; only the interests are eternal. This seems to be an enduring truth. The policy to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace is therefore a timely adjustment of Thailand's stand.

NATION Praises 'Cordiality'
BK1301043589 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
13 Jan 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Thai-VN (Vietnam) Cordiality Speeds Up Settlement in Kampuchea"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila has good reasons to be "very pleased" with his successful four-day visit to Vietnam. The success was actually beyond all expectations.

One instant positive outcome is the rapprochement between Bangkok and Hanoi, particularly between Sitthi and his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Co Thach. The two had met several times elsewhere. But this was the first Sitthi referred to Thach as his "younger brother" and Thach accepted Sitthi as his "elder brother". Such cordiality quickly erased their mutual distrust. Past bitterness was replaced by elation over breakthroughs on several issues, including the Kampuchean conflict.

On a bilateral level, the cordial atmosphere created during Sitthi's visit will pave the way for an early visit by Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan to Hanoi. The prime minister's visit, because of his frankness and outgoing personality as well as his well-known aspiration to see the battlefield in Indochina turned into a zone of peace and a market for Thai exports, will certainly boost Thai-Vietnamese relations in every aspect.

The cordial atmosphere will also encourage the Thai private sector to invest in and do business with Vietnam. Strictly speaking, the Thai government still does not condone government-to-government trade and economic cooperation with Hanoi because of the Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea. But by including business and banking leaders in his delegation, Sitthi implied government support to the Thai private sector exploring business opportunities in Vietnam.

Thai officials and academics in Sitthi's delegation who have held discussions with their Vietnamese counterparts came back with a positive impression of Vietnam, which most of them perceived as a direct security threat to Thailand at first. Vietnam is a country in need of economic development, rather than an aggressive power with formidable military capability. Such positive impressions will help create better understanding between governments and peoples of the two countries.

Talks between Sitthi and Thach reportedly concentrated on the Kampuchean question, which has been the main obstacle thwarting progress in Thai-Vietnamese relations since Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea on Christmas of 1978. And on this crucial issue, the two foreign ministers have also achieved remarkable breakthroughs.

They agreed, for example, on the need to have an effective international control "mechanism" to ensure peace and stability in Kampuchea after a political settlement. They also saw eye to eye on the usefulness of the informal meeting in Jakarta on Kampuchea, the so-called JIM talks, and agreed that the forum should be expanded to include other countries such as China and the Soviet Union.

Sitthi promised to try to persuade the three Khmer resistance factions to establish direct dialogue with the pro-Hanoi Khmer regime in Phnom Penh; Thach also promised to encourage Phnom Penh to meet with the three Khmer resistance factions.

Their agreements, as well as their joint pledge "to work together" in resolving the Kampuchean conflict, have brightened the prospect of achieving a political settlement in Kampuchea within this year. Direct talks between Beijing and Hanoi, which the two sides have recently agreed to hold soon, will likely be another big boost in the concerted international effort to end the 10-year-old conflict in Kampuchea.

Peace in Kampuchea and friendly ties between Thailand and Vietnam will make Southeast Asia a much better place in which to live. Therefore, Sitthi as well as Thach has good reasons to be "very pleased" with the overall outcome of Sitthi's trip to Vietnam.

VOFA Views Success of Visit
*BK1301081189 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia
in English 1500 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[**"Special commentary": "Sitthi's Achievements in His Vietnam Visit"**]

[Text] The visit to Vietnam of Thai Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila on 9-12 January can be praised by everyone as a major breakthrough in relations between Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It marks a new chapter of relations between the two countries that cooled down since the outbreak of the Kampuchean conflict when Vietnam in December 1979 sent its troops into Kampuchea to oust the though unpopular but legitimate government of Khmer Rouge from its office in Phnom Penh and installed its puppet regime of Heng Samrin to replace them. Thailand, ASEAN, and all peace-loving countries in the United Nations oppose the invasion and called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and letting Kampuchean themselves decide their own future from the beginning.

The changing of the world situation, especially the rapprochement between superpowers and the economic hardship of Vietnam caused by the sanction from all Western countries make Vietnam realize that its stubbornness in Kampuchea caused Vietnam more suffering than it can bear. The economic failure and the reduction of Soviet military and economic assistance force Vietnam to evaluate its position in the international arena. Vietnam found out that the best way to improve the country's economic bankruptcy is to turn back and join the regional prosperity, especially with ASEAN that is more than willing to accept Vietnam back to the community lest Vietnam withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea and solve the problem in the war torn country by allowing the international community to look after the process that let Kampuchean themselves to decide their own future and choose their own government in a general election.

Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila's visit to Vietnam came amidst the current of activities by many parties concerned to find possible ways to solve the 10 years

long conflict. His visit, the first Thai foreign minister to visit Hanoi within 13 years, registers the cornerstone of Thai relations with the communist country, since it also paves way for the visit of Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan to Vietnam, also the first Thai prime minister to visit Vietnam in many decades.

On his trip, Foreign Minister Sitthi brings with him, apart from the government officials, nearly 30 members of the delegation from all sectors—such as the businessmen, academicians, reporters—to improve ties between the two countries in every aspect. But the most important task, which is the aim of this trip, is to narrow down the gap between Thailand and the SRV in their differences on the Kampuchean conflict. After two rounds of talks between Foreign Minister Sitthi and his counterpart Nguyen Co Thach in Hanoi, Sitthi can win his [words indistinct] in reducing the differences, especially on the issues that Vietnam could not accept for quite a long time, that is the timetable for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea which comprehended with the cessation of the external aid to the Kampuchean resistance forces, the national reconciliation between the Kampuchean parties concerned, and an effective international control mechanism to monitor the peace process in Kampuchea. Both countries also felt that the so-called JIM 2, or the Jakarta informal meeting that provides the venue for the four warring Khmer factions to meet and solve their own differences in the problem for the second time, should be expanded to involve other concerned countries in the peace process.

Air Chief Marshal Sitthi not only wins the efforts to solve the Kampuchean conflict, but also achieves the goal of reaching closer cooperation between the two countries in every aspect, especially in the economy to serve the government's policy of increasing economic ties with the countries in the region—especially Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. For Laos, Thailand's economic relations are improved in many fields. For Vietnam, Foreign Minister Sitthi paves the way for better economic cooperation in his trip by resolving the obstacles that (?spread) the two countries for nearly a decade, that is the problem of occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese force, and that also prepare for the improving ties between Thailand and Kampuchea after the problem has been solved. [sentence as heard]

Air Chief Marshal Sitthi's achievement in his Vietnam visit is not only reducing the gap in the Kampuchean problem with Vietnam, but also achieves the better understanding and better cooperation with Vietnam for brighter future of the countries and the people in Southeast Asian region as a whole.

'Shut Out' Policy for Refugees To Continue
BK1301020589 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
13 Jan 89 p 4

[Text] Thailand will continue to "shut out" Indochinese refugees, said a senior Interior Ministry official who was

responding to an American human rights group's claim that the policy has caused the deaths of several boat people on the high seas.

Somphon Klinphongsa, deputy permanent secretary for interior affairs, denied that Thailand is pushing off Indochinese asylum seekers who manage to avoid naval guards and reach the Thai shore.

"Our policy is to prevent boat people from landing here. But if they can sneak in, we will keep them for a while before sending them to a third country," he said.

The New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights said in a recent report that the Thai government's refugee policy has opened the way for abuse of refugees by pirates and even Thai military personnel.

The report called on Thailand to allow all refugee boats to land and for the refugees to be granted asylum.

Somphon insisted that Thailand will maintain the "shut-out" policy. "But we have told the United Nations many times we will accept those who land," he said.

Somphon claimed the allegation of human rights abuses by Thai authorities was spread by Vietnamese racketeers who organized the Indochinese asylum seekers' escapes to Thailand. Due to Thailand's tough measures, the number of the syndicate "customers" have dropped significantly, according to the official.

Thai authorities last year arrested a Vietnamese man suspected of being a leading organizer of the asylum-seeking trips, Somphon said. He added that the man's accomplices lied to London-based Amnesty International when he said Thailand is responsible for inhumane measures being taken against the boat people.

The lawyers' human rights group, citing internal documents from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], said there have been a number of cases in which refugees were robbed, raped or killed.

The group's report said "hundreds" of refugees have drowned due to the Thai policy—initiated last January due to large influx of boat people, some of whom were considered by Thai authorities to be "economic migrants".

Somphon said some boat people drowned because they were told by escape organizers to swim to the Thai shore to avoid detection.

"Should we be held responsible for that?" he said.

An American journalist sought an interview with Somphon, who oversees refugee affairs, yesterday morning. Somphon said he was asked "whether Thai soldiers are either pushing off boat people or shooting them."

Somphon later signed an agreement with UNHCR Thailand director Pierre Jambor on the UN agency's Bt [baht] 25⁰ million aid project for refugees this year.

Somphon said the Interior Ministry is maintaining 103,000 Vietnamese, Laotian and Kampuchean refugees in seven camps throughout the country. However, he said the number of boat people had dropped dramatically, from 18,000 in 1987 to 4,000 last year.

He added that an average of 10 refugees enter Thailand each month at present.

Another 76 Burmese Students Sent Home
BK1301022189 Bangkok THE NATION in English
13 Jan 89 p 2

[Excerpts] Another group of 76 Burmese students flew home yesterday from the repatriation centre in Tak as a Burmese correspondent for an international news agency dismissed a U.S. charge that some of the students who had returned earlier were arrested and killed.

The Burmese were flown aboard two Burmese aircraft to Rangoon, bringing to 260 the number who have returned since the repatriation programme began Dec 26, officials in Tak said.

The students were seen off by Tak Governor Sombun Phrommet and Thai Red Cross officials and welcomed aboard the planes by Burmese military officers. Another 44 students were to return the same way today, accompanied by Thai and foreign journalists invited by the Thai military to try to dispel charges that the students were being forced back to harsh treatment by Burmese authorities. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, Sein Win, a Rangoon-based Burmese correspondent for the ASSOCIATED PRESS, yesterday also dismissed the Amnesty International's charges. He said he and five other Burmese reporters flew from Rangoon to Tak that day to accompany the 22 students back to Burma.

Sein Win, 67, who is on a business trip to Bangkok, said he saw no signs that suggested the group was forced to go back.

He also rejected as "rumour" an allegation by the U.S. State Department that the Saw Maung military government killed a number of pro-democracy students who returned home from exile.

The allegation, he said, was probably based on information sent by the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon which in turn "had gathered it from local staff who listened to rumours."

Sein Win, who is to return to Burma today, was arrested by Burmese authorities at the height of the people uprising in Burma in August.

The Burmese "would believe any anti-government rumours," he said. "We have been living with rumours for 26 years. There is no means of confirming anything and we always believe in rumours."

"The (Burmese) people have great resentment against the government so whatever rumours against the government, everybody believes it," he said.

He said he and other Burmese reporters have tried very hard to verify the rumours about the fate of the students. "There was no way of checking," he said.

Sein Win cited random interviews with 28 Burmese returnees from Tak as a confirmation of their safety. He said the 12 local reporters who did the interviews got the returnees' addresses from Burmese authorities.

He said there was one case in which a plainclothes policeman approached one of the returnees to request an interview.

The boy's mother rejected the request saying she would inform military officers, prompting the policeman to leave, he said.

But he said the returnees have expressed fears that they could be arrested.

Chawalit Returns From Laos, Refuses Comment
BK1301014589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
13 Jan 89 p 3

[Text] Army Commander-in-Chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut made an unpublicized one-day visit to Laos yesterday.

Chawalit, who was accompanied only by a handful of senior military officials, declined to discuss the purpose of the trip with the press.

Before leaving for Vientiane yesterday morning, Chawalit told reporters there was nothing "urgent" about his trip. "I will talk about it when I return," he said.

But the army chief avoided meeting with a group of reporters who were waiting for him upon his return to the military airport.

Group Capt Wira Intharaphrom, an air force staff officer, quoted Deputy Supreme Commander Gen Phat Akkhanitbut as having ordered the security men at the airport to prevent reporters from interviewing Gen Chawalit about the trip.

He described the trip as "confidential".

Chawalit was met by Air Force Commander-in-Chief Woranat Aphichari upon his return to Bangkok.

A source said Chawalit went to Laos to discuss Thailand's request to import wood from the communist country, but provided no other details.

The source said the trip was also a "follow-up" to Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's visit to Vientiane last month.

Lao Envoy Calls on Prime Minister Chatchai
*BK1201150989 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5
in Thai 1300 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Text] At 1500 at the Government House, Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan received Khamphan Simnalavong, LPDR ambassador to Thailand, who paid a courtesy call to express new year wishes to the premier. The prime minister noted that Thai-Lao relations have improved greatly and their private business sectors have made more commercial contacts. Chatchai also informed the Lao ambassador that the Thai foreign minister's official visit to Vietnam was successful, thus paving the way to establish peace in this region. This will enable each country to fully head for national development.

On the same occasion, the prime minister asked the Lao ambassador to request the Lao Government to loosen restrictions in its export policy for processed wood because at present Thailand needs it very much and at the same time Lao will benefit by creating more jobs for its own people.

At the end of the meeting, the Thai prime minister extended an invitation through the Lao ambassador to LPDR Premier Kaysone Phomvihan to make a trip to Nakhon Phanom Province on 17 January.

Vietnam

Nguyen Co Thach Outlines Economic Plans
*AU1201144089 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
12 Jan 89 p 4*

[Report by Lukas Schwarzacher on interview with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in Hanoi: "There Is Light at the End of the Tunnel"—date not given]

[Text] "I had many dreams and wishes for my country," Nguyen Co Thach recalls during this interview in Hanoi. Nguyen Co Thach, 65, has been foreign minister of the SRV since 1980, and today he is considered to be one of the important proponents of those reforms intended to make the nightmares of modern Vietnam disappear. "Finally we can see light at the end of the tunnel," has become one of his favorite statements.

At the beginning of the long haul, which began more than 13 years ago, there were the "illusions, we had after the victory. Every victory carries the germ of defeat—and vice versa. We simply believed that we could achieve

everything." Thwarted illusions have cost Vietnam dear. The country is on the verge of economic collapse, which Nguyen Co Thach admits frankly.

After the victory over the Americans, "we constructed a welfare socialism. Socialism by and through the state for the people. Things cannot continue like this. From now on the forces of the market must decide," Nguyen Co Thach said while outlining the reforms, which he has vigorously supported within the CPV Politburo (of which he has been a member since 1982). "The good sides of capitalism are welcome, but we can do without the bad ones," he said while displaying the kind of wishful thinking shared by many reformers in socialist systems. "What we need now is socialism by, through, and for the people."

The support by different allies over the past decades has not always been only positive, Nguyen Co Thach notes: "We have received help that has spoiled us. During the war from the USSR and China. Afterward, from the USSR (and other CEMA countries). We have used this help in a very wasteful way and have relied on it. From this angle it has been harmful to us."

Thach soon realized that the "laws of war cannot be applied to times of peace." "Corrupt members (of the CPV) who have used their posts and influence to line their pockets, have to be fought. They have become alien to our party."

As focal points that are necessary to lead Vietnam out of the crisis, Nguyen Co Thach mentions containing inflation, providing sufficient rice, which has to be distributed efficiently, reprivatizing agriculture, and promoting the private trade and production sectors.

Isolation in foreign policy, in which Vietnam has brought itself (mainly through the invasion of Cambodia 10 years ago) seems to worry Nguyen Co Thach less than his country's economic problems. "If two sides do not want to enter in a love relationship nobody can force them to,"—this is how he describes the unchanging distance between Washington and Hanoi. "However, in the long run, they cannot simply ignore the other's existence." The economic embargo on the part of the West, which has been directed by the United States, does not really worry Nguyen Co Thach: "We are not going begging to anybody who is not willing to give."

That the West relates its policy toward Hanoi with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia is met with a bitter smile from Nguyen Co Thach. "The French, Japanese, Americans, and Chinese have occupied our country. When we defended ourselves against the regime of Pol Pot, we were called 'aggressors.' What is that all about?" After all, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia after victory in 1975 and invaded it only after negotiations on territorial issues with the Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Penh came to absolutely nothing.

"Now we are withdrawing as scheduled. And what happens is that Western countries suddenly want to deploy an international peacekeeping force to disarm Pol Pot (and his guerrilla fighters)!" Nguyen Co Thach categorically discards the possibility of yet another invasion of Cambodia by Vietnamese troops, even if the Khmer Rouge should gain the upper hand again. "Now it is the West's turn."

Thai Foreign Minister Departs 12 January
*BK1201153989 Hanoi VNA in English 1504 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA January 12—Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila and his party left Ho Chi Minh City today, successfully concluding his visit to Vietnam since Jan. 9.

While in Vietnam, the Thai guests paid tribute to President Ho Chi Minh at his mausoleum and visited his house and office. Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila was received by General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Do Muoi. The minister conveyed to Chairman Do Muoi a letter addressed by Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, and held talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach. The Thai businessmen and scholars who accompanied him had working sessions with several concerned organizations and services. The talks and contacts took place in an atmosphere of friendship, cooperation, mutual understanding and mutual respect. The Thai guests visited Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

On Jan. 11, the Vietnamese and Thai foreign ministers held a press conference and issued a joint press statement affirming the fine results of the visit.

Army Paper Hails Visit
*BK1301081989 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 12 Jan 89*

[Report on QUAN DOI NHAN DAN unattributed commentary: "A New Chapter in the Relationship Between Vietnam and Thailand"—date not given]

[Text] The official visit to Vietnam by His Excellency Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila and his party concluded with positive results. Through talks, held in an atmosphere of friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding, the two sides reached and identity of views on numerous respects, thus opening the prospects for effective cooperation and peaceful coexistence between the SRV and the Kingdom of Thailand.

According to their joint press communique, the visit by His Excellency Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, the first by a Thai foreign minister since 1976, 13 years, marked a new chapter in the relationship between Vietnam and Thailand and also constituted an important contribution to developing the relations of friendship, cooperation, and good neighborliness between the two countries.

As neighbors, both the Kingdom of Thailand and the SRV have an important role and interests in establishing a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The two countries established diplomatic relations in August 1976. Both also signed agreements on cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology, air transportation, telecommunication, maritime, and trade.

However, it is very regrettable indeed that for a decade or more, there were differences between the two sides, especially on the Cambodian issue, causing their bilateral relations to plunge into an unusual situation that ran counter to the interests of both countries.

Recently, consistent with the developing trend in the world and region favoring dialogue over confrontation, considerable breakthroughs have been achieved in the relations between Vietnam and Thailand.

As we all know, the new government in Thailand, with His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan serving as prime minister, has expressed its desire to improve relations with Vietnam and turn the three Indochinese countries from battlefields into marketplaces. Many private Thai businessmen have traveled to Vietnam to establish trade relations. At a press conference held in Hanoi on the morning of 11 January, His Excellency Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said: At present, there is no obstacle whatsoever to the private Thai business circles in their trade relations with Vietnam.

This official visit to Vietnam by Sitthi Sawetsila reflected the common desire of the two countries to remove all obstacles to regional peace and stability as well as to the development of bilateral relations. The two demonstrated willingness to hold periodical dialogue, step up contacts between businessmen and scholars, and reactivate the agreements already signed between the two countries with the aim of achieving further progress in their bilateral relations.

Another point of concern to both sides was the settlement through peaceful means of all existing problems in the region, with emphasis on the Cambodian issue. The two countries, being close neighbors sharing common borders with Cambodia, have an important role and direct interests in solving the Cambodian issue as well as in establishing a zone of peace in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam and Thailand reached identity of views on the Cambodian issue, except for a number of minor points of disagreement which will be further discussed and settled. Both sides agreed that it was necessary for them to work together and aim for accelerating the process toward achieving a political solution to the Cambodian issue, thus ensuring a sovereign, independent, neutral, and nonaligned Cambodia. They also agreed to solve the international aspect of the Cambodian issue, including the withdrawal of troops and an end to aid and intervention from outside, considering that this would vigorously

encourage efforts among the Cambodian factions to arrive at a settlement for the internal aspect of this issue on the basis of national reconciliation.

The two sides agreed that the second Jakarta informal Meeting should be convened at an early date and be made a success.

At the 11 January morning Hanoi press conference, Sitthi Sawetsila affirmed that he does not count Pol Pot as a person who can take part in the settlement of the Cambodian issue and that, like Vietnam, Thailand also wants to prevent a return of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime.

The identity of views between Thailand and Vietnam on the Cambodian issue is of vital significance and an assurance toward the effort to usher in a new era in Southeast Asia, which is beneficial to the peoples of the two countries as well as to the peace, stability, and development of all countries in the region.

We welcome the fine success of the official visit to our country of the delegation of the Kingdom of Thailand led by His Excellency Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila. We also hope that the forthcoming visit to Vietnam by Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan will create an important turning point in the long-standing and durable relations of friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and Thailand, consistent with the interests and earnest aspirations of the two peoples as well as with the common trend in the new age.

Joint Fishing Ventures With Thailand
*BK1201092189 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
1300 GMT 10 Jan 89*

[Text] Chia Kokphon, deputy secretary to prime minister and adviser to Thai Fisheries Association, was interviewed by reporters of the Public Relations Department after his meeting with the director of the Vietnamese Fisheries Department in Hanoi this afternoon.

He said that Vietnamese have become more enthusiastic about joint fishing ventures with Thailand. As a result of the discussions, it was decided that the joint ventures would be carried out either through joint fishing and dividing the fish caught or renting Thai fishing boats. There is a good possibility that the proposed joint fishing ventures will be realized. Another round of talks will be held on 11 January in Ho Chi Minh City.

Chia said that at this meeting, Vietnam has shown its sincerity and willingness to have more joint fishing venture with Thailand. On the question of the safety of Thai fishermen, he thinks that now Vietnam has developed a more positive attitude toward Thai fishermen.

Austrian Parliament President Arrives in Hanoi
*BK1201152089 Hanoi VNA in English 1455 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA January 12—A high-level delegation of the Austrian National Council and Government led by Leopold Gratz, president of the council, arrived here this afternoon for an official visit to Vietnam.

The Austrian guests were greeted on their arrival by Le Quang Dao, chairman of the National Assembly; Phung Van Tuu, vice-chairman of the National Assembly; and Vu Mao, head of the National Assembly and State Council Office.

Also present was Austrian Ambassador Ernest Illsinger.

Meets With Le Quang Dao
*BK1201154389 Hanoi VNA in English 1459 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA January 12—Chairman of the National Assembly Le Quang Dao held talks at the Presidential Palace here this afternoon with President of the National Council of the Republic of Austria Leopold Gratz.

Present at the talks on the Vietnamese side were Phung Van Tuu, vice chairman of the National Assembly; and Vu Mao, director of the Office of the National Assembly and the State Council.

On the Austrian side were Ernst Sucharipa, chief of the Third Department of the Foreign Ministry; and Ernest Illsinger, Austrian ambassador to Vietnam.

The two sides exchanged views on a number of international and regional issues of mutual concern, and discussed measures to promote the relations of friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and Austria.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship and mutual understanding.

This evening, Chairman Le Quang Dao threw a banquet in honour of President Leopold Gratz and his party.

Vietnamese Citizen of Japanese Origin Pardoned
*BK1101161389 Hanoi VNA in English 1602 GMT
11 Jan 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Jan. 11—The Vietnamese Government has granted pardon to Truong Van Tuong, alias Thich Nghiem Tin, a Vietnamese citizen of Japanese origin whose name is Iwanobu Yoshida and who was detained for security reasons. He is permitted to rejoin his family in Japan.

The representative of the Japanese Embassy in Hanoi was notified of this decision on Jan. 9.

Two Japanese, Two Britons Arrested for Smuggling
*BK1301083189 Tokyo KYODO in English 0735 GMT
13 Jan 89*

[Text] Hanoi, Jan. 13 KYODO—Vietnam has arrested two Japanese and two Britons for alleged violation of territorial waters and smuggling, Vietnamese Government sources said on Friday.

The sources said the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry notified the arrest of the four, who called themselves seamen, to the Japanese Embassy here.

They were questioned for alleged spying, the sources said.

No further details were immediately known.

Assembly Resolution on 1987 State Budget Balance
*BK1301093189 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
28 Dec 88 p 1*

[“Resolution ratifying the final accounting of the 1987 state budget”]

[Text] The SRV National Assembly,

By virtue of Article 83 of the SRV Constitution,

After having scrutinized the Council of Ministers report on the final account of the 1987 state budget, and

After having heard the testimony of the National Assembly Economic, Planning, and Budget Committee,

Resolves:

To ratify the final accounting of the 1987 state budget as follows:

Total revenue: Four-hundred and twenty-five billion, seven-hundred and seventy-eight million dong (425,778,000,000 dong);

Total expenditure: Five-hundred and fourteen billion, nine-hundred and thirty-seven million dong (514,937,000,000 dong);

Deficit: Eighty-nine billion, one-hundred and fifty-nine million dong (89,159,000,000 dong).

This resolution was passed by the Eight SRV National Assembly at its Fourth Session on 22 December 1988.

Chairman of the National Assembly,
Signed: Le Quang Dao

Economic Crimes in Ho Chi Minh City Reported
*BK1201140489 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2300 GMT 10 Jan 89*

[Text] In 1988, the market control forces in Ho Chi Minh City uncovered 8,195 cases of speculation, smuggling, and manufacture of contraband or faked goods. Altogether, 404 cases of speculation and smuggling, 107 cases of purchases or sale of contraband goods, and 106 cases of circulation of prohibited goods are of a serious nature.

In addition, some 23,000 violations against the business registration regulation have been detected throughout the city.

The market control committees at all levels have taken measures against two-thirds of these violations. The money derived from confiscated goods, fines, and collection of taxes overdue reached nearly 740 million dong.

Most of those cases still to be dealt with or that have already dealt with but where fines are yet to be collected and deposited in the state budget are of a serious nature because they involve losses valued at hundreds of millions of dong.

Officials Tried in Departures Case
*BK1301125789 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
25 Dec 89 pp 1, 4*

[Report by Thien Anh]

[Summary] “On 19 and 20 December, the People’s Court of Dong Nai Province held a public trial of first instance of the N2 case, that is, the case of Nguyen Van Hiep and accomplices on charges of abuse of power, activities at variance with official policy, bribery, corruption, fraud, coercing people into going abroad, misappropriating and causing the losses of a considerable amount of socialist property, thereby exerting a bad influence in many fields and lessening the masses’ confidence in the party and the state.

“Seven defendants of the 21 people against whom legal proceedings had been ordered in the case were prosecuted by the People’s Organ of Control of Dong Nai Province. They were: Nguyen Van Hiep, deputy commander of the People’s Security Force of the Dong Nai Provincial Public Security Service (head of the Political Security Office at the time the crime was committed); Pham Tan Hung, alias Sau Cuong, head of the Political Security Office (deputy head at the time the crime was committed); Mai Khac Thanh, cadre of the Political Security Office; and Ly Tin Tuong and Huynh Quang Trung, owners of Boats VT 892 and VT 556.

“In 1978 and 1979, in compliance with the wishes of a number of people who wanted to go abroad for family reunion, our state authorized some units, the Public

Security Service of Dong Nai Province among them, to organize their departures. In June 1978, the Board of Directors of the Dong Nai Provincial Public Security Service entrusted the Political Security Office with implementing this task, which concluded on 31 May 1979.

"In carrying out this duty, at the beginning the Political Security Office organized six departures by boat at the Nhai Beach. Because of some complications in the situation, Nguyen Hoang Van, the then Provincial Public Security Service director, revamped the operation by reorganizing the unit in charge into a work team under the direct leadership of Nguyen Van Hiep, head of the Political Security Office. The team had the duty of making direct contact with would-be-emigrants, guiding them in fulfilling formalities, receiving files for study and making recommendations to the office's leadership, and submitting decision to the Provincial Public Security Service director for approval. The defendants, however, failed to correctly follow these procedures. Hiep, Hung, and their accomplices used a number of middlemen to contact people wishing to leave and to collect gold from those who departed for sharing among themselves."

Those used as middlemen by Hien and Hung were of unsavory backgrounds and complex political affiliations, such as: Tieu Thi Tien, whose husband was an officer of the former regime. Tien acted as a go-between for the defendants in collecting gold from 123 boats which applied for departure. Hiep and Hung took Dang Hoang Day, an officer of the former regime, from Ho Chi Minh City to Dong Nai and helped him set up a production cooperation team to build boats for sale to would-be-emigrants.

The trial proceeded in a democratic fashion, with the defendants taking care of their own defense or having lawyers to help them. In view of the hard evidence, the defendants admitted to their crimes and asked for clemency. "Nguyen Van Hiep, Pham Tan Hung, and their accomplices admitted that in the period mentioned above they had sent more than 8,140 people abroad on 38 boats and collected 29,000 taels of gold of which they had turned over to the state 22,500 taels (without vouchers). Of the remaining 6,500 taels, the defendants misappropriated more than 3,720 taels, with Hiep keeping 1,560 taels and Hung 704 taels. In addition, they had also embezzled an enormous amount of money (including dollars) and appliances." They lived it up, giving gold by the dozens of taels to relatives and friends.

"This is a very serious case. Nguyen Van Hiep and Pham Tan Hung were key cadres of the Dong Nai Provincial Public Security Service entrusted with the task of struggling against and preventing crimes to defend the regime and the property and legitimate interests of citizens. But they had become deviant and degenerate, lived in

debauchery, taken advantage of state policy, and abused power to commit crimes, thus exerting a bad influence in many fields with unfathomable consequences.

"The adjudicating panel sentenced Pham Tan Hung to 20 years imprisonment; Nguyen Van Hiep 18 years; Nguyen Ngoc Minh 12 years; Mai Khac Thanh 10 years; Lam van An 8 years; Ly Tin Tuong 6 years; and Huynh Quang trung 5 years. All the gold, money, and property illegally acquired by the defendants and other people involved in the case were to be confiscated and incorporated into the state funds."

The nearly 3,000 [figure as published] delegates attending the court session welcomed the public trial of the case. The outcome of the trial has restored the confidence of the local population.

Article Urges Tighter Army Discipline
*BK1101142989 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2330 GMT 8 Jan 89*

[Article by Bui Dinh Nguyen: "Correctly Assess the Status of Army Discipline to Work Out Proper and Appropriate Measures"]

[Text] Army discipline, as always, continues to be the concern of military commanders because it is a factor that creates the strength with which to win victory. For this reason, it is often said that discipline constitutes the strength of an army, and this has become a saying with regard to military affairs. Controlling and forging discipline is one of the key permanent tasks of leading and commanding echelons. To work out appropriate measures for tightening discipline it is necessary first of all to start with correctly assessing the actual status of discipline. Through discussions with some colleagues, we have learned that there are currently three different viewpoints regarding this matter which are presented below:

The first viewpoint contends that our Army's discipline is deteriorating steadily—at certain times and in some places, quite seriously—as has been reflected in the observance of directives and orders, ordinances and rules, and the prescribed systems and rules for the maintenance of weapons and equipment, internal relations, relations between the lower and higher echelons, and relations between the Army and the people, especially at the grass roots level. In various public discussions and exchanges of opinion in the press, it has been pointed out that the real status of Army discipline at the grass-roots level has become a worrying concern of many cadres. A regimental commander from the 1st Military Region said: The most serious weakness, which is also a difficulty that can hardly be overcome quickly at the grass-roots level at present, is the issue of discipline. If a painting is commissioned to depict this situation, it will show but a few bright shades or, to be more correct, a monotonous mass of grey.

The second viewpoint holds that this is not true; that there is nothing to worry about. Our Army's discipline has been firmly upheld and the situation is generally good, including at the grass-roots level. It is thanks to strict discipline that we have had the strength to fulfill all the tasks entrusted by the party and state. No matter how difficult and hard the tasks may be and whatever combat duties and sacrifices they may involve, including the performance of internationalist duties, our troops have accomplished them all. Granted weaknesses do exist, but they are either insignificant and limited to only a few or only related to such trivial matters as shortcomings in dress, etiquette, conduct, and personal behavior.

The third viewpoint stops short of affirming whether the situation is bad or good. If discipline, ask its advocates, is deteriorating to an alarming level, what then constitutes the factor and the strength that enables our Army to fulfill their tasks everytime and everywhere and to always remain loyal to the party, faithful and filial to the country and a reliable armed instrument of the party and state? Is it not true that our party and state have, on three occasions, accorded our Army with the highest distinction in the form of the Gold Star Order? No other organizations have ever received such a honor, not to mention the high appreciations by friends near and far. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think that our Army's discipline is entirely fine, and there is nothing to worry about. For many tasks involving study, work, labor, and combat have not been carried out in a scrupulous and proper manner. Observance of prescribed systems and rules, especially discipline over men and equipment, has been lax; and this has caused numerous serious incidents such as warehouse explosions and fires and traffic accidents on land, in the air, and on water, resulting in heavy losses in human and material-technical resources. Violations of Army-people discipline still remain fairly prevalent, causing the Army to lose the people's support and gradually tarnishing the fine image of Uncle Ho's soldier.

In addition, other negative phenomena in society have spread and affected many units and individuals. According to some people, society and the armed forces share the same kinds of evils and the only difference is in the degree of seriousness. That is why Major General Vu Trong Canh, deputy commander of the Air Defense Forces, said: Discipline, technical standards, and life at grass-roots units have all been deteriorating.

These are different opinions that people may have when evaluating the state of Army discipline. Yet, they all agree that only by making constant efforts to improve Army discipline can there be conditions for meeting the requirements of our country at present.

However, different viewpoints and evaluation methods have led to different standpoints, educational measures, and ways to oversee the maintenance of discipline. At times, there have been contradictions between actual situations and problem-solving methods.

Therefore, it is our opinion that in order to correctly evaluate the state of Army discipline and work out proper measures to deal with it, we must, first of all, reach unanimous agreement on a starting point and perspective so everything can be considered with fairness and impartiality, and in a spirit of respect for the truth. The reason for this is because objective realities always provide food for thought and serve as the criteria of truth. It is necessary to concentrate efforts on clarifying the two key issues that may affect the morale and sense of discipline of members of the armed forces as follows: first, the nature and characteristics of discipline and the uniformity between nature and characteristics; and second, the requirements of discipline and the relationship between the Army discipline and realities in society.

Regarding the nature of our Army discipline, everyone knows that this is the discipline of a revolutionary army. It is the military discipline of comrades who share the common goal—and no other—of struggling for national liberation and defense and for the people's happiness. All members in the Army must be comrades in arms to achieve singlemindedness. Education must be the primary way to persuade people of what is good and correct, and to reach mutual understanding, while treasuring human personality and dignity. The nature of discipline is self-awareness and self-respect and not a need for corporal punishment; yet, it is very strict and severe.

Once well aware of the nature of discipline, we must simultaneously determine the characteristics of the military organization. The characteristics of Army discipline lie in military and combat discipline that considers military orders of that paramount importance strictly required by the law of war and involving the survival of the country and the flesh and blood of our comrades in arms. As a result, there is a close relationship between the nature and characteristics of discipline.

If we separate the nature of discipline from its characteristics, only seeing its revolutionary nature and not its military characteristics, we will become easily confused and identify it with ordinary discipline of mass organizations. This will lead us to complacency with stereotyped theories and general appeals and with superficial manifestations and temporary results.

Conversely, if we merely see the characteristics of iron-like Army discipline and not its revolutionary nature, we may also become easily pessimistic and vacillating, thinking that everything is a total failure. This will make us impatient, irritable, and inclined to take rigid measures to restrain, force, and impose rudely, and will lead us to know merely how to apply this or that article of the rules and laws as deterrent and coercive measures conducive to militaristic, savage, and despotic action that belittles or overlooks persevering and persuasive education to enhance self-awareness and self-respect in cadres and combatants.

Concerning the requirements of discipline, we must say that the nature of our Army's revolutionary discipline remains an unchanged core. Yet, the requirements of discipline are constantly changing to become ever higher commensurate with the development of the situation and tasks. Nowadays, the requirements of regular Army discipline for concentrated and combined arms combat in the national defense war differ completely from the discipline of the Army that operated dispersed in each region in the former national liberation war. The seriousness, urgency, and accuracy of the present requirements of discipline is very high.

The requirements of discipline in the management of weapons and equipment of a modernly equipped Army are not as simple as those of the former Army in which a soldier only had a rifle and a bag of rice, with bare head and feet. Moreover, following the guideline of building an Army of better quality than quantity, the requirements of discipline become ever higher to create quality in compensation for the number.

Moreover, the requirements of discipline must always be linked closely to the social environment. If we separate society from Army discipline, we will have no basis for talking about effort to overcome difficulties and consolidate and firmly maintain Army discipline.

Our entire Army comes from the people and is a part of society. Each soldier is a citizen. The Army rear is always connected with all social relations. Therefore, society—either a healthy and good one with constantly loyal and faithful members who observe good ethical relations or a degenerate one—always has a direct effect on the life and discipline of troops just as weather affects mercury in a thermometer. This is a cause of anxiety for those who are constantly concerned with troop education to forge their discipline in order to seek ways of overcoming, opposing, and intercepting bad social influences.

However, some people say that society is merely an objective factor and cannot be a decisive one and only the subjective one—that is, the role of cadres of all ranks in leadership, command, education, and management together with self-awareness of each soldier—can exert a decisive influence on the discipline in their units. This is

also a correct view that should be taken into consideration to bring into play the positiveness of the subjective factor in order to maintain disciplinary management and minimize the abnormal influences of society on the Army life. Nevertheless, this still remains a controversial matter.

We think that the above mentioned differing views should attract the attentive interest of leading functional agencies in seeking to understand troop education and management, and disciplinary enforcement in a broad, clear-sighted and alert manner so as to clarify and arrive at accurate conclusions in line with realities which will serve as a basis for the formulation of policies and measures relevant to the current real situation and long-range development. We think that no matter what we discuss, we still have to consider persevering persuasive education to enhance the sense of discipline and organization for troops as the main task. We must turn the sense of discipline into disciplined, voluntary, and scrupulous action. At the same time, we must pay most attention to organizational measures to maintain and consolidate discipline, because, at present, the weakest aspect of disciplinary management is organization and implementation, especially in primary units.

Let us concentrate our investment ability on truly helping primary unit cadres correctly perform their educational and managerial functions to maintain Army discipline. First of all, we must concentrate on securing enough food and clothing equipment for troops so that they can have clothes to keep warm, sufficient footwear, headgear, beds and blankets to sleep, oil and lubricant for cleaning weapons and lighting, radio sets to hear news, and newspapers to read. What is not realistically necessary to troops' livelihood, and what is formalistic and showy, should be reduced.

No matter how society will really develop and how difficult life will be later on, we still think that our troops must always keep themselves from being identified or associated with negative evils in society. The more bad influences society exerts, the higher the requirements for disciplinary management will be, just as we must keep ourselves healthy to prevent diseases from attacking our bodies.

Australia

Politicians Leave for Libyan 'Chemicals Plant'
*BK1301103489 Hong Kong AFP in English 1005 GMT
13 Jan 89*

[Excerpts] Melbourne, Australia, Jan 13 (AFP)—Five Australian state politicians have left for Libya to inspect a controversial chemicals plant and try to meet Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

One of the group, independent New South Wales Senator Irina Dunn, said she also planned to take photographs at the Al-Rabitah factory, which Washington claims could produce chemical weapons and Tripoli says is a pharmaceuticals plant.

"If the Libyan Government is correct in its denials that this factory is not a chemical weapons factory, then I see absolutely no reason for it to prevent me from taking photographs of record," she said.

The group, which includes three members of the ruling Labor state government in Victoria, has been criticised for accepting the trip at Tripoli's invitation. They left Melbourne on Wednesday [11 January]. [passage omitted]

A spokesman for Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Kim Beazley said the group had not sought advice from the Australian Government about the trip.

Firm Wins Communication Contract With SRV
*BK1101084489 Hong Kong AFP in English 0833 GMT
11 Jan 89*

[Text] Sydney, Jan 11 (AFP)—Australian telecommunications Firm AWA Ltd. said Wednesday it had won a 20 million Australian dollar (17 million U.S.) contract to supply Vietnam with digital microwave and associated equipment.

AWA General Manager Jeff Wake said that the five-year contract with the Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications of Vietnam was the largest garnered by AWA since it began targeting Pacific markets 18 months ago.

The initial contract provides for the linking of Ho Chi Minh City with other cities in the southern region and Danang.

Vietnam recently signed a contract with Australia's Overseas Telecommunications Commission (OTC) for the installation of satellite earth stations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

"The new systems will allow more extensive use of international call facilities to Vietnam through the OTC-supplied earth stations and at the same time boost the domestic network capability," Mr. Wake said.

Vanuatu

Imprisoned Former President Removed From Office
*BK1201092889 Hong Kong AFP in English 0919 GMT
12 Jan 89*

[Text] Port Vila, Jan 12 (AFP)—Vanuatu's imprisoned President George Sokomanu was sacked Thursday by the country's electoral college, state-controlled Radio Vanuatu said here.

Radio Vanuatu reported that the electoral college had voted to remove the 56-year-old Mr Sokomanu as head of state for gross misconduct.

"Accordingly, he is no longer president of the republic," Radio Vanuatu said.

The college, comprising members of parliament and 11 provincial government presidents, said it would release a statement detailing its decision Friday.

Faces Mutiny Charge
*BK1301062589 Hong Kong AFP in English 0603 GMT
13 Jan 89*

[Text] Suva, Jan 13 (AFP)—Vanuatu's sacked President George Sokomanu and six other people were committed for trial Friday on charges relating to an attempt to oust the government of Walter Lini last month, according to Pacific radio reports monitored here.

The reports said that Senior Magistrate Dawn Barcinski found that the seven accused had a case to answer and ordered them to stand trial before the Supreme Court on February 20.

Mr. Sokomanu is facing a charge of incitement to mutiny, which carries a maximum life sentence, while the others face charges of taking unlawful oaths and making seditious statements, which carry maximum penalties of two and three years respectively.

Miss Barcinski said that the gravity of the charges warranted that they be heard by the Supreme Court, the reports said.

Mr. Sokomanu had sought the support of Vanuatu's 550 police and paramilitary after attempting to oust Prime Minister Walter Lini's government by dissolving Parliament on December 16.

Two days later Mr. Sokomanu swore in a five-man rival government to prepare for general elections which he said were the only means of restoring political stability.

Appearing in court with Mr. Sokomanu were his nephew and former Government Minister Barak Sope, former independent parliamentarians Frank Spooner and John Naupa, opposition Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) leader Maxime Carlot and his deputy Willy Jimmy.

They have all been in jail since their arrest in late December.

Also in court was Mr. Sokomanu's private secretary, John Kalotiti, who was rearrested three days ago.

Miss Barcinski handed over all papers relating to the charges to the office of the chief justice, Frederick Cooke.

The chief justice has refused bail because of the nature of the charges and for public security.

Some 100 supporters of the accused were at the court Friday morning.

On Thursday Vanuatu's electoral college dismissed Mr. Sokomanu as president, a position he had held since the former Anglo-French colony gained its independence in 1980.

Speaker of the Parliament Onneyn Tahi was named acting president until the electoral college meets in three weeks to elect a new head of state.

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17 Jan 1989

